APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Katherine Louise Holmes, was convicted of attempted first degree (premeditated) murder, a Class A felony.  The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years.  On appeal, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; that the trial court unduly restricted her cross-examination of a witness; that the trial court erred in revoking her bond; that the trial court erroneously did not permit surrebuttal evidence; and that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence.  Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted petitioner, Steven D. Hill, of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, and theft over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty years. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions to this court and subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jeffery D. Aaron, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and driving while his blood alcohol concentration was .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Prior to trial, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the state trooper’s stop of Defendant. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record, relying upon our supreme court’s decision in State v. Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2010), we conclude that the trooper had reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that Defendant had committed or was about to commit the Class C misdemeanor offense set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123(1). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The pro se petitioner, Frank Shackleton, appeals the Davidson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction and sentence are illegal and void because he pled guilty to an offense with a different date from the offense date in the indictment. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Deandre D. Rucker, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, and the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial or a cautionary instruction because of prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing argument. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant’s first two assignments of error are without merit. However, we agree that the State’s closing argument was improper to such a degree that we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Christopher Allen Cummins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Alfred Calvin Whitehead, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver in a Drug-Free School Zone, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014) (possession of cocaine with intent to sell), 39-17-417(c)(1) (classifying the offense as a Class B felony), 39-17-432(b)(1) (2014) (requiring that offenses committed in a Drug Free School Zone be sentenced one classification higher and affecting the minimum required service and release eligibility of the sentence). The Defendant, a Range II offender, was sentenced to serve twenty-eight years with a minimum required service of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial because a juror slept during a portion of the proof, (3) the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify as an expert witness, and (4) the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial based upon the recantation of a State witness. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Based upon our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Rodney Jeffries, the Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of his motion.

In a plea agreement encompassing several cases, the Defendant, Michael Anthony Smith, pleaded no contest to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000, one count of sale of a Schedule II drug, one count of sale of a Schedule IV drug, and one count of theft of property valued less than $500. In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed several charges against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of nine years to be served on supervised probation. It also ordered that he successfully complete the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program and pay restitution. Subsequently, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a warrant, alleging that he had ceased to participate in the 23rd Judicial Drug Court Program. At a hearing, the Defendant admitted the violation, and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The appellant, Terrance E. Kindall, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revoking his community corrections sentence for carjacking and ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant was statutorily ineligible for community corrections. Therefore, the appellant’s community correction sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained-for element of the appellant’s plea agreement.  

In this interlocutory appeal, Susan Gail Stephens (“the Defendant”) challenges the prosecutor‟s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She asks this court to remand the case to the prosecutor with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion. She also asks us to instruct the prosecutor to grant pretrial diversion nunc pro tunc to the Defendant‟s 2012 update to her application for pretrial diversion. Upon review, we find that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion upon the terms and conditions of the diversion to be established by the trial court. However, we decline to instruct that pretrial diversion be granted nunc pro tunc to 2012.

Defendant, Vickie1 Lynn Perry, appeals her convictions for first degree murder and robbery, arguing: 1) that there is insufficient evidence to establish that she killed the victim while committing felony robbery; 2) that the State introduced improper evidence; 3) that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a specific instance of conduct to impeach Defendant‟s character for truthfulness; and 4) that the State made improper remarks during its closing argument. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Gary Hamilton (“the Defendant”) seeks interlocutory review of the district attorney general‟s denial of his application for pretrial diversion and the trial court‟s affirmance of that denial. The Defendant, a former teacher‟s assistant, was charged with assault after engaging in an altercation with a student at the school where he was employed. The district attorney general denied the Defendant‟s application for pretrial diversion. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the trial court, challenging the denial, and the trial court upheld the district attorney general‟s decision. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the trial court erred when it found no abuse of discretion. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the trial court did not properly review the district attorney general‟s decision to deny pretrial diversion. Additionally, although the district attorney general considered all the relevant pretrial diversion factors and did not consider any irrelevant factors, the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions that the Defendant be granted pretrial diversion.

The petitioner, Phillippe Rogers, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of both conspiracy to sell and possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Fred Calvin Lee, pleaded guilty to two counts of delivery of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to serve concurrent terms of ten years for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to consider all of the relevant sentencing factors and erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant stands convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, fourth offense, and driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to an effective eighteen-month sentence, suspended to supervised probation after serving 150 days in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court violated the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and appellant's Equal Protection rights by limiting appellant's cross-examination of Officer Norris regarding any racial bias or any disciplinary action the police department levied against Officer Norris due to racially-biased language. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.