APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case of first impression, we consider whether a defendant can be convicted of
criminally negligent homicide when he incites, encourages or coerces another person to
commit suicide and whether the State of Tennessee has territorial jurisdiction over a
defendant when he affirmatively reaches out to Tennessee via electronic means. A Knox
County jury convicted Defendant, Hayden Jennings Berkebile, of criminally negligent
homicide after the victim, Grace Anne Sparks, shot and killed herself for Defendant’s
sexual pleasure while on a video call with Defendant. Defendant argues on appeal that: (1)
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because (a) the State did not prove
that Defendant’s actions were the proximate cause of the victim’s death, and (b) the
negligent homicide statute as construed here violates the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution; (2) the State did not establish territorial jurisdiction over Defendant
because he was in Indiana at the time of the victim’s death and only communicated with
her electronically; (3) the trial court erred in admitting an alleged hearsay statement by the
investigator; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to utilize a transcript of
Defendant’s interrogation that contained inaccurate transcriptions; (5) cumulative error
requires a new trial; and (6) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion because it
relied on evidence not in the record. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and oral arguments,
the record, and the relevant law, we affirm in all respects.

In this case, the State relied exclusively upon online communications sent between
the Defendant, who resided in Indiana, and the suicide decedent, who resided in Tennessee,
to establish a conviction of criminally negligent homicide. In my view, the State failed to
establish the essential elements of territorial jurisdiction and proximate cause. No matter
how “dark” or “diabolical” the online communications leading up to the decedent’s death
may have been, there is simply no law in Tennessee making it a crime to verbally persuade
or coerce someone to commit suicide.1 Because Tennessee has yet to criminalize
incitement, inducement, or encouragement to commit suicide, words alone cannot serve as
the basis for a criminal conviction.2 Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent

The Defendant, Jonathan E. Woodruff, pled guilty to the offense of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a five-year sentence to be served in a community corrections program and later on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant was alleged to have engaged in new criminal conduct by possessing fentanyl, and following a hearing, the trial court fully revoked the Defendant’s suspended sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that a violation was not established by a preponderance of the evidence and that he was denied the opportunity to review a video of the alleged misconduct. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Honeycutt, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of initiating the process to manufacture
methamphetamine and two counts of child endangerment, in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence,
suspended to ten years of probation, after service of sixty-one days in confinement. After multiple violations
and revocation hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence and ordered it into
execution, granting “street time” credit from October 25, 2021 to May 6, 2022. The Defendant filed a Rule 36
motion, claiming “clerical mistakes in the judgment orders” related to whether the Defendant’s sentence was a
probation sentence or a sentence served on community corrections. The Defendant argued that he was
entitled to time served in community corrections from September 4, 2012, rather than October 25, 2021,
because his sentence was a community corrections sentence. The trial court denied the motion, and the
Defendant appeals, maintaining that he has been deprived of time served in community corrections. After
review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Charles Thomas Johnson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Alysha J. Barr, was convicted of vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence resulting from a blood draw at the scene of the collision because: (1) it was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search; and (2) she did not sign the waiver form as statutorily required at the time of the offense.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406 (2017) (amended 2019).  She also argues that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony based on an untrustworthy experiment.  After review, we conclude that no reversible error occurred and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After a bench trial, Defendant, Christopher C. White, was found guilty of one count of theft valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and ordered Defendant to pay $10,228 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal; and (3) collateral estoppel required the trial court to dismiss the case. After review, we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for theft. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the case.

Tory Keith Mote, Defendant, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, domestic
assault, and interference with a 911 call after a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault. Because
the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Lamons Gooch, III, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (2) whether the stop and seizure were adequately supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion and whether the length of the stop exceeded the scope of the stop; (3) whether the preliminary hearing was improperly conducted; (4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (5) whether the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department and the City of Nashville are liable for implementing unconstitutional policies; and (6) whether the United States District Court committed plain error by holding that the Defendant’s federal false imprisonment claims were untimely. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions. We also hold that we lack jurisdiction to entertain an original civil action or to review federal court proceedings. Finally, because the Defendant has waived plenary review of the remaining issues and has not requested plain error review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Vernice Darlene Farrar, of three counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and three counts of fraudulent use of a debit card, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions for first-degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, and fraudulent use of a debit card. She also contends that the trial court erred in affirming her convictions as the thirteenth juror and that her sentence was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Richard Rand, Jr., was convicted of the possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced him to a term of four years on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant violated the terms of his probation by absconding from supervision. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentence in full and ordered the original sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his conduct amounted only to a technical failure to report rather than an absconsion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jeffrey Neal Olive, of second degree murder, and he was sentenced to a term of twenty years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was denied his rights to a fair trial and due process of law. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to thoroughly investigate the case and potential defenses; (2) failing to discuss with the Petitioner his right to testify and allow him to testify at trial; (3) failing to challenge various pieces of evidence; and (4) encouraging the jury to convict the Petitioner of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter instead of the charged offense of second degree murder. The Petitioner also alleges that his rights to a fair trial and due process of law were violated in the taking of a pretrial statement and the faulty preservation of evidence. Finally, the Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants post-conviction relief. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Camden A. Miller, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen and was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to have his aggregate sentence declared illegal because it contravenes his status as a Range I, standard offender. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County sentenced the Defendant, Gustavio Rousseau, as a Range I offender to twenty-four years at thirty percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction following his guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to one year less than the maximum sentence in the applicable range. The Defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-114(2), finding that the Defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in not giving due consideration to sentencing principles since the Defendant had accepted responsibility in entering an open plea and had no prior felonies. The State contends that the Defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion because the Defendant did not overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded to the trial court’s sentencing decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Mario Rogers, appeals his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator or that he acted with the requisite mental state. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James E. Johnson, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Carlos Key, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder and resulting effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post conviction court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Kireek Kaseem Steele, of rape, sexual battery, rape of a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on all five counts. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gary Lee Emory, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, which petition challenged his multiple convictions of aggravated robbery, robbery,
aggravated burglary, and facilitation of aggravated burglary, alleging that he was deprived
of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of postconviction
relief.

The defendant, Demetrius A. Brooks, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his eight-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willis Holloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to 135 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful appeal, post-conviction filing, and extraordinary relief filing, in December 2022, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion challenging an unconstitutional jury instruction. He then filed a supplemental motion claiming “actual innocence.” The trial court denied his Rule 36.1 motion. The Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, and the Petitioner now appeals. The State asserts that, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), the appeal is untimely. After review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

After a 2022 bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Rickie Lumley, of felony evading arrest, and subsequently sentenced him as a Career Offender to twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his Class D felony conviction for felony evading arrest because his flight did not create a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties. He contends that his conviction should have only been for a Class E felony. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Appellant, Gardtrella Marie Day-Knowles, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of neglect of an impaired adult, for which she received a sentence of seven years’ supervised probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-117 (2017) (amended 2019, repealed 2020). On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing witnesses to describe conditions of animal neglect in her home; (2) refusing to redact an unfairly prejudicial comment from the victim’s medical records; and (3) allowing a witness to testify about her memory of the contents of a report under the public records hearsay exception. After review, we conclude there was no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Andre Terry, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts on appeal that the post-conviction court erred
in concluding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel, specifically as it
related to his failure to procure a plea offer from the State. The State counters that the postconviction
court properly denied relief. We ordered supplemental briefing as to whether
the post-conviction court had jurisdiction to consider this petition. We hold that the postconviction
court did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition because the pro se postconviction
petition was deficient, and thus a nullity, and the amended petition was filed
outside of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the postconviction
court and dismiss the petition.

The Defendant, Jarvis Miller, appeals his twenty-five-year sentence at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) for his second degree murder conviction. Specifically, he challenges the length and manner of his sentence as excessive because the trial court (1) failed to mitigate the Defendant’s sentence based on “mistakenly recollected” facts from trial; (2) misapplied and gave improper weight to two enhancement factors; and (3) failed to give meaningful consideration to imposing an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm.