APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jeremiah R. Key, sought post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated robbery, second degree murder, and coercion of a witness. The post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adequately communicate with petitioner; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to ensure that his guilty pleas were voluntarily entered; and (3) involuntariness of his guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Stewart County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey M. Forguson, of sale of a schedule IV drug (Alprazolam) and sale of a Schedule III drug (Dihydrocodeinone). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve consecutive six-year sentences for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) consecutive sentencing was improper in his case; and (3) the trial court could not properly fulfill its role as thirteenth juror. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

I concur in the majority opinion in this case and only write separately to respectfully comment about the issue of the trial judge’s Facebook “friendship” with the confidential informant in this case.
 

The Defendant, Travis Andrew Harris, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-12-101, 39-13-403, 39-16-603 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of eleven years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and (2) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony as substantive evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Arthur Shelton, appeals the Morgan County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2004 convictions for first degree murder, three counts of false imprisonment, and two counts of vandalism and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Thompson, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of twenty-five years for second degree murder and eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred during sentencing. We conclude that the lengths of the sentences are proper but that the trial court erred by failing to state on the record the facts and conclusions which support consecutive sentences pursuant to State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). We remand the case in order of the court to make its findings and conclusions on the record.

The Petitioner, Tina G. Strickland, appeals the Carter County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2010 conviction upon a guilty plea for vehicular homicide and her twelve-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that her guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this State appeal, the State challenged the Knox County Criminal Court’s setting aside the jury verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and ordering dismissal of the charges. This court reversed the judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdicts and dismissing the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, reinstated the verdicts, and remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing. We also determined that although the trial court erred by dismissing the firearms charge on the grounds named in its order, error in the indictment for that offense nevertheless required a dismissal of those charges. Finally, we affirmed the defendants’ convictions of aggravated robbery. Upon the defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this court for consideration in light of State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). Having reconsidered the case in light of the ruling in Cecil, we confirm our earlier holdings. The jury verdicts of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary are reinstated, and those convictions are remanded to
the trial court for sentencing. The trial court’s dismissal of the firearms charge is affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court, and the convictions of aggravated robbery are affirmed.

Appellant, the State of Tennessee, appeals after the Hardeman County Circuit Court granted a motion to dismiss the indictments against Appellee, Virgil Calvin Howell. Appellee was indicted by the Hardeman County Grand Jury for three counts of contracting without a license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 62-6-103 and 62-6-120. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictments. On appeal, the State insists that the trial court improperly determined that Appellee was not a contractor because Appellee was supervising more than $25,000 of improvements to buildings that he owns and are intended for public use. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictments where the plain language of the statute indicates that the actions performed by Appellee amounted to contracting as defined by the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Luis Rodriguez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding his 2008 conviction for especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition when his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, David Earl Freeman, pled guilty to three counts of theft of property and three counts of misapplication of funds in Hamilton County. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of sixteen years and placed on probation. He was also ordered to pay restitution to the victims. Subsequently, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft of property and one count of passing a worthless check. A four-year sentence was imposed and ordered to run consecutively to the sixteen-year sentence. The new sentence was to be served on probation, and Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to the victims. A probation violation warrant was filed based in part on Appellant’s failure to pay restitution payments and the fact that he was convicted of several new charges in North Carolina. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remaining fourteen years of his sentence in incarceration. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Roger Joseph (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting, among other claims, that, due to mental illness, he could not have formed the requisite intent for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment dismissing the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.

The defendant, Damien O. Armstrong, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years, with one year of confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his home because the search warrant was defective. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In September of 2006 in exchange for an eight-year sentence, Appellant, Jeremy Bo Eaker, pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Appellant was released to probation with credit for time served. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine and hallucinogenic mushrooms. A violation of probation warrant was filed. Appellant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine and received a sentence of nine years, to be served concurrently to the eight-year sentence for which he was already on probation. Appellant’s probation was revoked, and Appellant was ordered to serve twelve months in incarceration with the trial court reserving the right to suspend the balance of the sentence upon Appellant’s entry into a drug treatment program. Following Appellant’s release from incarceration and reinstatement to probation, numerous probation violation warrants were filed against Appellant on the basis of among other things new criminal charges and positive drug screens. As a result of these various probation violations, Appellant’s probation was partially revoked, he was ordered to enter into and complete a drug treatment program, and he was ordered to community corrections. This appeal arises following a violation of probation warrant filed in response to Appellant’s January 17, 2013 arrest for possession of methamphetamine and failure to report the arrest to his probation officer. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, George Anthony Braddock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was in error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to investigate the petitioner’s psychological, mental, and physical health history and to present proof of such at trial in an attempt to negate the petitioner’s culpable mental state; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to law enforcement; and (3) failing to fulfill his duty of loyalty and to zealously advocate on behalf of the petitioner because of a familial relationship with the district attorney general. Following review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Terrell B. Johnson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417, -432 (2010). The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years at 100% service. See id. § 39-17-432 (2010) (enhanced penalties for offenses committed in drug-free zones). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing evidence at the trial that was not included in the State’s discovery package and (2) by limiting his closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Christopher Pillow, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Edward Fritts, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce expert testimony regarding Fritts’s gang affiliation, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a retrial, the defendant, Elgie Sykes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jamaal L. Byrd, appeals from his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court and in the trial court’s failure to admit certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, Johnny L. McGowen, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion to reduce his sentence to probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Perley Winkler, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Monroe County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of attempted aggravated arson, claiming that the State withheld material evidence at trial, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and that the post-conviction court erred by refusing to allow the petitioner to treat his trial counsel as an adverse party. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Charged by the Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury with aggravated robbery, the defendant, Tavaruus Montrel Moss, pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery and agreed to a three-year sentence of split confinement consisting of 11 months and 29 days in jail with credit for time served and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The trial court entered the judgment on August 9, 2012, but on January 17, 2013, the State obtained a probation revocation warrant that alleged that the defendant had incurred new criminal charges, that he had failed to report his arrest to his probation officer, that he had failed to provide proof of lawful employment, that he had failed to report for probation, that his whereabouts were unknown, and that he had failed to pay his probation fees. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In his timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

Appellant, Teddy Russell Robbins, Jr., was indicted by the Scott County Grand Jury for domestic assault, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape based on acts committed against his wife. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all the offenses as charged in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and rape; and (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial. After our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial where the juror in question was dismissed from the jury pool and the trial court issued a curative instruction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellants, Grico Clark, Jordan Curry, and Deangelo White, were each indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of evading arrest. Deangelo White was also indicted for one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell and one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. After a jury trial, Clark, Curry, and White were found guilty of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. Clark and Curry were found guilty of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. White was found not guilty of the firearm charge and convicted of the lesser included offenses of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Clark and Curry each to effective sentences of forty-four years and White to an effective sentence of forty years. The trial court denied motions for new trial. In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to determine whether under the holding of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Additionally, we must determine whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court properly instructed the jury as mandated in White and that the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Further, we determine that the State was not required to elect offenses. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing White to an effective sentence of forty years and Clark and Curry each to an effective sentence of forty-four years. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.