APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Maury County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Carla R. Richter, of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense; driving on a revoked license; and speeding. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of four years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress, arguing that she did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to a blood test.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Webster, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) she failed to inform him of his preliminary hearing and waived his right to appear without his permission; (2) she did not adequately communicate with him; (3) she did not consult with him to develop a “reasonable” trial strategy; (4) she did not fully investigate or present witnesses; (5) she did not request a mistrial following “possible jury panel contamination”; and (6) she failed to make appropriate objections during his cross-examination.  Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is therefore affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antwon Thomas, of assault by bodily injury and domestic assault, Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction to be served as two years on probation and merged the convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court committed plain error by failing to admit the entire recording of the victim's 911 call into evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court committed plain error by making improper comments on the evidence, that the trial court committed plain error by refusing to allow him to sit at counsel's table, and that the trial court committed various sentencing errors, including rendering him infamous. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to correct a clerical error in the judgment for count three rendering the appellant infamous.

The defendant, Elvis Strickland, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Patrick Wilson, appeals the trial court's denial of an alternative sentence after the entry of a guilty plea to aggravated statutory rape. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reasoned opinion with regard to its conclusion that the absence of the White instructions constituted reversible error. I would affirm the convictions as they were entered, although merging those counts which were alternatively charged. In all other regards, I join in the majority's opinion.

The defendant, James Brandon Stewart, appeals the summary denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the challenged sentence has expired, we affirm the summary dismissal of the defendant's motion.

The petitioner, Shelley Denise Blair, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by relying solely on her pro se petition, and not considering the allegations of fact in the amended petition prepared by post-conviction counsel, in concluding that she failed to make out a prima facie case of mental incompetence to toll the statute of limitations.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The defendant, Anthony Porrazzo, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and misdemeanor theft, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers, that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain witness testimony and by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, and that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jordan Curry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest and his effective forty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Tanya Nicole Slimick, of first degree (premeditated) murder for shooting her boyfriend.  The defendant received a life sentence.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to show premeditation or to negate self-defense.  She also raises numerous challenges to the jury instructions, including that the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of raising the issue of self-defense; that the self-defense instruction was confusing to the jury; that the jury instructions improperly failed to list the negation of self-defense in the litany of items which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the instructions failed to list lesser included offenses whenever the “charged offense” was referenced.  The defendant also asserts that there was reversible error in the use of a demonstrative aid in the prosecution’s closing argument.  After a thorough review of the law and the facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Raphael Cortez Ferguson, pleaded guilty to facilitation of possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to resell, a Class C felony, and received the agreed-upon sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The department of correction placed appellant in its special alternative incarceration unit and, approximately six months later, released him from custody subject to supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued, alleging the following infractions: (1) committing new criminal offenses for theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, criminal simulation, and identity theft; (2) testing positive on two drug screens; and (3) failing to complete community service as ordered. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered his sentence into execution. On appeal, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting his new criminal offenses and that the remainder of the evidence warranted a lesser consequence than complete confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Michael Dean Hodges, for aggravated child abuse in counts one through three and aggravated child neglect in count four.  After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of count one but convicted as charged in counts two and three and convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect in count four.  The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated child abuse convictions and sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-five-years in confinement to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to sever the charge of aggravated child abuse in count one from the remaining two counts of aggravated child abuse; that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear a portion of his statement in which he admitted to prior bad acts; that the trial court erred by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on “knowingly” that failed to include language about non-accidental conduct; and that cumulative error warrants a new trial.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that the appellant had been “in trouble” previously.  However, we conclude that the error was harmless. Nevertheless, we conclude that the appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault must be reversed because aggravated assault is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated child neglect.

Demontise Martez Drumwright a.k.a. Demontise J. Drumwright (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count each of aggravated burglary and robbery.  The trial court denied alternative sentencing, ordering the Defendant to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement.  On this appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it (1) considered the Defendant’s pending case in Knox County as a basis for denial of alternative sentencing and (2) ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Shane Hixson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-four-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tom Moore, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to set aside his 1991 convictions of aggravated rape. Because the defendant has failed to present a cognizable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the order of summary dismissal.

The petitioner, Mark Brooks, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, William Anthony McDaniel, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the Appellant timely appealed the ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John Vernon Campbell, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for his premeditated first degree murder conviction because the offense was committed in the Cherokee National Forest; and (2) that the indictment charging the Petitioner was invalid due to the State’s dismissal of a charge of felony first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In 2012, a Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice McAllister, of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1)  denied his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) admitted evidence seized from his vehicle; and (3) imposed a twelve-year sentence to be served in confinement.  The Defendant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require a reversal of his conviction.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and later filed a motion challenging his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion without appointing counsel after he had stated a colorable claim for relief. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Quincy Howze, stands convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to serve twenty years at 100% release eligibility based on his two prior convictions of the same. Appealing his conviction and sentence, appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in omitting a special jury instruction on identity; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term allowed by law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. For the reasons that follow, I would remand this matter to the trial court for Tipton to be placed in the community corrections program. In this appeal, Tipton contends that the trial court relied upon an erroneous interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-106 in finding him statutorily ineligible for placement in the community correction program. He argues that the prior convictions relied upon by the court do not constitute a pattern of prior violent offenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-36-102(11).1 Specifically, he contends that (1) reckless endangerment does not meet the definition of a violent offense; (2) aggravated animal cruelty, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-212, is classified as a property offense and not a crime of violence; and (3) the trial court improperly relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(f)(1)-(3) (2006), rather than section 39-13-113 (2001), in finding that his 2001 charge for violating an order of a protection was a violent offense. Excluding the convictions that the trial court improperly classified as crimes of violence, Tipton claims the sole basis for the trial court‟s denial of his placement in the community correction program was charges reflected in his presentence report that did not result in convictions, which is likewise an improper basis to deny placement.