APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, George Wells, pleaded guilty to reckless homicide with an agreed-upon sentencing range of two to five years. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion or any other form of alternative sentencing and imposed a five-year incarcerative sentence. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, challenging the length, manner of service, and denial of judicial diversion. After review, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider and weigh all of the relevant judicial diversion factors and by utilizing an improper factor. Based upon our de novo review of the judicial diversion factors, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion is granted. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of a term and the conditions of judicial diversion.

The defendant, David Elias Hernandez Sanchez, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his bid for judicial diversion of the four-year sentence imposed for his guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, Dominique Michael Byrd, guilty of theft of property and vandalism, and the trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant argues only that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he is the person who committed the crimes. On our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Webster Malone, of two counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court denied his request for community corrections and sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Duane R. Doxtater, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective tenyear
probationary sentence for multiple convictions stemming from two separate global
guilty plea agreements. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.
Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Guy, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective sixyear
probationary sentence for his convictions for two counts of misdemeanor domestic
assault and one count of felony vandalism. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation because he had completed his probationary
period by the time the revocation warrant was filed and (2) the revocation warrant should
have been dismissed due to law enforcement’s failure to preserve evidence. The Defendant
also contends that he should have been granted an appellate bond during the pendency of
the appeal. The State responds that we should affirm the trial court’s revocation order and
that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on his appellate bond issue. Following our
review, we determine that the Defendant had completed the probationary periods on his
misdemeanor domestic assault convictions before the issuance of the revocation warrant
but that the revocation warrant was timely as to the probation for his felony vandalism
conviction. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for entry of an amended
probation revocation order and a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s felony vandalism
conviction in accordance with this opinion.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s judicial diversion probation and imposing a three-year sentence. I part ways with my fellow panel members in my reasoning for this conclusion.

Defendant, David Lyndel Cochran, stands convicted of one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in allowing a sexual assault nurse examiner to offer expert testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the Defendant, Kim Owen Alley,1 by
presentment with one count of theft of $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, one count
of transacting business as an unregistered broker-dealer, and one count of fraudulent acts
or devices. A few months later, another presentment was issued charging the Defendant
with two additional charges: one count of money laundering and one count of theft of
$2,500 or more but less than $10,000.2 Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for
the theft count in the second presentment. Then, following the State’s proof at trial, the
trial court dismissed all three charges from the first presentment because the evidence
presented did not correspond to the dates alleged in the presentment. At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the remaining money laundering count, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to ten years’
incarceration with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues:
(1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his money laundering conviction; (2) the trial
court erred in providing a jury instruction for theft of property as a part of the jury
instruction for money laundering after all the theft charges had been dismissed; and (3) his
ten-year sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted Defendant, Gregory Ryan Webb, of one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail at seventy-five percent service. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve body camera footage from the crime scene; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence was excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, John Butler, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of six years. The State subsequently alleged that the Appellant violated his probation, and, following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s diversion and entered judgments of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking the Appellant’s diversion and in ordering confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Detrick Turner, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel. He argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate and
failing to raise additional issues on appeal. Following our review of the entire record,
including the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Albert Franklin Thompkins, Jr., of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-three years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also asserts that the trial court (1) violated “the spirit” of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), when an African American juror was randomly selected and excused as an alternate juror at the end of trial; and (2) erred in failing to grant a mistrial and a motion for a new trial when defense witnesses failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to testify. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Rony Noe Ambrocio Cruz, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of
second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to serve
at 100%. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
second degree murder conviction. He also contends that the trial court erred in sentencing
when it applied an enhancement factor related to his immigration status. After a thorough
review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Hutcherson, was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment and received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder, that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police, and that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about his gang affiliation in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment in count nine.

The Defendant, Stephen Novatne, pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine in a drug-free zone and agreed to serve a sentence of eight years. He later filed a motion asking the trial court to resentence him in accordance with the 2020 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. The trial court declined to do so, finding that resentencing was not in the interests of justice, and the Defendant appealed. Because the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right from a denial of resentencing under the Drug-Free Zone Act, we respectfully dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Humberto Paulino Gomez, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, which petition challenged his 2020 Greene County Criminal Court guiltypleaded
convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, for
which he received an effective 20-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Martrice Thomas, of first degree
premeditated murder. The Petitioner appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment. State v. Thomas, No. W2017-02489-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL
6266277, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 29, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 28,
2019). On April 6, 2020, more than a year after the final judgment, the Petitioner filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was ineffective, and the
post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had received the effective
assistance of counsel. The Petitioner appealed, and we remanded the case for consideration
of the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. After a hearing, the post-conviction
court determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations. The
Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of review, requesting this court complete review of
the appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction
relief.

Leonard John Clemons, Defendant, was convicted of attempted burglary, burglary,
vandalism, and two counts of theft. For those convictions, Defendant was sentenced as a
career criminal to a total effective sentence of 24 years, 11 months, and 29 days. After the
trial court denied his motion for new trial, Defendant appealed. On appeal, Defendant
argues that the trial court erred by denying a continuance based on discovery violations
and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Because Defendant has
waived his challenge to discovery violations and because the evidence is sufficient to
support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Tailor James Simpson, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for aggravated burglary and possession of methamphetamine with the intent to
sell or deliver. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2013, the Petitioner, Marcus Anthony Robey, pleaded guilty to evading arrest and criminal impersonation in exchange for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. In a bifurcated proceeding, a jury convicted the Petitioner of aggravated robbery following which he pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. For these convictions he received concurrent thirty- and fifteen-year sentences, respectively. State v. Robey, No. M2015-00306-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4487954, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2016). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction related to the indictment, and that the State withheld evidence resulting in prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied his petition after a hearing. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jerry P. Haley, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s
summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for
aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal trespass and his
effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred
by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Jerome Griggs, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated rape conviction, for
which he is serving a twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the postconviction
court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, acting pro se, entered guilty pleas to various
felony offenses and received an effective sentence of six years’ imprisonment. A few
weeks later, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming they were
unknowing and involuntarily entered because he was not advised of the consequences of
the guilty pleas.1 Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. For
the first time in this appeal, the Defendant claims that his waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; therefore, his subsequent guilty
pleas were constitutionally invalid. The Defendant additionally claims the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and determining
that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we
conclude that the trial court’s investigation of the factors bearing upon the Defendant’s
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel complied with Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). We further conclude that the
Defendant failed to establish that manifest injustice required the withdrawal of his guilty
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Nicholas Thomas Beauvais, Defendant, pleaded guilty as a Range II offender to Class C felony voluntary manslaughter, reserving all sentencing issues for the trial court. Defendant claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him to nine years’ incarceration. We determine that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Defendant and affirm the judgment.