APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Taylor Brent Farley, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted delivery of fentanyl, a Class C felony. Defendant sought judicial diversion, but the trial court denied diversion and imposed a six-year sentence on Community Corrections. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Edward Dean, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

This is a State appeal, filed by the State Attorney General and Reporter, from the entry of
an order granting the petitioner’s, Courtney Anderson’s, motion to reopen his postconviction
and amending/reducing his original sentence of 162 years, 11 months, and 29
days to a time served sentence of 25 years. The State appealed, arguing the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion as it was barred by the one-year statute
of limitations and the petitioner failed to prove the statute should be tolled. Additionally,
the State submits that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the petitioner’s sentence
under the post-conviction statute and that the trial court’s actions amount to an improper
commutation of the petitioner’s sentence. The petitioner contends that the State waived
any challenge to the statute of limitations by failing to raise the issue below and that his
claim meets the requirements of the statute and allows for the tolling of the statute, and
therefore, the trial court properly granted the relief requested. Upon our thorough review
of the applicable law and the briefs and arguments of both parties, we conclude that the
instant petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that the petitioner failed
to establish and the trial court failed to find a proper basis for tolling the statute.
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion and amend
the petitioner’s sentence. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the
petitioner’s original sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

The defendant, Cedric D. Marshall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to an effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration for his guilty-pleaded convictions of evading arrest, burglary, and theft of property. Because the defendant’s notice of appeal is untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

Michael Notaro, Defendant, pled guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor
with an agreed-upon sentence of 10 years for each conviction, to be served consecutively
for a total effective sentence of 30 years at 100% in exchange for the State agreeing not to
seek further prosecution for any other offenses under investigation. Defendant did not seek
a direct appeal of his sentence. Instead, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of
the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in which he argued that his sentence was
illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim.
Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lorie Ann Gerbis, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish her identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Kirk Stack, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the six-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction
for attempted aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Pettioner, Victercika Gilchrease, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of
her petition for post-conviction relief from her guilty plea convictions for second degree
murder and two counts of aggravated assault, for which she is serving an agreed, effective
twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the post-conviction court erred in
denying relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Mark L. Ward, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated
kidnapping, attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated rape, for which
he received an effective sentence of sixty-eight years in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s
convictions. Upon our review, we affirm.

The defendant, Will Vaughn, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of
first-degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no
error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Micah Joshua Ford, alias Joseph Tolbert, III, appeals the denial of his postconviction
petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received
the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. He also argues that he is
entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

The Defendant, Gregory L. Nelson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his eight-year sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bradley Dwight Bowen, appeals from his jury convictions for possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; simple possession of cocaine; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; for which he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of (1) his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his detention and (2) his motion to continue requesting additional time to prepare his pro se defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alain Benitez, appeals the Smith County Criminal Court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing for his two convictions of first degree felony murder. Upon review, we conclude that we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In 2019, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Victor Wise, of two counts of
aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to forty-four years of incarceration. The
Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and we affirmed the convictions but
concluded that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. This court modified
the Petitioner’s total effective sentence to twelve years. State v. Wise, No. W2018-01343-
CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4492910, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2019), no perm. app.
filed. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied
after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Kimberly Miller, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, for which she received a life sentence.  On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to permit Petitioner “to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision on whether to assert—or not assert—the statute of limitations for all lesser[-]included offenses of first degree murder and first degree felony murder” and counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss, “along with alternative requests for mandatory or permissive jury instructions, related to the violation of [Petitioner’s] Due Process rights under the federal and state constitutions” based upon a lengthy, pre-indictment delay.  Following a thorough review, we affirm. 

The defendant, James Tyler Fucci, appeals the denial of his request for judicial diversion of the six-year sentence imposed for his Montgomery County Criminal Court guiltypleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We remand for entry of a judgment on Count 2 reflecting that the charge was dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement.

Defendant, Christopher A. Williams, while on parole under a sentence from the Sullivan
County Criminal Court, was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base. The State filed a
detainer based on Defendant's violation of parole. Defendant filed a pro se "Motion to
Terminate Parole as Unsatisfactorily Completed/Alternatively Revoke Parole and Impose
Sentence in Absentia to Run Concurrent with Federal Supervise Release," which the trial
court denied, finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") "does not apply
to probation violations." Defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider, asserting that he
was denied a due process hearing on his parole revocation. The trial court denied the
motion, and Defendant appeals. We dismiss Defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Markettus L. Patrick, of aggravated
assault by strangulation or attempted strangulation, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv), for which he received a sentence of five years to be served on
supervised probation following service of 150 days in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant of aggravated assault for which she
received a four-year sentence to be served on supervised probation after service of eleven
months and twenty-nine days at 75% release eligibility. The sole issue presented for our
review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the serious bodily injury element of
aggravated assault and self-defense. Upon our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, William Heath, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated
robbery, aggravated assault,1 and reckless endangerment, for which he is serving an
effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred
in “failing to view the cumulative effect of [his] claims as a constructive denial of the right
to counsel.” We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Paul Jerome Johnson, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his claim of alleged bias by the
trial court and in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Decatur County Jury found Dustin Len Lovelace, Defendant, guilty of facilitation of
aggravated robbery. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the
judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Nicolas Wayna Johnson, of possession
of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver (counts one and two), possession of a firearm
with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (counts three and
four), theft of property up to $1,000 (count five), and possession of unlawful drug
paraphernalia (count six). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged counts
one and two and imposed a concurrent sentence of two years. The trial court also merged
counts three and four and imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered the concurrent two year
term for counts one and two to be served consecutively to the three-year term in counts
three and four. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(a), (e)(1), (g)(1). For counts five and
six, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be
served concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of five years in
confinement. The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying alternative sentencing. Because the Appellant was eligible for probation on the
theft and drug-related offenses, we remand for resentencing.

The Appellant, Taylor Jenkins Littrell, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence
in confinement. The Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1)
admitting a blood alcohol report in violation of his confrontation rights; and (2) ordering
him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.