APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Timothy Sedman, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, and
the trial court imposed a sentence of six years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request
for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected
judgment forms in counts one through five and counts seven through twenty.

The Petitioner, Cedric Taylor, entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine and resisting arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to suppress to challenge the constitutionality of the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle, and trial counsel’s failure to appeal his sentence. The Petitioner also claimed that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to trial counsel’s misleading advice that he would likely be sentenced to probation. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief, in part, and ordered a delayed appeal based on trial counsel’s failure to appeal the Petitioner’s sentence. This court subsequently affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s request to serve his sentence on community corrections. See State v. Taylor, No. M2024-00192-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3879116, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2024), appeal denied (Tenn. Nov. 14, 2024). The post-conviction court entered an order denying the issues that were held in abeyance, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The Defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, entered a guilty plea to two counts of
aggravated kidnapping. As a part of his plea, and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 37, the Defendant sought to reserve one certified question of law related to the
trial court’s finding that his right to a speedy trial did not attach when he was arrested in
Florida due to his escape status as well as being served with a warrant from Kentucky; one
certified question related to the trial court’s finding that the Defendant’s verbal request to
the Florida court to invoke his constitutional rights was insufficient to properly invoke his
rights to speedy trial and due process; and one certified question related to the trial court’s
finding that the Defendant’s written letters and motion to dismiss sent to both the general
sessions clerk and the district attorney’s office failed to properly invoke his constitutional
rights to a speedy trial and due process as it pertained to his Henry County, Tennessee
general session case arrest warrants. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve
certified issues for review, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the
Defendant’s claims, and we dismiss his appeal.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Bennett Tate, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court
revocation of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that
the trial court erred by improperly admitting video footage from a police officer’s bodyworn
camera during the revocation hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boone Beverly, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. On
appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the
Defendant’s request to allocute or speak on his own behalf at his revocation hearing.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jerome Nchiyako Dooley, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery and received an agreed sentence of five years as a Range III offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation based on a video Defendant posted to TikTok and that the court erred in failing to recuse itself sua sponte. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Fred Auston Wortman, III, pled guilty to two counts of attempted
first-degree murder and solicitation of first-degree murder, stemming from his repeated
attempts to kill his wife. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective
Range II sentence of thirty years with a Range I release eligibility of thirty percent. The
Board of Probation and Parole denied the petitioner release, and after challenging the denial
via other avenues, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he
claimed entitlement to relief on grounds of breach of contact. In his petition, the petitioner
claimed that the State violated the terms of his plea agreement by opposing his release at
the parole hearing. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding it was timebarred.
However, this Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the postconviction
court to make findings relative to whether due process considerations tolled the
statute of limitations. See Wortman v. State, No. W2023-00017-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL
6318088, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2023). On remand, the post-conviction court
-found the petitioner was not guaranteed release, that the State did not attempt to thwart
the petitioner’s ability to have a parole hearing, and rejected the petitioner’s claim that the
State “acted in bad faith by attending and opposing his parole” because the petitioner
received the benefit of everything to which he bargained. Following a thorough review of
the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court denying the petitioner post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He contends
that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to
relief on the merits of his petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Wayne Strouth, of first degree
premeditated murder and conspiracy to comrnit first degree premeditated rnurder. The trial
court irnposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction and a consecutive
twenty-five year sentence for the conspiracy conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when
it failed to give jury instructions on enhanced identification and general inferences; and (3)
the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced hirn. After review, we affirm the
convictions and the Defendant's life sentence for first degree prerneditated murder;
however, we vacate the Defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit first degree murder
and the trial court's imposition of partial consecutive sentencing. We remand this case to
the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant, Anthony Glover, appeals the denial of his bid for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court’s ruling is not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness and that, upon our de novo review, this court should grant him diversion. Because the trial court failed to consider all the appropriate factors and to make the required findings to support its denial of judicial diversion, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Because we find that the record is insufficient for de novo review, the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Shamone Davis, Defendant, was convicted of four counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, one count of attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure for events that involved his stepdaughter. As a result of the convictions, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty years. Defendant appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the trial court improperly admitted testimony of several witnesses, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, and his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lacy Frank Walls, III, Defendant, was convicted of evading arrest and three counts of possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of forty years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court refused to consider all of the issues presented in his motion for new trial. After a review, we find the trial court erred by refusing to consider all the issues presented in the motion for new trial. On remand, the trial court should hold a new hearing on the motion for new trial, at which the trial court should consider all the issues in the motion. The trial court should also enter judgment forms for Counts Four and Five and enter corrected judgment forms in Counts One, Two, and Six, reflecting Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and the proper statute under which Defendant is required to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence.

Petitioner, Brian Howard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. He argues trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: first, by failing to sever Petitioner’s trial from that of his co-defendant, or alternatively, failing to introduce the co-defendant’s pretrial statement to police during their joint trial; and second, by failing to waive lesser included offense instructions. He also raises a standalone due process claim, arguing that criminal defendants should have a constitutional right to affirmatively waive lesser included charges contrary to Tennessee law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner appeals from the order of the post-conviction court denying his petition seeking relief from his conviction for first-degree murder. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues (1) that trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to or raise as an issue on appeal the admissibility Chamere Talley’s prior statement based on Tennessee Rule 803(26); (2) that the State and the trial court violated due process in failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to Rule 803(26); (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate closing argument; and (4) that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors deprived the Petitioner of a fair trial.1 We affirm.

The Defendant, Jacquiz McBee, has filed a petition for recusal appeal seeking review of the Knox County Criminal Court’s January 28, 2026 order denying his motion to recuse. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.02. Following our review of the Defendant’s petition, we have determined that a response from the State is not necessary and summarily deny relief. 

Defendant, Charles Hubert Russell, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the indicted charge violated the Second Amendment. After the trial court denied the motion, Defendant pled guilty to the indicted charge but reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to whether his conviction violated the Second Amendment right to bear arms. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jennifer Leigh Sexton, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court
of vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony; initiating a false report, a Class D
felony; driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; and following too closely,
a Class C misdemeanor, and received an effective sentence of ten years in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
testimony from the State’s expert because the expert’s method of data collection was
unreliable, (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide the Defendant’s requested special
jury instructions, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of initiating
a false report. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Jonathan Abernathy, for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Upon full consideration, the application is denied for the reasons stated below.

Defendant, Gerald Elijah Crossley, challenges his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s alleged gang affiliation and expert testimony about gang-related activities and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, was convicted by a Scott County jury of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; two counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years
of age or less, a Class A felony; and carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced
the Defendant to four years for the aggravated assault conviction, twenty years for each of
the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, twenty years for each of the aggravated
child neglect convictions, and ten years for the carjacking conviction. Finding the
Defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentences
for an effective total sentence of thirty years at 100% service in the Tennessee Department
of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of her aggravated child neglect convictions and argues that the trial court erred by
not considering a mandatory mitigating factor in imposing her especially aggravated
kidnapping sentences and by classifying her as a dangerous offender under the consecutive
sentencing statute. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s
convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court did not err in its application
of enhancement and mitigating factors but failed to make adequate findings in support of
consecutive sentencing under the dangerous offender criterion of the consecutive
sentencing statute. However, upon de novo review, we conclude that the record supports
the imposition of consecutive sentences based on the Defendant’s having committed the
offenses while she was on probation. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions
and the sentences imposed by the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Defendant, Christopher Lee Faulkner, for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The Defendant seeks to challenge the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The State has filed a response in opposition to the motion. Based on the following, we deny the Petitioner’s motion for an interlocutory appeal.

This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the post-conviction court’s November 14, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Chris Craft from his capital post-conviction proceeding. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. For the reasons set forth below, the post-conviction court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED.

Defendant, Martha Jane Durocher, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial, and the trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence at trial was insufficient. Because the evidence does not establish that Defendant’s conduct placed any person or persons in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, we reverse and vacate her conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a weapon.

The Petitioner, Shun M. Ramey, acting pro se, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, John Wayne Hamby, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of rape
of a child, for which he received a sentence of forty years’ incarceration at one hundred
percent service. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction and that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence.
Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed and that the
interests of justice do not merit waiver of the untimeliness, we dismiss the appeal.