APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Brian G. Wallace, pled guilty to five counts of attempted especially aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted sexual battery. The plea was an open guilty plea, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eighteen years which included consecutive sentencing. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suspend the balance of a six-year sentence he was serving in the Rutherford County jail. He claims that the trial court erred; (1) in limiting Appellant’s opportunity to present proof at the motion hearing; (2) denying his motion to suspend sentence because of a waiver included in a probation violation agreement; (3) denying Appellant’s motion on an improper basis; and (4) that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at the motion hearing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Selwyn Forbes George, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. Petitioner entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he pled guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale in exchange for a twenty-year sentence to be served as a Range I, standard offender. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Christopher D. Seals, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and in determining the amount of restitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Alan F. Watson, was indicted by the Houston County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the evidence seized after execution of a search warrant at his home. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of the aggravated robbery of Crystal’s Check Cashing. As a result, he was sentenced to nine years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (2) that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court excluded evidence; and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the evidence, we determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause and did not contain false and misleading information. Additionally, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding irrelevant evidence and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, William Atrel Townsend aka Abdullah R.S. Ashanti, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his conviction for attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Lee Hutcherson, pled guilty to one count each of possession of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, - 17-433, -17-425. He received an effective sentence of three years on all counts. As a condition of his guilty plea, the Defendant sought to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to properly certify his question of law in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2).

The petitioner, Steven Malone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel pretrial and at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In two indictments, the Defendant, Steven Deshawn Crawley, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of forty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it misapplied enhancement factors, failed to apply applicable mitigating factors, and failed to follow the sentencing guidelines set forth in Tennessee Code annotated sections 40-35-102, -103, and -115. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Keith Whited (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, driving under the influence, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Keith A. Whited, No. M2010-00134-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4684468, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 25, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Petitioner, Leroy Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his conviction for being a habitual drug offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417(d). The trial court sentenced petitioner as a Range II offender to a forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective presentment. He also claims that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it erroneously classified him as a habitual drug offender and because it erroneously applied a sentencing enhancement. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Jonathon C. Hood, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief from the imposition of ongoing punishment in the form of fines. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Appellant, Ricky Neal Forster, II, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft and received an effective six-year sentence, suspended to probation. A probation violation warrant and an amendment thereto were issued, alleging violations of the terms and conditions of probation by: (1) testing positive for marijuana; (2) using controlled substances; (3) failing to complete a drug rehabilitation program as instructed; (4) failing to make payments toward court costs and restitution; and (5) garnering new criminal convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation, which appellant now claims was an abuse of discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lee C. Palmer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of felony reckless endangerment and one count of driving under the influence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court afforded her only three peremptory challenges instead of the statutorily required eight. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Harold Morris, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402, -13-502, -14-403. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Jonathan Ray Chapman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting his videotaped confession into evidence and (2) failing to admit a statement made by his girlfriend into evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Cedric Earl Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On October 11, 2010, judgments of conviction were entered against Petitioner pursuant to his negotiated guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On February 27, 2013, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition with prejudice because it was filed outside the one-year applicable statute of limitations. On April 11, 2013, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal. In its brief, the State moves this court to dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was filed almost two weeks late. See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) (a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from). We decline to dismiss the appeal and waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. However, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Defendant, Malcolm W. Bennett, was charged by indictment with Class C felony aggravated assault. In a negotiated plea agreement, he entered a “best interest” guilty plea to the amended charge of Class D felony reckless aggravated assault of the victim, a ten-year-old boy. The parties also agreed that Defendant would be sentenced as a Range II multiple offender, with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eight years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of the Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

The defendant, Courtney Knowles, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Shana Schafer, for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and DUI with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of greater than .08 percent. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test based upon a violation of State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State filed for an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted the State’s application, and, on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Ronnie Woodall, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial, that the State failed to disclose favorable evidence, and that the post-conviction court erred by failing to address each of the issues raised in the petition for post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jose Antonio Henriquez, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; solicitation of a minor, a Class C felony; and sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2010) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2010) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2006) (amended 2013) (solicitation of a minor), 39-13-529 (2006) (amended 2011, 2012, 2013) (sexual exploitation of a minor). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven years as a violent offender for each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions and five years as a Range I, standard offender for each of the attempted aggravated sexual battery, solicitation of a minor, and sexual exploitation of a minor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) a fatal variance exists between the solicitation of a minor charge and the trial proof. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Davis, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interview of the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gary Allen Jordan, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, felony evading arrest, and two counts of aggravated assault. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petitions.

Appellants Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett stand convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen years as a violent offender and sentenced Appellant Collett to serve seventeen years as a violent offender. On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the victim’s coaching of an essential witness should have resulted in a mistrial; and (3) the prosecutor violated the appellants’ right to remain silent during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.