APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellants Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett stand convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen years as a violent offender and sentenced Appellant Collett to serve seventeen years as a violent offender. On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the victim’s coaching of an essential witness should have resulted in a mistrial; and (3) the prosecutor violated the appellants’ right to remain silent during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Reuben Hickok Fairfield, pled guilty to second degree murder and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years, at 100 percent, for the second degree murder conviction and to six years, at 30 percent, for the tampering with evidence conviction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

After the appellant, Danny Wayne Carpenter, pled guilty in the Hamblen County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and theft of property worth more than $10,000, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered the appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $15,250. On appeal, the appellant challenges the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2000, the Petitioner, Frederick Parks, pled guilty to one count of escape. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence as well as any other prior sentences. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Frederick Parks, No. W1999-01357-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1672341, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 27, 2000), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Frederick Parks v. Cherry Lindamood, No. W2013-00361-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 6529307, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 10, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that his guilty plea to the escape charge had been illegally induced by the prosecutor. After a hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

The petitioner, David Allen Brimmer, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the validity of his 1999 aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting sentence of 60 years as a violent offender. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Rodney Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to “solicit” the testimony of Albert Sweat; (2) trial counsel failed to depose the State’s witnesses prior to trial; and (3) trial counsel failed to obtain video surveillance footage from the cameras at the “Mix Factory in Jackson, Tennessee showing that he had been approached by a young black man, who drove him to the purported crime scene.” After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial in 2008, Petitioner, Kenneth Allen, was ultimately convicted of two Class B felony cocaine offenses and two Class C felony cocaine offenses. He was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of thirty years as a career offender. The trial court ordered the effective thirty-year sentence to be served consecutively to an unrelated sentence of ten years for additional drug convictions for which his probation had been revoked. See State v. Kenneth Gregory Allen, No. M2009-00070-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2010). Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition attacking his 2008 convictions. After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Lorenzo Spencer, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 34-14-403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The Petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. However, this court is without jurisdiction in this case because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Henry Wayne Russell, charging him in Counts One, Three, and Five with rape; and in Counts Two, Four, and Six with statutory rape by an authority figure. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged in the indictment. The trial court merged the convictions in Count Two with Count One; Count Four with Count Three; and Count Six with Count Five. The trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years for each count of rape as a Range II offender for a total effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for statutory rape by an authority figure; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion under Tenn. Rule Evid. 412 to allow evidence of C.L.’s sexual behavior; (3) the trial court erred by advising Defendant that the State would be permitted to cross-examine him concerning his prior felony drug convictions; (4) the trial court erred by allowing a forensic social worker to testify concerning the victim’s medical history; (5) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and (6) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeffery Newton, was convicted by a Marion County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years and nine months with thirty days to serve in confinement and the remainder to serve on probation. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, (3) the trial court erred during jury instructions, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Walter Ware, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide, first degree (felony) murder and two counts of facilitation of attempted first degree murder. These convictions all sprang from an incident in which shots were fired at three men in a car during an attempted robbery. To establish the defendant’s identity as the murderer the State introduced evidence at trial of a separate carjacking and shooting committed by the defendant and an accomplice several hours prior to the homicide. The defendant, who had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder of the carjacking victim prior to trial on the instant charges, asserts on appeal that the two incidents were subject to mandatory joinder and that he could not be tried for the charges in the present indictment after he had pled guilty to the attempted first degree murder. He also appeals the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the carjacking, the trial court’s limits on cross-examination of a witnesses, the trial court’s evidentiary decisions regarding hearsay, and the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Junior P. Samuel, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for relief as time-barred. The petitioner is currently serving an effective thirty-two year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure in 2008. In April 2013, the petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition after concluding that it was filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the dismissal was improper because due process required tolling the statute of limitations. Specifically, he contends that he was mislead by appellate counsel into believing that appellate counsel was continuing the appellate process following the denial of the direct appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Mitchell Nathaniel Scott, entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse. Prior to a sentencing hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because he provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a “fair and just reason” that would justify the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Matthew Black, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of nineteen years’ confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his police statement, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the State to strike potential jurors on the basis of race, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to include aggravated assault in the jury instructions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Julie Fuller a.k.a. Julie Cole, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for correction of an illegal sentence and/or reduction of sentence. On August 9, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender to serve ten years at thirty percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence was illegal and that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to modify it. Following a review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion and remand to correct the judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted Petitioner, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent incarceration for the aggravated rape to be served consecutively to five years to be served at thirty percent incarceration for the aggravated burglary. State v. Newt Carter, No. W2009-00600-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2349207, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After holding evidentiary hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition and argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the post-conviction court correctly denied the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Ronald W. Damon, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2010) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-403 (aggravated burglary), 39-12-103 (2010) (criminal conspiracy). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-three years as a violent offender for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eleven years as a Range I, standard offender for aggravated robbery, nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for aggravated burglary, and seven years as a Range II, multiple offender for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the court erred in allowing an eight-day break in the trial between the proof and the closing arguments, (4) the court erred in excluding the testimony of a 9-1-1 operator regarding one of the victim’s statements, (5) the court erred in admitting testimony about a letter he wrote, (6) the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, (7) the court erred in allowing the State to play portions of a video recording of his pretrial statement, (8) the court erred in allowing a jail inmate to testify without being subject to cross-examination about the truthfulness or falsity of his prior testimony in another matter, (9) the court erred in admitting testimony about his financial problems despite the witness’s lack of personal knowledge, (10) the court erroneously admitted evidence in his first trial that resulted in a hung jury but would have resulted in an acquittal if the evidence had not been admitted, and (11) the court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Crystle D. Rutherford, appeals the summary dismissal of her pro se petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In June 2010, she pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. She is currently serving a total effective sentence of fifty years in the Department of Correction. In March 2013, the petitioner filed a pro se petition alleging multiple grounds for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner addresses only her asserted grounds for relief, and she fails to address the finding of untimeliness. Following our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Presson, of ten counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and eleven counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years of confinement. On direct appeal from his convictions, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to admit into evidence the medical record for one of the victims; (3) the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 by allowing the State’s designated witness to be present during the victims’ testimony, without requiring the designated witness to testify first; (4) the State improperly used an exhibit and commented on a jury questionnaire during closing arguments, violating the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the mens rea elements of the crimes; (6) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; and (7) the trial court erred when it placed the victim’s medical records under seal and denied the Defendant the opportunity to review the records. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Danny R. Mays, of felony evading arrest, reckless driving, driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, leaving the scene of an accident, violation of the registration law, criminal trespass, vandalism, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest, reckless driving, driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, and possession of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Justin Shelton, was indicted by the Lincoln County Grand Jury on two counts of reckless endangerment and two counts of vandalism. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to two years on each count for a total effective sentence of eight years. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered Appellant to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed which alleged that Appellant had not reported to his probation officer; failed to pay fines; and failed to provide proof of employment. Petitioner also pled guilty to another offense. At a hearing, Petitioner pled guilty to the probation violation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tim Smith, challenges his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he did not understand the ramifications of his plea, noting that trial counsel erroneously advised him that he would be eligible for release after he had served eighty-five percent of his sentence. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to prove that his plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Travis Darnell Kendrick, was found to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation agreement and was sentenced to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the remainder of his sentence to be served in incarceration. After review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.