APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2008, a jury found the Petitioner, Tornita N. Crenshaw, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of coercion of a witness.  The jury also convicted three co-defendants related to these offenses.  On joint direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions.  See State v.Lance Sandifer, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Tornita Crenshaw, & Glenard Thorne, No. M2008-02849-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5343202, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 26, 2011).  On April 11, 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging numerous errors.  The trial court issued an order on April 25, 2016, dismissing the petition as time-barred.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 2012, the Petitioner, Tamir Clark, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder.  The Petitioner later filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and this Court affirmed the denial on appeal.  See State v.Tamir Clark, No. M2014-00618-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 7191536, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 13, 2015).  On February 24, 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered evidence.  In March 2016, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition as time-barred.  We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Rodney Lee Scott, was found guilty by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, reckless aggravated assault, leaving the scene of the accident, and public intoxication as the result of an incident described as road rage on December 16, 2013. As a result of the convictions, Defendant received an effective sentence of six years. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the denial of a motion to sever; (3) the denial of a motion in limine which sought to allow Defendant to cross-examine the victims about their criminal history; (4) his dual convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault; and (5) the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, leaving the scene of the accident, and public intoxication. Because reckless aggravated assault cannot be a lesser included offense of aggravated assault based upon fearing imminent bodily injury, we reverse and dismiss Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault. On remand, the trial court should enter judgment forms dismissing Counts Four and Seven of the indictment.

The Defendant, Antonio Richardson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by admitting in evidence a photograph of the victim from the crime scene. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Victor Sharmell Sparkman, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that he received illegal sentences for his convictions of second degree murder, Range I, 33 years with a release eligibility of “violent 100%” and especially aggravated robbery, Range I, 33 years with a release eligibility of “violent 100%” pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.  The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and Defendant has appealed.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Montez Adams, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Billy Hill, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class X felony, for the 1986 killing of his mother. See T.C.A. § 39-2-211 (1986) (repealed 1989). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-four years‘ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss based upon lost and destroyed evidence, a due process violation created by the extensive pre-indictment delay, and a violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the trial court erred by allowing improper witness testimony, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a witness violated a court order prohibiting testimony about the Defendant‘s alleged violent conduct against the witness, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction relative to the State‘s obligation to corroborate his statements, and (5) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. We have also considered whether the statute of limitations for second degree murder had expired before the commencement of the prosecution. Although we affirm the Defendant‘s conviction, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the proper felony classification for second degree murder at the time of the offense.

The Defendant, Travis Pallaria, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. The Defendant cites evidence excusing his violation and contends that the trial court was unduly harsh and abused its discretion in ordering the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the revocation and confinement order of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robreka Jay Quan Sullivan, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and she received a total effective sentence of ten years.  On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her convictions.  Specifically, she contends that the victim’s testimony was not credible and that the State proved, at most, that she was involved in the disposition of stolen property.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In July 2012, the Petitioner, Michael Joseph Lugiai, Sr., entered a “best interests” guilty plea to four counts of aggravated assault.  He timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was unknowing and involuntary.  Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Eddie A. Medlock, is appealing the trial court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.

In 2011, the Petitioner, Herman Sowell, Jr., pleaded nolo contendreto attempted aggravated rape, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and incest, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, at 30%.  The trial court ordered a “time served” sentence followed by probation.  In April 2013, after the statute of limitations had expired, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, using a separate case number but challenging as ineffective the representation of his counsel for the November 2011 case.  At some point thereafter, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s probation.  The Petitioner amended his petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his November 2011 convictions.  The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the post-conviction petition.  We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Misty Ann Miller, appeals the trial court’s denial of her Rule 35 motion to modify the sentences imposed against her pursuant to a negotiated plea deal.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding no new post-sentencing developments exist to justify a modification of her sentences.  After our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Wesley Howard Luthringer (“the Defendant”) was convicted of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide by a Bedford County jury.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-four years for each count to be served consecutively as a Range I standard offender.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to find him guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively.  After a thorough review of the record and case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Richard W. Wilburn, was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions to one count of initiating the methamphetamine manufacturing process and three counts of driving on a revoked license, second offense or more.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying enhancement factor 10—the Defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high—to increase his sentence for initiating the manufacturing methamphetamine process because, he asserts, there was no proof that anyone was endangered by his actions.  He also submits that the trial court erred by denying any form of alternative sentencing based upon his need for drug treatment.  Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision.  Accordingly, the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Roxann Lee Cruse, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for her Dyer County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of a Schedule III narcotic. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Mahlon Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief for his convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendants, Dantario Burgess, Rodriguez McNary, and Joseph Jones-Cage, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. Mr. Jones-Cage and Mr. McNary also were convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Mr. Burgess also was convicted of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony and of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The trial court sentenced Mr. Burgess to an effective term of fifty-five years, Mr. Jones-Cage to an effective term of fifty years, and Mr. McNary to an effective term of forty-one years. On appeal, the Defendants raise the following issues either collectively or individually: (1) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ motion to suppress a witness‘s identification of him in a photographic lineup and in limiting the
cross-examination of the victim during the suppression hearing; (2) the failure to name the predicate felony in the indictment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony voids the conviction; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court committed plain error in not allowing defense counsel to impeach the victim‘s testimony at trial with her statement to the police; (5) the malfunctioning of the recording equipment during the trial warranted a mistrial; (6) the sentences of Mr. Burgess and Mr. McNary are excessive; (7) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial; and (8) the trial court erred in denying Mr. Burgess‘ pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Mr. McNary‘s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and reverse the conviction. We remand the matter for a new trial on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense. We also remand the case for entry of corrected judgments reflecting that Mr. Jones-Cage was convicted of attempted first degree murder in count one and is to serve 100 percent of his sentence for the firearm conviction in count three. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Defendant”) filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that his sentences for first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder were illegal because the trial court constructively amended the corresponding indictments by instructing the jury on “alternative theories for felony murder.” The trial court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Hughes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pro se Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Dekarlos Johnson, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. On appeal, Johnson argues: (1) the admission of his redacted statement negatively impacted the jury's verdict; (2) he was denied the opportunity to present evidence in his own defense; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey Forest, was indicted for possession of twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free school zone, possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the warrantless search of his vehicle.  The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance and to unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful.  After review, because the Defendant has failed to properly comply with Rule 37, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

Pro se Petitioner, Rocky White, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court‟s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Because the sentences in this action have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, James Floyd Thomas, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2014 Bedford County Circuit Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, for which he received an effective sentence of 18 years.  Because the petitioner failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court’s order is affirmed.