APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Currently before the Court is the Petitioner’s pro se application for an extraordinary appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10. It is not entirely clear what the Petitioner is seeking to appeal, but he failed to attach to his application a copy of any trial court order appealable under Rule 10. An extraordinary appeal may be granted from an interlocutory order of a trial court if the appellate court determines the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review or if necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a). Thus, Rule 10 is utilized to gain interlocutory appellate review of a trial court order. Again, the Petitioner failed to attach a copy of any trial court order which demonstrates how the trial court has acted in an “arbitrary fashion” necessary to warrant an extraordinary appeal at this juncture of the trial court proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10, Advisory Commission Comment (“[t]he circumstances in which review is available . . . are very narrowly circumscribed to those situations in which the trial court . . . has acted in an arbitrary fashion, or as may be necessary to permit complete appellate review on a later appeal”). 

Accordingly, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied. Because it appears the incarcerated Petitioner remains indigent, costs are taxed to the State. However, the State has the authority to recoup the costs associated with this appeal from the Petitioner’s trust fund account, if appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143.

After a bench trial, the Defendant, Alphonso Elexander, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary, misdemeanor vandalism, and possession of drug paraphernalia and received an effective six-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Paul Springer, was charged with two counts of forgery in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000 and one count of theft in an amount $60,000 or more but less than $250,000.1 Defendant’s jury trial ended in a mistrial after Defendant “violat[ed] a court order” by referencing an alleged victim’s prior criminal record. During the trial, Defendant was twice held in contempt of court, once for arriving late to court and again for violating the court’s order. Nearly three years after judgments were entered against Defendant for two counts of direct contempt of court, Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Contempt of Court,” which the trial court denied.2 Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of contempt. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court failed to explicitly order he serve his life sentence for felony murder in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and failed to indicate the same on his felony murder judgment form. Additionally, the Petitioner alleges two procedural errors occurred in these proceedings: (1) the State was without authority to attach a proposed dismissal order to its motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition, and (2) the habeas corpus court erred by simply signing the State’s dismissal order without providing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law for its decision. After review, we affirm.

After the Defendant, Brandon Tylor Mulac, was arrested in Smith County with 396 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle, law enforcement executed a search warrant on his home in DeKalb County and found another 425 grams of methamphetamine. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the DeKalb County search and a motion to exclude evidence from his Smith County arrest based on Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, both of which were denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver over three hundred grams of methamphetamine and received a sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred based on the following three grounds: (1) in denying his motions to suppress because the search warrant and affidavit did not establish probable cause and because the affidavit contained false information in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); (2) in admitting evidence from the Smith County traffic stop in violation of Rule 404(b); and (3) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction.1 Upon review, we affirm.

Lamar Fletcher, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Movant, Antonio K. Champion, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence related to his guilty-pleaded convictions in Madison County Circuit Court case numbers 22-488 and 22-489. 1 On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion because he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender based upon several prior convictions, which he asserts also involved “illegal” sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Christopher Terrell Shipp, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, one count of felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder after a jury trial. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life in prison. On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims in the home invasion. State v. Shipp, No. M2016-01397-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 4457595, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. An amended petition filed after counsel was appointed raised additional claims, including a Brady claim based on the State’s withholding of a witness statement before the preliminary hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner sought removal of his appointed counsel. This Court denied Petitioner’s application for an extraordinary appeal and the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Eventually, Petitioner was allowed to proceed pro se on appeal. Because Petitioner has either waived his issues or failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this dependency and neglect action, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected in 2015 and found that the child was the victim of severe child abuse perpetrated by one or both of his parents. The parents appealed that decision to the circuit court. Because a termination petition was filed shortly thereafter, the circuit court stayed the dependency and neglect appeal pending the outcome of the termination action. Both parents’ parental rights were terminated pursuant to the severe child abuse ground in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), but the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed that determination. The dependency and neglect appeal then resumed in the circuit court, and the Department of Children’s Services filed an amended dependency and neglect petition alleging new facts. The mother filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, and she filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in the termination case barred all claims in the dependency and neglect case under the doctrine of res judicata. The circuit court denied both motions but permitted the parties to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s determination that the severe child abuse claim was not precluded, but we affirm the court in all other respects.

In two separate criminal proceedings, one in Smith County and one in Wilson County, the Petitioner, John Allen Hessmer, was convicted of two felony offenses and two misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Approximately one year later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Wilson County, alleging that his Smith County convictions were void. He also asserted that he had not received proper credit for time served in pretrial detention. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the convictions from a different county and that the application otherwise failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly dismissed the application. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree with the Petitioner and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Jason Patrick Odom, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; burglary of a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; and vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property); 39- 14-105 (2018) (grading of theft); 39-13-1002 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (burglary); 39-14-408 (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (vandalism). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of twelve years for theft, six years for burglary, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for vandalism. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph into evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Juan Manuel Mejia Nunez, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) permitting several of the State’s witnesses to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial; (2) admitting testimony that referenced and described the victims’ forensic interviews; (3) admitting testimony from a police investigator about the behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims; and (4) limiting testimony from the victims’ mother regarding the circumstances of her divorce. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Travis Rogers, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. After the State rested, Defendant put on proof. Because Defendant waived his challenge to the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof by putting on proof, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2008, a Lincoln County jury convicted the Petitioner, Shawn Simmons, of first degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Sixteen years later, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asserting that a trial witness had since revealed previously undisclosed information related to the offense. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition without a hearing, concluding that the petition was untimely and that due process principles did not toll the one-year statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the summary dismissal was erroneous. Upon review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding (“the Bonding Company”), appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petitions to obtain bonding privileges in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The Bonding Company contends that (1) the trial court improperly held a hearing without counsel present, (2) the trial court erroneously considered certain evidence without the required necessary authentication or identification in violation of the Rules of Evidence, and (3) the evidence did not support the trial court’s denial of approval to write bonds. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Brandi Michelle Adams,1 pled guilty to the offense of second degree murder as a Range II, multiple offender and received a sentence of forty years. She later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that she was a Range I, standard offender and did not agree to be sentenced in an enhanced range. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appealed, asserting three issues: (1) that she could not legally be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender; (2) that her plea was involuntary; and (3) that the trial court exhibited bias in denying her Rule 36.1 motion. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gabriel Enriques Turcios, was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, he alleged that his trial counsel (1) failed to timely and adequately raise an insanity defense; (2) failed to challenge the aggravating circumstance for sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(5); and (3) failed to seek suppression of messages exchanged between the Petitioner and the victim. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Brandon Bassett, Defendant, was indicted for and convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal he argues that the State’s failure to elect an offense in Count 5 resulted in a jury verdict that was not unanimous and requires reversal. Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing by failing to place findings on the record to show that the overall length of the sentence comported with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Because we determine that the proof at trial necessitated an election on Count 5, we reverse the conviction in Count 5 and remand for a new trial. However, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Nancy Abbie Tallent, was convicted by an Anderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of third-offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2024). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served at 75%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case, (2) no probable cause existed for her arrest, (3) the trial court erred by failing to strike the testimony of witnesses who offered allegedly perjured testimony, (4) a police officer committed willful misconduct because he “overcharged” her in order to obtain a higher bond and obtain leverage for a plea agreement, (5) the trial court erred by not suppressing the blood sample evidence based upon the use of an allegedly outdated consent form, (6) the police violated the Defendant’s HIPAA rights and violated State law by requesting her medical records and by fabricating the alcohol toxicology report used at trial, (7) the police violated State law by altering video evidence used at trial, (8) she was denied due process of law due to various defects in the conviction proceedings, (9) she was denied an additional blood sample for defense testing, (10) police officers perjured themselves and suborned perjury, (11) the chain of custody for the blood evidence was not established, and (12) the State unjustifiably made a plea offer after the jury returned the guilty verdict in order to avoid an allegedly meritorious appeal following “an abusive performance” during the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Byron Pipkin, of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, possessing a firearm during a felony, and possessing a handgun as a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence plus sixty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree premeditated murder conviction and the trial court erred when it admitted prejudicial information. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Corridirus Qualls, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of attempted second degree murder; one count of reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; two counts of aggravated assault; and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of life plus eighteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Heather Jackson, through counsel, has filed a motion for review of
the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s revocation of her pretrial bail. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-11-144; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 8. The Defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly revoked her pretrial bail, sua sponte, when the Defendant decided not to enter
a guilty plea at the plea submission hearing and, instead, asserted her right to a jury trial.
The Defendant argues that the trial court’s summary revocation of her pretrial bail—
without notice, a hearing, or requiring the State to establish by a preponderance of evidence
a statutory basis for revoking her pretrial bail—does not comport with due process. See
State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015). The court has determined that a
response from the State is not necessary in this matter.1 Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this court’s order.

The Defendant, Andrew Jackson, through counsel, has filed a motion for review of
the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s revocation of his pretrial bail. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-11-144; see also Tenn. R. App. P. 8. The Defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly revoked his pretrial bail, sua sponte, when the Defendant decided not to enter
a guilty plea at the plea submission hearing and, instead, asserted his right to a jury trial.
The Defendant argues that the trial court’s summary revocation of his pretrial bail—
without notice, a hearing, or requiring the State to establish by a preponderance of evidence
a statutory basis for revoking his pretrial bail—does not comport with due process. See
State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tenn. 2015). The State has filed a response
conceding that the Defendant’s due process rights were denied when the trial court
summarily revoked his bail without holding a hearing. Upon full consideration, the
Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this court’s order.

The Petitioner, Henry T. Johnson, appeals from the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Petitioner contends he raised cognizable claims for habeas corpus relief and asserts his judgment of conviction of first degree murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to pronounce judgment or sentence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-101(a); (2) the original judgment was not signed by the trial judge; and (3) the trial judge was without jurisdiction to enter a corrected judgment because the original judgment had already become final. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found that four statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the minor child and that termination of parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.