APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his motion to re-open his original petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a murder he committed as a juvenile. On appeal, he claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the new precedent established in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which held that it violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole without individual consideration of mitigating circumstances. Following review of the applicable law and the record before us, we conclude that the motion was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Randall Turner, pleaded guilty to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated robbery, for which he received agreed-upon sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and thirty years. The pro se petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he requested DNA analysis of his “clothing, pants, shoes and socks” as well as a witness’s “pajamas.” The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal follows. On appeal, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court should have: (1) recused itself from considering his case; (2) appointed counsel to represent petitioner; and (3) granted his petition for DNA testing. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the scant record before this court, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, Jr., appeals as of right from the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis. The petitioner challenges his 1993 Rutherford County Criminal Court convictions of three counts of aggravated assault for which he received a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Justin Evan Davis, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of selling and delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, in case number 12CR157 and in case number 12CR158. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the respective convictions in each indictment and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years’ confinement. The Defendant’s twelve-year sentence in 12CR157 was ordered to be served consecutively to convictions in two unrelated cases. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Nichols, pro se, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus regarding his 2005 convictions for nine counts of aggravated sexual battery and five counts of rape of a child for which he received an effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief because (1) the judgments in case numbers 02-530 through 02-538 for his aggravated sexual battery convictions do not contain the required community supervision for life provision and (2) the rape of a child convictions in case number 02-706, which required the victim to be under age thirteen, concerned a thirteen-year-old victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Myron Jay Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following his convictions of promoting prostitution and money laundering, the petitioner, Joseph Chi-Choi Wong, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal of his petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dale Samuel Waggoner, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of eighteen years, to be served at eighty-five percent, for the aggravated robbery conviction and three years, to be served at thirty-five percent, for the felon in possession of a handgun conviction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Edward Shannon Polen (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of theft over $60,000 and two counts of securities fraud. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years in prison. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the length and manner of service of his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Vernica Shabree Calloway, was convicted of aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the assault conviction with the neglect conviction and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses; (3) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that it could convict her of either Count 1 or Count 2 of the indictment, but not both; (4) her convictions violate double jeopardy; (5) the trial court erred in admitting expert opinion testimony after the State violated the trial court’s order with respect to the information that could be provided to the expert; (6) the trial court erred in admitting as an exhibit a “learned treatise”; (7) the trial court erred in admitting unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence; (8) the trial court erred by denying her motion to redact portions of her interviews with the police and the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”); (9) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the victim’s foster mother; and (10) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we remand for entry of a single judgment setting the defendant’s release eligibility at 30%. We conclude that all of the defendant’s other issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rodney Evans ("the Defendant") was convicted by ajury of driving under the influence. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days' probation after service of the forty-eight (48) hour minimum in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Gerald Anthony Humphrey, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to DUI, first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, with seven days to serve prior to release on supervised probation. As a condition of his guilty plea, he attempted to reserve certified questions of law regarding the constitutionality of the “loud muffler” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-202, under which the arresting officer initiated the traffic stop of his vehicle. Based on our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to meet his burden to properly certify his questions of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, James Buck, pled guilty to failure to appear, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Career Offender to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that he is entitled to relief based upon his attorney’s deficient representation. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Melvin Powell, was found guilty of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010) (amended 2011). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of the offense, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting paternity testing results based on the laboratory’s accreditation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marquis Dashawn Hendricks, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine while employing a deadly weapon, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of more than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and simple possession of marijuana. Appellant received an effective sentence of life in prison for the convictions. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, expert testimony about the trajectory of the bullet that was fired into the victim’s vehicle, and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis of a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the challenge to the testimony was related to the credibility of the expert’s opinion; and the State did not commit a Brady violation so the trial court properly denied a mistrial. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Marquis Dashawn Hendricks, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine while employing a deadly weapon, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of more than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and simple possession of marijuana. Appellant received an effective sentence of life in prison for the convictions. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, expert testimony  about the trajectory of the bullet that was fired into the victim’s vehicle, and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis of a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the challenge to the testimony was related to the credibility of the expert’s opinion; and the State did not commit a Brady violation so the trial court properly denied a mistrial. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Respectfully, the facts of this case in the light most favorable to the State do not establish the first degree murder element of premeditation. The evidence does establish a knowing killing, and so I would impose a conviction of second degree murder and would remand for sentencing.

Petitioner, Robert D. Mendenhall, was indicted in case number 2006-A-231 for two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder and in case number 2006-C-2134 for two counts of theft of property valued at over $60,000, and four counts of violations of the Tennessee Securities Laws. Subsequently, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder in case number 2006-A-231. He also pled guilty to two counts of theft of property over $60,000, one count of securities fraud by a device, scheme, or artifice, and securities fraud by sale of an unregistered security in case number 2006-C-2134. As a result of the guilty pleas, Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty years. He was represented by separate counsel in each case. Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief. Upon review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Michael Morris, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in July of 2004 for possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Petitioner pled guilty to the charge in September of 2004 in exchange for a suspended four-year sentence and drug treatment. In September of 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Daniel A. Rogers (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence, simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, and driving on a suspended driver’s license. The Defendant also was convicted by the trial court of violating the implied consent law, resulting in the suspension of his driver’s license for one year. Following a sentencing hearing on his remaining convictions, the Defendant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation after the service of sixty days. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court declined to provide a jury instruction regarding the State’s duty to preserve evidence, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Petitioner, Erik E. Guerrero, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the judgments and sentence on appeal. State v. Erik E. Guerrero, No. M2010-00851-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3107722, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial counsel failed to: (1) request a jury instruction on the natural and probable consequences rule; (2) adequately advise him of all of the considerations of not testifying in his own defense; and (3) to challenge the admissibility of his statements. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Anthony Foster, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of reckless endangerment and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment conviction with the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced Foster to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Foster argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment showing that Foster was charged with and convicted of aggravated assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), which is a Class C felony.

Jimmie R. Robinson, Sr., (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to second degree murder after he shot and killed his son-in-law. The plea agreement provided for a sentence of seventeen years and six months in prison. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Terry Johnson, of one count of second degree murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, and one count of possession of a firearm during a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and the trial court’s refusal to allow the appellant to introduce evidence of the deceased victim’s involvement in an unrelated murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jimmy Wayne Wilson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury in 1985 of committing a rape in 1984. The jury also determined the Defendant to be an habitual criminal, and the Defendant, accordingly, was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this proceeding, the Defendant is attacking his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.