APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mitchell S. Pozezinski, for one count of violating the terms of his community supervision for life, and the trial court sentenced him to ten days in jail plus six months of state probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly violated the terms of his community supervision for life. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

A Gibson County jury found the Defendant, Susan M. Barnett, guilty of one count of aggravated assault, two counts of assault, and one count of unauthorized use of an automobile. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction and concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the remaining convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for aggravated assault by seriously bodily injury because the victim did not suffer “seriously bodily injury.” After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark Anthony Anderson, of one count of arson. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements to police. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

An Obion County jury found the Defendant, Jerry Sherrill, II, guilty of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years as a Range II, persistent offender. The Defendant appeals, asserting that: (1) the trial court improperly ruled that his prior theft convictions could be used for impeachment purposes should he testify at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court improperly required the jury to continue deliberations; and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury concerning possession of recently stolen property. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Rickey Bradford, was convicted by a Lincoln County Circuit Court jury of two counts of making a false report, Class C felonies, and extortion, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-502, 39-14-112 (2010). The trial court merged the false report convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years for making a false report and five years for extortion. The court ordered that the effective eight-year sentence be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding Navigator Telecommunications records, (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lost or destroyed evidence, (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs taken from a lost or destroyed video recording, (4) the trial court erred by admitting bank records without requiring the State to comply with the Financial Records Privacy Act, (5) the trial court erred by permitting the State to impeach him with his previous conviction, and (6) that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors requires a new trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Kevin Holst, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the court erred by refusing to send the exhibits to the jury room during deliberations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Derron Guy, pled guilty to carjacking, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated robbery in case number 10-00740; carjacking and employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony in case number 09-06692; and criminal attempt of carjacking and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony in case number 10-00741. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. The dismissal of the petition was affirmed on appeal. See Derron S. Guy v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden, No. W2012-00759-CCA-R3-HC, 2012 WL 5943396, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 28, 2012). Petitioner sought leave in a different court to amend the first petition and raised additional grounds for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief as he has not proven on the face of the judgment or the record that the convicting court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence Petitioner or that Petitioner is still imprisoned despite the expiration of his sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron D. Ostine, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court then sentenced the Defendant to 00twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied a motion to suppress his statements to police; and (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

In this procedurally complex case, a Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Arthur Ray Turner, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated rape, and attempted aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of seventy years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based upon the State’s destruction of evidence; (3) the trial court erred when it ruled on the admissibility of DNA evidence; (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for two counts of aggravated rape because the State did not prove that he was armed with a weapon or anything the victim reasonably believed was a weapon; (5) the trial court erred when it allowed separate convictions for aggravated rape in Counts 3 and 4 and attempted aggravated rape in Count 5 because separate convictions violate his protections against double jeopardy; (6) the trial court erred when it ordered his sentences to run consecutively and when it ordered him to serve his sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping at 100 percent. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects save one. The trial court’s judgment in Count 1, especially aggravated kidnapping, should be modified to reflect a release eligibility date of 30 percent.
 

Appellant, David Michael Blevins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery as lesser-included offenses of the indicted charges, rape of a child. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed three consecutive sentences of ten years each. Appellant raises three issues in this appeal: (1) whether aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; (2) sufficiency of the convicting evidence; and (3) challenges to the length and alignment of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Randall Scott McCoy (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant, Terrence Justin Feaster, stands convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, for which he received consecutive sentences of twelve years as a career offender, fourteen years as a persistent offender, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant. Likewise, I agree with the conclusion that State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012), provides the current double jeopardy analysis and that the analysis announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), applies retroactively. I respectfully disagree, though, with the majority opinion’s conclusion that a separate due process analysis is unnecessary in the present case, and I believe the separate convictions should be merged.

The petitioner, Rodricko O. Thomas, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a basis on which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal, contending that the habeas corpus court should have appointed counsel and held a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Michael Wilder, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors and erroneously classifying him as a persistent offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Ronald Bernard Anderson, II, was found guilty as charged of four counts of the Class C felony offense of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of thee years for each conviction. A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing resulted in an effective sentence of six years. As to the manner of service of the sentences, the trial court ordered split confinement: three months incarceration and the balance of the six-year sentence suspended, with supervised probation for twelve years. In this appeal Defendant presents two issues for review. He claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend each of the four counts of the indictment over Defendant’s objection because the indictment was defective, and he asserts the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions. After review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Thomas Paul Gagne, Jr., appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1998 convictions for two counts of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sandra L. Perez, appeals a jury verdict of guilty of Tenn Care fraud, asserting insufficient evidence upon which to base a verdict of guilty. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Cordell Bufford, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce a plea agreement with the State, by denying his request for funds to hire an expert witness, by denying his motions to exclude certain evidence, by prohibiting cross-examination of the victim’s mother about the victim’s previous sexual abuse pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and by denying his request for a special jury instruction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Jimmy R. Griffin, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court. We affirm the denial of alternative sentencing but remand the case for a determination of the proper amount of restitution.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which sets aside the order of restitution and remands for another hearing. I disagree that this is an appropriate case to observe “plain error” and would accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Donquarius Person, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, challenging the admission of certain hearsay testimony that was admitted pursuant to the excited utterance exception and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Carter County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Leslie Dean Ritchie, Jr., of two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-529(a) (Supp. 2009). The trial court sentenced Ritchie as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years in confinement. Ritchie’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his two convictions. Upon review, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in count two to reflect that the jury convicted Ritchie of the offense of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor rather than that Ritchie entered a guilty plea to this offense and to reflect that the sentence in count two is concurrent with the sentence in count one. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Frederick Hegel, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for rape of a child and incest. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Linda Garvin, pleaded guilty to two counts of the sale of cocaine in the amount of .5 grams or less, Class C felonies. She received two four-year sentences to be served consecutively on probation for an effective sentence of eight years. She admitted to violating the terms of her probation. After a probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of her probation and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence in the penitentiary. The defendant now appeals, arguing that her right to due process was violated because the trial court revoked her probation without making a sufficient statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation and that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.