APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gavin Quaedvlieg, of rape. The Defendant appeals, contending that the prosecutor impermissibly commented upon his silence at trial during the State's rebuttal closing argument and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on this issue. The State argues that the Defendant has waived plenary review of this issue and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. In his reply brief, the Defendant counters that he has not waived plenary review and that, in any event, he is entitled to plain error relief. We conclude that the Defendant has waived plenary review and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The pro se petitioner, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Shaun Dewayne Patton, appeals his Robertson County Circuit Court conviction of evading arrest, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Branden Eric Michael Delong, appeals the Chester County Circuit Court’s
ordering him to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement after revoking his probation,
arguing that the trial court should have elected to place him back on supervised probation.
Based on our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation
but reverse the court’s placing his original ten-year sentence into effect and remand the
case to the trial court for findings related to the appropriate consequence for that revocation.

The Petitioner, Joseph Wilson, was convicted in 2001 by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of a number of offenses, including attempted second degree murder and three counts
of aggravated rape, based on his having raped and cut the throat of a woman during his
participation with accomplices in burglarizing her home. In February 2022, the Petitioner
filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et. seq., for DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit, the
knife used to cut the victim’s throat, the clothing the victim was wearing at the time of the
assault, and assorted other items recovered from the bathroom where the sexual assault
occurred, asserting that “significant technological developments in forensic methodologies
over the last fifteen years [have occurred] that may now make it possible to conclusively
identify the true perpetrator[.]” Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the
petition, finding that the Petitioner had not shown there was a reasonable probability that
he would not have been prosecuted or convicted or that new DNA testing would resolve
an issue that had not been previously resolved. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the
post-conviction court erred in finding that the Petitioner did not satisfy the requirements
for DNA analysis pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The State concedes
that DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit and the knife is warranted but argues that it is
not warranted for the other pieces of evidence. We agree with the State that DNA analysis
is warranted for the sexual assault kit and unwarranted for the items collected from the
bathroom and for the victim’s clothing that was not collected as part of the sexual assault
kit. However, we disagree that DNA analysis is warranted for the knife. Accordingly, we
reverse the denial of the request for DNA analysis of the sexual assault kit but affirm the
denial of the request for DNA analysis of the knife and additional items. Thus, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order for DNA testing consistent with
this opinion.

The petitioner, Jaquan Gathing, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

Defendant, Wayne Daryl Potee, pleaded guilty in case numbers 2015-CR-185 and 2015- CR-186 to one count of selling 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine in a Drug-Free School Zone (“DFSZ”) and one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine in a DFSZ. Defendant received an effective 15-year sentence to serve at 100 percent for his convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h)(1), which the trial court denied following two evidentiary hearings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. In his brief to this Court, Defendant acknowledges that he has no right of appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, see State v. Bobo, 672 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023). He nonetheless asserts that the trial court’s ruling was fundamentally illegal and asks this Court to grant a writ of certiorari. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we deny Defendant’s request for a writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Bevis, Jr., of two counts
of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during
the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of
thirty-five years at eighty-five percent for the attempted murder convictions and a
consecutive ten-year sentence at one hundred percent for the firearm conviction. On
appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court failed to declare a mistrial in response to
numerous outbursts by the victims’ families; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions; (3) the trial court erred in overruling the defense’s objection when the
prosecutor misrepresented evidence during closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and attempted first degree murder
without serious bodily injury. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to reflect the accurate
conviction offense of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

The Defendant, Ralph Lee Atkins, Jr., was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The
Defendant was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Travis Haynes, of first-degree murder,
tampering with evidence, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, for which he
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions for first-degree murder and tampering with evidence. The defendant also
argues the trial court erred in not allowing the introduction of autopsy photographs through
Ms. Dinkins, in failing to include an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and in denying
the defendant’s motion to continue. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Moquann Smith, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective eleven-year sentence in confinement and three years of probation. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14-105(a)(4) (2018) (grading of theft). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting a video recording and several photographs depicting him with a handgun. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Khalil Young, pleaded guilty to attempted carjacking and kidnapping, and
the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying
his request for diversion and alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and
considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric DeShawn Webb, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s partial denial of his motion to reduce his sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and imposition of an effective 10-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated rioting and aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Tut Mayal Tut, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated rape, alleging that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

A Tipton County jury found the defendant, Kevin Scott Pendleton, guilty of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon for which he received a sentence of ten years in confinement.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Defendant, Frank James Hastings, appeals his effective sentence of twenty-two years related to three cases in which he entered open best interest pleas. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive service and denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed
pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, wherein he sought DNA
testing of evidence related to his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted
second-degree murder. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Floyd, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking postconviction
relief from his convictions of driving under the influence (two counts) and
reckless driving. He received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days,
which was suspended after service of seven days. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his ex-girlfriend as a witness at trial and claims
she would have established that the Petitioner was not the driver at the time of the offense.
The Petitioner also argues the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because the
court initially “advised [the Petitioner] that it would accept an affidavit of [his exgirlfriend]
as a substitute for live testimony” and later denied the Petitioner relief for failure
to produce witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.1 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment
of the post-conviction court.

The Smith County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Ralph Edward Overstreet, Jr., for burglary, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted first degree murder conviction. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the prosecutor’s previous representation of Defendant created an actual conflict of interest that required disqualification and a new trial; (2) the State violated its discovery obligations by introducing evidence that the State allegedly did not disclose of a prior domestic incident between Defendant and his girlfriend; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of any other conviction. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Henry County jury found Defendant, Justin Daniel Barker, guilty of two counts of rape (under alternate theories) and one count of aggravated statutory rape. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight and a half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony related to Defendant’s pending criminal proceedings in another jurisdiction, and he contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdicts. After review, we conclude the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the pending criminal proceedings, but such error was harmless. We also conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Farris Lamont Kidd, pleaded guilty to five separate charges, and received an effective fourteen-year sentence. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael White, of five counts of rape in 2005, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because, among other things, the original affidavit of complaint was invalid and that his charges were not supported by probable cause. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the application, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief and that he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for requesting the writ. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2005, the Defendant, Ruben D. Pimentel, pled guilty to the offense of first degree murder and accepted a negotiated sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. He alleged that his sentence was illegal because it violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2), as amended in 2020, which provides that a defendant may be released from a life sentence after sixty years. The trial court summarily denied the motion, finding that the Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Defendant and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Karla Marie Clausell, appeals as of right from her conviction for first degree
premeditated murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant
contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from Snapchat in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(a) and by admitting Snapchat and Facebook messages in
violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). She also contends that the cumulative
effect of these errors entitles her to a new trial. After a thorough review of the evidence
and applicable case law, we affirm.

The defendant, Vicky L. Smith, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, and the
trial judge imposed a ten-year sentence of incarceration with the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her request
to serve her sentence on probation. After reviewing the record and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.