APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Levester Taylor, was convicted by a Davidson County jury for multiple counts of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child.  The trial court imposed a sentence of 10 years at 100% for each aggravated sexual battery and 20 years at 100% for each rape of a child, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of 200 years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred imposing an effective sentence of 200 years.  Upon review, the Defendant’s judgments of conviction are affirmed, the sentences imposed by the trial court are vacated, and the case is remanded for a resentencing hearing, following the Defendant’s election to proceed under the pre-2005 sentencing act or the amended sentencing act accompanied by the Defendant’s written waiver of his ex post facto protections. 
 

The Defendant, Aivar Lang, pled guilty to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and agreed to allow the trial court to determine his sentence.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that no error exists in the sentence imposed by the trial court, but a corrected judgment form is required.  Therefore, the sentence is affirmed, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error in the judgment.
 

The defendant, Thomas Bolton, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of vandalism, theft of property, and violations of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of certain jury instructions. We affirm the convictions and sentences but remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Daniel Lee Draper, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him to life with the possibility of parole, that the habeas court erred in summarily dismissing his petition without a hearing, and that the habeas court erred in failing to treat his habeas petition as a post-conviction petition. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Jeffrey Walton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of vandalism over $10,000, a Class C felony, and burglary of a building, a Class D felony, for which he received sentences of fifteen years as a persistent offender and twelve years as a career offender, to be served consecutively, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Anthony Clinton, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. Appealing from the post-conviction court’s order, petitioner pursues the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (a) failure to file a motion to suppress his identification; (b) failure to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his person; and (c) failure to obtain copies of the store surveillance tapes and the 9-1-1 recordings. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Wesley M. Gifford, Jr., was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated burglary, telephone harassment, and indecent exposure.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of three years and six months for the attempted aggravated burglary conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the telephone harassment conviction.  This effective sentence was also to run consecutively to his prior sentences.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that the Defendant previously had been in jail; (2) the trial court erred in allowing admission of evidence of the Defendant’s prior bad act; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the issue of alibi; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (5) cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion.  Indeed, I join in the majority opinion on all but one issue.  I write separately to address the issue of the trial court’s admission of the prior bad act of the Defendant’s exposing himself to Pamela through the back window of a truck “a few days earlier.”  The majority holds that it was error, albeit harmless, for the trial court to admit this evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence.  The majority concludes that this evidence was only marginally relevant, and, therefore, the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant outweighed the relevance of the evidence.  The majority emphasizes that the Defendant also was on trial for indecent exposure.

The pro se petitioner, Terry V. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his 2005 conviction for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine is void because the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teresa Turner, pled guilty to reckless homicide, a Class D felony.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to three years with six months of the sentence to be served in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on supervised probation.  The Defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) denied judicial diversion; (2) misapplied enhancement factors; and (3) ordered a sentence involving split confinement.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Brian Marshall Keys, of one count of selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and two counts of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fifteen years.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his constitutional challenge to the Drug-Free School Zone Act and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Tawana Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of rape and abuse of an adult. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-502(a)(3), 71-6-117. The trial court sentenced appellant to twelve years and two years, respectively, to be served consecutively. On appeal, appellant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her rape conviction regarding whether the victim was mentally defective and, if so, whether appellant knew the victim was mentally defective; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting appellant’s abuse of an adult conviction; (3) the trial court’s use of specific enhancement factors during sentencing; and (4) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm appellant’s rape conviction and, as the State concedes must be done, reverse and remand appellant’s abuse of an adult conviction for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mateem Hudson, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence about his other bad acts and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Ashley Aaron Selke, pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary and received a two-year sentence for each count, to be served concurrently.  The record reflects that appellant received pretrial jail credit for time served in confinement, and the remainder of his sentence was suspended to probation.  A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that appellant had committed new offenses while on probation.  The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows.  Appellant now alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement rather than extending appellant’s probation or placing appellant in the community corrections program.  After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis Allen White, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to three counts of aggravated assault, one count of domestic assault, one count of misdemeanor vandalism, and one count of resisting arrest.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective five-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Edward Fayte Webster, IV, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to nine counts of burglary, seven counts of felony vandalism, ten counts of misdemeanor vandalism, and eight counts of misdemeanor theft.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Billy Coffelt, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated assault, three counts of misdemeanor theft, four counts of false imprisonment, and felony escape. In his appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon allegations that Counsel failed to move for an election of offenses; failed to pursue a claim based on the dismissal of one of the Petitioner’s co-defendant’s charges on appeal; and failed to request a jury instruction on the “natural and probable consequences” rule for criminal responsibility or raise it as a ground for relief on direct appeal.   Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Phillip Matthew Burgess, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault, raising a variety of issues for review, each of which is addressed to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motions to compel and his motion for new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2011, the defendant, a priest, was found guilty after a trial by jury of one count of first degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of aggravated rape. The charges stemmed from conduct that occurred in 1979 and 1980, while the victim attended a school associated with the church. The defendant was sentenced to an overall effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss his indictment because forcing him to stand trial more than thirty years after the crimes were committed violated his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions. However, reviewing these facts in light of the relevant test governing unconstitutional “preaccusatorial” delay set forth in State v. Gray, 917 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. 1996), we hold that the thirty-two year delay in the defendant’s prosecution did not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. The defendant also claims that the trial court committed errors with respect to myriad evidentiary and procedural matters relating to his motion to dismiss. Upon review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish entitlement to relief on any of these claims. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to give special jury instructions concerning the need to corroborate the testimony of the victim of a sex crime, as if the victim were the defendant’s criminal accomplice. However, in State v. Collier, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 636 (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013), our supreme court recently overruled all of the cases on which the defendant relies, and no ex post facto concerns prohibit this court from relying on Collier to deny the defendant’s claim. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Jerry Crawford, Jr., appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence. In addition, the defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defense during closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the conviction. Because the trial court improperly classified the defendant as a career offender, the sentence imposed is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing.

Petitioner pleaded guilty to manufacturing less than .5 grams of a controlled substance and received a sentence of seven years. Petitioner filed an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea hearing and that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Michael Lynn Poston, appeals his White County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery claiming that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for recusal; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for change of venue; (3) the trial court erred by failing to swear the victim prior to her testimony; (4) the trial court erred by admitting certain hearsay testimony; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (6) the sentence was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, George P. Fusco, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and received a five-year sentence for each count, to be served concurrently.  He served six months in confinement, and the remainder of his sentence was suspended to probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that appellant drove an unregistered vehicle, owed $420 in “GPS fees,” used or possessed an alcoholic beverage, and violated regulations regarding Halloween trick-or-treaters.  The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows.  Appellant now alleges that the trial court denied him procedural due process by failing to make adequate factual findings regarding the evidence supporting his probation revocation, that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, and that the relevant Halloween probation conditions are unduly restrictive. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I write separately to express my opinion that the result of this case is mandated by the following language in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 55 (Tenn. 2011):

Petitioner, Willie Lewis Tolbert, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery, one count of carjacking, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. Pursuant to petitioner’s plea agreement, the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years. Petitioner applied for probation, which the trial court denied, and the trial court ordered petitioner to serve his sentence in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to properly communicate with petitioner prior to his guilty plea submission hearing; (2) failed to adequately advise petitioner regarding whether he would receive probation; and (3) made an incorrect prediction that petitioner’s case would be dismissed in general sessions court. He further argues that these errors rendered his guilty plea involuntary. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.