APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2023, the Defendant, Aimee Lee Higby, entered a guilty plea to the facilitation of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and abuse of a corpse. By agreement, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea, which the trial court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Richard E. Reed, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged convictions for
possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone;
possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone;
possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free childcare
zone; possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more in a drug-free childcare zone;
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and unlawful
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, for which the trial court imposed an effective
twenty-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel for failure to include an offer-of-proof transcript in the appellate
record; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress; and that he was denied
due process because he was not permitted to testify or call trial counsel as a witness at the
post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

In 2012, the Defendant, Jesse L. Kutrieb, pleaded guilty to two counts of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, three counts of burglary other than a habitation, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and two counts of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of four years of supervised probation. The Defendant moved out of state without notifying his probation officer and was arrested and convicted of multiple offenses in Michigan. On this basis, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation because it did not rely on the facts set forth in the probation violation warrant, which only included absconding. After a thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a retrial, Defendant, William Eugene Moon, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony and sentenced to an effective sixteen-year sentence to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter; that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written request for the jury instruction before the jury began its deliberation; that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements; and that Defendant was denied a speedy trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The majority opinion offers a thoughtful examination of this challenging case. I agree with much of the majority’s well-stated analysis, but there is a salient point of departure between the majority’s understanding and mine. This point of departure relates to whether admission into evidence of Mr. Moon’s post-shooting statements to Officer Wilder violates the protections afforded by Miranda. I conclude that it does, and, accordingly, respectfully dissent.

The Petitioner, Bernard Woodard, was convicted of burglary, theft of property valued at $2500 or more, and felony evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, as a career offender, to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Woodard, No. M2020- 01538-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 5467384, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2021), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging, among other claims, that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, this court reversed and concluded that the petition raised colorable claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Woodard v. State, No. M2022-00162-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 4932885, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2022), no perm. app. filed. On remand, the post-conviction court held a hearing and later issued an order denying relief. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Christopher Alan Ayotte, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor with greater than one hundred images, two counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of one hundred and twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form as to Count One of Case No. 2023-B-1260 reflecting the defendant's multiple offender status.

The Petitioner, Keinesa Lillard, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her convictions for attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, especially aggravated robbery, evading arrest by use of a motor vehicle involving risk of death or serious bodily injury to others, and four counts of simple possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on her claim that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to communicate with her regarding the State’s proof; (2) failing to review discovery materials with her; and (3) failing to discuss pretrial motions and strategy with her. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the pro se Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the trial court’s July 31, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Donald Allen. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. The trial court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED.

James Patrick Stout, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as well as the denial of his motion for recusal and motion for contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lacey Jones, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion1 to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 based on his claim that he was illegally sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Kevin D. Buford, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance, failing to establish a defense, calling him to testify, and failing to call an expert witness. He further argues that trial counsel’s representation resulted in prejudice and that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Brian Michael Jarrett, pleaded guilty to two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, two counts of incest, and one count of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Leon Brazelton, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, maintaining that his attorney at trial was ineffective. Following our
review of the record, we remand the judgment of the post-conviction court for further
findings concerning the timeliness of the petition.

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the plaintiffs properly served the corporate defendant with process. The trial court determined that plaintiffs did so because the employee who signed for the documents was an appointed subagent of the defendant’s registered agent. Having reviewed the record and relevant authorities, we reverse.

On August 27, 2025, Defendant Timothy Laquan Davis, Jr. filed an application seeking an extraordinary appeal of the trial court’s order, filed on July 24, 2025, denying his motion to strike the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment in this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). Tenn. R. App. P. 10. Pursuant to prior order, the State filed its response on September 8, 2025. In the meantime, on September 2, 2025, Defendant Braze Roland Rucker filed an almost identical application for permission to appeal. Given the fact Mr. Davis and Mr. Rucker are co-defendants, and considering the identical issue being raised, the court hereby consolidates the two applications for purposes of its review. Tenn. R. App. P. 16(b). Upon full consideration, the applications are denied for the reasons stated below.

An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if this Court determines the trial court “has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review” or “if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). A party must obtain permission from this Court for an extraordinary appeal; it is not a matter of right. Id. To that end, an application for permission to appeal must contain a statement of the question(s) presented for review, a statement of the facts, a statement of the reason(s) supporting an extraordinary appeal, and the relief sought. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(c). Furthermore, the application must contain a copy of the trial court order from which an appeal is being sought, as well as copies of other parts of the record necessary for determination of the application, such as the transcript of any hearing held on the motion at issue. Id. Because, generally, there is no record on appeal when a party seeks an extraordinary appeal, it is the party’s responsibility to provide this Court with an ad hoc 09/12/2025 2 record of the proceeding below. The Defendants’ applications are adequate for this Court’s review.

The Defendant, John Wendell Lewis, appeals from his guilty-pleaded conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39- 17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant, a Range I offender, contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lionel Vashon Champion, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; use or unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies; four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class C felonies; unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence, a Class C felony; and eight counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony having previously been convicted of a felony drug offense, Class D felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-17-425 (2018) (possession of drug paraphernalia); 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2024) (armed dangerous felonies); 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (carrying or possession of weapons). The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a career offender, to serve an effective sentence of forty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s incoming and outgoing text messages, (2) the court erred in permitting a witness to read one of the text messages to the jury, and (3) the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Keenan Alexander, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s jury-trial convictions for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, speeding, and failing to maintain financial responsibility and his effective two-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, David James Paul, was convicted of two counts of driving under the influence. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. He contends that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure because the officers who detained him did not testify, leaving the record without proof of the circumstances justifying the stop. The State responds that reasonable suspicion was established through a “be on the lookout” dispatch report, or BOLO, and the testimony of the arresting officer, who arrived after the Defendant had been detained. Upon our review, we hold that because the State offered no admissible evidence concerning the circumstances of the initial seizure, it fell short of establishing that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand for dismissal.

The defendant, Gerald Lovelace, was convicted by a Stewart County Circuit Court jury of three counts of first-degree felony murder, which were merged into one conviction and for which the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement; (2) his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated; (3) the trial court erred in allowing witness testimony concerning his prior purchase of drugs from the victim, his “habit” of keeping a gun under the hood of his car, and his being “suited and booted” when he left the house the night of the murder; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Serena N. Hammond, Defendant, was indicted by a Knox County Grand Jury for one count
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Count 1, one count of aggravated burglary
acting in concert with two or more other persons in Count 2, and one count of attempted
second degree murder in Count 3. Defendant was convicted as charged in Counts 1 and 2
and convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 3. Defendant was sentenced
to an effective sentence of ten years in incarceration as a standard offender. Defendant
appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for
aggravated burglary acting in concert; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting photographs of a gun and magazine recovered from a car in which she was pulled
over fifteen days after the incident; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by
admitting recordings of Defendant’s phone call made from jail to a co-defendant; (4) the
trial court improperly considered Defendant’s false testimony at trial and the location of
the offense in enhancing her sentence for aggravated burglary acting in concert; and (5) the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived her of the right to a fair trial. After review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The Petitioner argues that Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), established a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause to expert testimony. Upon our review of the application and the State’s response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

A Grundy County jury convicted the defendant, John W. Smith, of one count of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count of attempted second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and eight counts of reckless endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in admitting the 911 calls, in refusing to admit Jerome Powell’s statement that “she had her gun then,” and in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for consideration of the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). We also remand for corrected judgment forms in counts five, fourteen, and fifteen.

Defendant, Matthew James Wood, appeals from his Polk County Criminal Court
convictions for attempted possession with intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 grams of
methamphetamine; possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the attempted
commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he
received a total effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration. Defendant contends that:
(1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from
the traffic stop; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted text messages in violation of
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) the trial court erroneously restricted Defendant’s
cross-examination of a police officer; and (4) the evidence of his intent to sell or deliver is
insufficient to support his convictions for attempted possession of methamphetamine and
possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the attempt to commit a
dangerous felony. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.