APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Morrieo Allen, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Terrance Terrell King, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion seeking resentencing for a drug-related conviction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motion, and the State contends this court does not have jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal. Defendant rejects the State’s assertion. After reviewing the applicable law and the parties’ arguments, we conclude Defendant does not have an appeal as of right available to him, and the appeal is therefore dismissed

The Petitioner, Douglas Eugene Horton, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2018 convictions for two
counts of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, four counts of possession
of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
four counts of facilitation of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, for which he is serving an effective fifteen-year
sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by
denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations for counsel’s (1) failure
to obtain adequate discovery, (2) failure to challenge the search warrant resulting in the
Petitioner’s arrest, (3) failure to subpoena the Petitioner’s daughter and his girlfriend as
witnesses at the trial, (4) failure to play a body camera recording purporting to show
officer misconduct, and (5) cumulative errors during the trial. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Timothy Elliott1 Davis, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence
of an intoxicant (“DUI”) and driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood
alcohol concentration (“BAC”) greater than 0.8 (“DUI per se”). Defendant pled guilty to
DUI, third offense following the jury verdict on the first two counts. The trial court
sentenced Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised
probation upon service of seven months in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol
test and that the evidence is insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Following our review
of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court but remand for correction of the judgment forms consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Adam Janes, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Specifically, the Defendant argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) he entered into his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily; (3) the assistant district attorney was prejudiced against him; (4) he was entitled to concurrent sentences; (5) he was not given the opportunity of rehabilitation; (6) his sentence was not the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence was imposed; and (7) the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Amanda Helena Rogers, appeals her Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted first degree murder, facilitation of vandalism of property in an amount of $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, and two counts of reckless endangerment for which the trial court imposed an effective term of 10 years and six months to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of facilitation of attempted first degree murder and that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted Defendant, Tamarion Terrell Johnson, of second degree
murder and aggravated assault in the shooting death of the victim, Shawnquell Stanfield.
The trial court merged the assault conviction into the murder conviction. Defendant argues
on appeal that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight and that the evidence
was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

The Defendant, Hank Cooley, Jr., appeals from his best interest, guilty-pleaded
convictions for felony evading arrest risking death or injury, driving on a revoked license
(second offense), reckless driving, disobeying a traffic signal, violation of the light law,
speeding, and failure to exercise due care. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b)(3)(B) (2018)
(subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2020) (driving on a revoked
license), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-8-110 (2020) (subsequently amended)
(disobeying a traffic signal), 55-9-402 (2020) (subsequently amended) (violation of light
law), 55-8-152 (2008) (speeding), and 55-8-136 (2020) (failure to exercise due care).
The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twelve years in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appealed the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her car.  On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because probable cause existed to search the Defendant’s car based on a police dog’s signal for the presence of narcotics.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for reinstatement of the charges.

I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion based on the narrow issue raised by the parties and the existing law in Tennessee.  I write separately, however, to highlight how the legalization of hemp has fractured the foundation underlying the rule that a drug detection dog sniff is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.  In my view, the cases before this court thus far miss the primary issue—whether a drug detection dog sniff that no longer discloses only contraband is itself a search that must be supported by probable cause.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Richard Williams, III, of several offenses, including attempted first degree murder. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after finding that it was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court did not adequately consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his ability to access the prison library and, therefore, to timely file his petition. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher James Funk, Sr., of driving
under the influence of an intoxicant and possessing a firearm while under the influence of
alcohol. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months
and twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying both his motion to suppress and his
subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal. The State asserts that the Defendant waived
any issue regarding his motion to suppress by failing to file a motion for a new trial. It also
argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct
appeal. On our review, we agree with the State and respectfully affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

The Defendant, Glen Edward Miller, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year effective sentence, to be served on probation after one year of confinement. In response to the Defendant’s second proven probation violation, the trial court ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal from this judgment, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that he violated his probation; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Nicole L. Lindholm, appeals the trial court’s imposition of an effective five-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for her convictions for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, which followed the trial court’s revocation of her probationary sentence on judicial diversion. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying her request for probation. Based on our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Defendant of patronizing prostitution from a minor, a Class B felony, in count one and solicitation of a minor to commit patronizing prostitution, a Class C felony, in count two. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight and three years, respectively, and merged the convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is sufficient to support only a conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, in count one and that the evidence is insufficient to support any conviction in count two. The State concedes that the Defendant committed a Class A misdemeanor in count one and, therefore, that both convictions must be modified to misdemeanors. We agree with the State; modify the judgment in count one to reflect a Class A misdemeanor conviction of patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor; modify the judgment in count two to reflect a Class B misdemeanor conviction of solicitation of a law enforcement officer posing as a minor to commit patronizing prostitution; and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

The Defendant, Deonta Baskin, was convicted of first degree murder and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life without parole
pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute for his first degree murder conviction to be
served consecutively to thirty years’ confinement as a Range III, persistent offender for his
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues
that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences based on his prior convictions.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals his convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm
with a prior violent felony conviction, for which he received an effective sentence of fortyeight
years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred
in denying the motion to suppress his confession; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to
establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Lance T. Sandifer, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In his motion, the Defendant argued that his sentences were illegal because he was not granted a juvenile transfer hearing and that the criminal court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him. Following our review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Willie Nathan Jones, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denying his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Petitioner argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s closing argument and failing to object to the prosecutor’s use of the term “victim” when referring to a State’s witness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jimmy Dewayne Richards, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of burglary, theft of property, and vandalism. On appeal, the Defendant argues, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. We cannot adequately review on the record before us whether the search was supported by probable cause or whether Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. The trial court sua sponte raised the standing issue after all the proof was presented at the hearing and did not comply with its duties to judge the credibility of witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to resolve factual issues in deciding the motion to suppress. We therefore remand this case for a new hearing on the motion to suppress in accordance with the instructions in this opinion.

The Petitioner, Quintavious Montez Patton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Frederick Peat, of aggravated rape, for
which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in preventing him from
impeaching the victim with evidence of the victim’s prior convictions and in imposing an
excessive sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Juan De Paz Mondragon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court
imposed an effective sentence of thirty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for seconddegree
murder and attempted second-degree murder, and the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court. Furthermore, we remand to the trial court entry of corrected judgment forms
in counts one and two reflecting the merger of the defendant’s convictions for seconddegree
murder into a single conviction.

The defendant, Eric Dewayne Milton, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
community corrections sentence and order directing the defendant to serve the remainder
of his eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to treat the defendant’s violation as a violation of probation
and impose a thirty-day sentence of confinement. After a thorough review of the record,
the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Chauncy Black, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of reckless
endangerment of Kaleb Wakefield and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon of
Isabella Edwards for discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. The trial court
imposed a six-and-a-half-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of reckless endangerment with
a deadly weapon of Isabella Edwards. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury as to a presumption of reasonableness in the use of deadly force
within his residence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.