APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Tony C. Woods, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on December 17, 2013, seeking a new trial of the offenses for which he was convicted in 1989:  first degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of an illegal firearm, a sawed-off shotgun.  The petition for writ of error coram nobis alleges that he is entitled to relief because the forensic medical examiner who testified at his trial had his medical license revoked in 2005 due to “intentional misdeeds.”  The coram nobis court dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations, and no due process concerns precluded application of the limitations period.  After a full review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Following a jury trial, Christopher M. Epps (“the Defendant”) was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a special jury instruction on eyewitness identification.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Theodore Lebron Johnson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury regarding the loss or destruction of evidence.  We discern no flaw in the conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Michael C. Bigbee, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion.

Viewing the defendant's motion in the light most favorable to the movant, as we are obliged to do, see State v. David Morrow, No. W2014-00338-CCA-R3-CO, slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug. 13, 2014); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H), we should accede to the State's concession that a fair reading of the claim indicates that it bespeaks an illegal sentence.

Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the defendant, Walter Shegog, appeals, claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose his conviction because the offense occurred on federal property, that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment based upon the State's destruction of certain evidence, and that the trial court erred by permitting the State to use all of the defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Albert Taylor, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court's summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred (1) by determining that, because his sentences had expired, he was not entitled to a motion hearing and (2) by treating his motion as a petition for habeas corpus relief. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion.

Although I concur with the lead opinion's holding that this case needs to be remanded for the appointment of counsel and a hearing, I write separately to express my opinion that, if the evidence at the hearing proves that the effective sentence entered in 1992 has been fully served and has expired, the controversy is moot and not justiciable. Moreover, even if the effective sentence has not expired, if the proof establishes only that the Defendant's three-year illegal concurrent sentence has been fully served, I would hold that the fulfillment of the promise of concurrence purged the illegality from the Defendant's effective sentence such that the controversy is moot and not justiciable and the Defendant would not be entitled to relief under Rule 36.1.

Miqwon Leach, the Defendant, filed pro se a Motion for Correct of an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court found the motion failed to state a colorable claim and summarily dismissed the motion. We affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Lindsey, filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failing to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Donnie Dewayne Davenport, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-433. He was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to twelve years' confinement to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, he argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mario D. Frederick, of indecent exposure and public indecency, Class B misdemeanors, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days for each conviction to be served concurrently.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the definition of “masturbation.”  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory Gene Spiceland, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2011 Stewart County Circuit Court jury convictions of initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Terrell Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm on school property, a Class E felony; and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to display scars from his gunshot wounds to the jury; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon via cross-examination of his mother and the court should have, thus, declared a mistrial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Tucker, was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender. State v. Steven Van Tucker, No. W2010-01943-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1478774, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2012). This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and he now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of relief. Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement entered a home, which did not belong to petitioner, with only an arrest warrant for the petitioner and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the search. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we dismiss petitioner's appeal as untimely.

The defendant, Timothy Curtis Greenman, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and facilitation of burglary of a motor vehicle, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Timothy Eugene Kelly, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cortney R. Logan, and his co-defendant, Joseph Leon Jackson, Jr., were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for attempted first degree premeditated murder in count 1 and employment of a firearm during the flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony in count 3. Although Logan was not charged in count 2 of the indictment, Jackson was charged in count 2 with employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Logan was convicted as charged, and the trial court imposed mandatory consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction and six years for the employment of a firearm during the flight or escape conviction. On appeal, Logan argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present proof of his role in Jackson’s escape from custody in Mississippi to show Logan’s motive and intent to commit the offenses in Tennessee under a theory of criminal responsibility; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his effective sentence of thirty-one years is excessive. Upon review, we affirm Logan’s convictions but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing a conviction for employment of a firearm during the flight or escape from the attempt to commit a dangerous felony in count 3 and either redacting the word “Violent” and leaving the 100% release eligibility designation or using the “Special Conditions” section of the judgment form to specify that Logan received a sentence of six years at one hundred percent release eligibility for his conviction under Code section 39-17-1324(b)(4). In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Juan Villa, was found guilty by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years' confinement at 100% service as a violent offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Adrian Marcel Newbill, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of the possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, with the intent to sell/deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Willie Nolan, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and vandalism. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-102, -14-408. After merging the attempted reckless endangerment conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to enter as substantive evidence the unsigned statement of a witness in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brenda Woods, was convicted by a McNairy County Circuit Court jury of three counts of procuring an illegal vote. See T.C.A. §2-19-117 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) her convictions violate double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence; and (4) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donna Marie Chartrand, was charged in the Circuit Court for Gibson County with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(1) (Supp. 2012) (amended 2014) (manufacture of methamphetamine); 39-12-103 (2014) (conspiracy); 39-17-433(a)(1) (2014) (promotion of methamphetamine manufacture); 39-17-425(b)(1) (Supp. 2012) (felony possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-17-425 (Supp. 2012) (misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia). In this interlocutory appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of her home, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in which the evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid warrant is suppressed.

The Defendant, Alison Briars, pleaded guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202 (2014). The court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days’ confinement and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) erred in denying judicial diversion and (2) abused its discretion by not sentencing her to full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.