APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant-Appellant, Robert Lamar Kelley, entered a guilty plea in the Wilson County Criminal Court to the charged offense of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class D felony, for which he received a sentence of four years, with service of six months in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(2). As a condition of his guilty plea, Kelley properly reserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) regarding the stop and search of his vehicle. After reviewing the record, we find no error in the denial of the motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Corey E. Huddleston, pleaded no contest to sexual battery on February 8, 2016. As a result of the no contest plea, he was sentenced to one year of incarceration and placed on the sex offender registry. Defendant sought to withdraw his no contest plea, and the trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendants, Kalpesh Patel and Pratikkumar V. Patel, were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-102, -103, -107. The trial court merged the solicitation convictions into the conspiracy convictions and sentenced each Defendant to fifteen years as Range I, standard offenders. On appeal, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder; (2) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence retrieved during warrantless searches of their cell phones; (3) Defendant Kalpesh contends that the trial court erred by not sentencing him as an especially mitigated offender; (4) Defendant Kalpesh contends that a new trial is warranted based on newly discovered evidence impeaching the State’s primary witness; (5) Defendant Pratikkumar contends that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and (6) Defendant Pratikkumar contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following the trial court’s denial of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State sought and was granted permission for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this appeal, the State argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed a burglary count in a superseding indictment against the Defendant, Danielle Chandria Jensen, who had previously been charged with theft of property valued at $500 or less, assault, and criminal trespass involving the same conduct. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101(a)(1), 39-14-103, -105(a)(1), -402(a)(3), -405 (Supp. 2014). We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the burglary count.

The Defendant, Edward Joseph Benesch II, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of aggravated child neglect and voluntary manslaughter, for which the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of eighteen years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following allegations of error: (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police after he first requested an attorney and that request did not need clarification in the Defendant’s opinion; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions because he did not intentionally neglect the victim and because the element of adequate provocation was absent; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted photographs of the victim taken at the crime scene and during the victim’s autopsy given their gruesome nature; (4) that trial court erred by allowing a paramedic to testify as an expert about the “significance of the force” that caused the victim’s injuries; (5) that it was improper for the trial court to allow two witnesses, Shannon Edmonson and Shara Tisdale, to testify about the Defendant’s alleged drug usage and drugs being found in his home; (6) that the trial court should not have allowed testimony from the Defendant’s next-door neighbor that bore “no indicia of reliability and was completely unverifiable”; (7) that the trial court’s refusal to allow the Defendant’s “mitigation expert” to testify regarding how the Defendant told her he fell on the victim violated the Defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense; and (8) that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to play, as a prior inconsistent statement, the video recording of Judith Lane’s interview with law enforcement. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we must conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter because the Defendant was not adequately provoked by the eighteen-month-old victim, and therefore, that conviction is reversed and vacated. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a reckless homicide conviction and imposition of a consecutive, four-year sentence for that conviction. The Defendant’s remaining issues do not entitle him to relief, and his conviction for aggravated child neglect is affirmed. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Petitioner, Anthony T. Brandon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and simple possession of marijuana. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we determine that Petitioner has waived his claim for failing to present an adequate argument in his appellate brief. Waiver notwithstanding, we also determine that Petitioner failed to prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner, Maurice O. Byrd, Jr., of aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder, and the Petitioner received an effective sentence of life. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. See State v. Maurice O. Byrd, No. M2010-02405-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5989817, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 29, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2013). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Raymond Deshun Ross, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 2005 Henderson County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault, carjacking, felony theft, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Upon the request of the Department of Safety, the State filed a petition to declare William Christopher Davis, the Defendant, a “habitual offender” pursuant to Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act (“the MVHO Act”). The trial court dismissed the petition after concluding that the MVHO Act was ambiguous regarding when the State had a duty to file a petition. On appeal, the State argues that it has an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) from the dismissal of its petition and that the trial court erred in dismissing its petition on the grounds that the MVHO Act was ambiguous and penal in nature. The Defendant argues that the State does not have an appeal as of right from the dismissal of its petition and that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the facts of this case and applicable case law, we conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right from the dismissal of a motor vehicle habitual offender petition, and thus we dismiss the State’s appeal.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeanet Marie Covington, of aggravated arson, and the trial court sentenced her to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant timely filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion, maintaining that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jonquarius Cunningham, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-three years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Errol Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, and two counts of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the two aggravated child neglect convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The trial court also merged the defendant’s convictions for criminally negligent homicide and sentenced him to two years. The defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because aggravated child neglect is not an enumerated offense included in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(i)(2), the trial court erred in its applying the statute and sentencing the defendant as a violent offender at 100% release eligibility. Therefore, we remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

After a jury trial, the defendants, Leon Denton and Devan Denton, were convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of aggravated rape, one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendants assert the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, arguing the State failed to overcome the defense of duress. The defendants also claim their right to a speedy trial was violated. Independently, Leon Denton argues his convictions violate double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Elza Evans III, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and his effective sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial and on appeal. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Tony Britton, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2015 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2011 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Because the petition was filed well beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jabriel Linzy, alias, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant argues (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and (2) that evidence from social media posts was improperly admitted. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Larry A. Pullum, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim. We affirm its judgment.

William Harold Smith, alias (“the Defendant”), was convicted of failure to appear after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve three years with a thirty-five percent release eligibility in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and dismiss the charge.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Sebastian Pegues, of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus twenty years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Sebastian Pegues, No. W2014-00854-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3404736, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 27, 2015), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel ineffectively cross-examined the medical examiner. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Calvin Banks, of first degree premeditated murder and the trial court imposed a sentence of life. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence supporting his conviction is insufficient because the State failed to establish premeditation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Michael Dean Sexton, was convicted of one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of vandalism over $10,000. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each count to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) Whether the trial court properly discharged a juror (Defendant’s Issues I and II); (2) Whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly declined to issue a jury instruction (Defendant’s Issues III and IV); and (3) Whether the trial court erred by permitting the name of the co-defendant to be redacted from the indictment and whether the trial court refused to allow Defendant to introduce a copy of the unredacted indictment into evidence. (Defendant’s Issues V and VI). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.