APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Demarcus Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas in case number 14-02150 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated burglary, theft of property, and setting fire to property and in case number 14-02151 to especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective forty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jamarius Deon Gant, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402 (2014) (aggravated robbery), 39-13-304 (2014) (aggravated kidnapping), 39-11-403 (2014) (facilitation of a felony), 39-14-402 (2014) (burglary of a vehicle). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307 (2014) (amended 2017). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive nine-year terms for the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Defendant received concurrent sentences of four years for the firearm convictions and eleven months, twentynine days for the facilitation of burglary of a vehicle, for an effective eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (2) the trial court erred during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gabriel Toban, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of third offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §55-10-401 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction, (2) the trial court erred by rejecting a negotiated plea agreement, (3) the indictment was invalid, and (4) the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment, which charged the Defendant with domestic assault by causing bodily injury. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment. The order of the trial court is reversed, the domestic assault charge is reinstated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Brijesh Mukesh Desai, the Defendant, entered a negotiated guilty plea to Class C felony issuing or passing a worthless check in the amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would be sentenced as a Range I standard offender; the sentence would be between three and six years; there would be a possibility of diversion; restitution would be $18,871.34; and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court at a later hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ probation following the service of forty-five days in jail. The Defendant now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty. However, the Defendant did not reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law or seek review of his sentence, nor do any other grounds for direct appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) exist. Because the Defendant has no right to a direct appeal from his guilty plea, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Terrence McDonald, was convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of reckless endangerment. He appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief and argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pro se petitioner, Mark Foster, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Relying on Anthony D. Byers v. State, the petitioner argues in this appeal that his convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are illegal and in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). No. W2011-00473-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 938976, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2012) perm. app. denied (Aug. 15, 2012). Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Calandra Clark, of identity theft, forgery, driving on a revoked license, and violation of the seat belt law. The Defendant pled guilty to an additional count of driving on a revoked license as a prior offender, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for identity theft and forgery and that her sentence is improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Curtis Wren, filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the pleading, finding that the petition for post-conviction relief was untimely, that the petition failed to allege a sufficient factual basis for a motion to reopen prior post-conviction proceedings, and that the petition failed to state a colorable claim of an illegal sentence. On appeal, Petitioner only challenges the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record, we determine that this is Petitioner’s second such petition and that dismissal was proper on that ground. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Hardin County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Knight, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court failed to excuse a juror for cause when the juror had extrajudicial information about the Defendant; (2) the trial court failed to perform its role as the thirteenth juror; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this parental termination action, we conclude that the trial court properly found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the rights of the mother and father on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. We conclude that the trial court erred in terminating the father’s rights on the ground of willful failure to visit. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

The Defendant, William “Bill” Douglas Farr, Sr., was convicted by a Lawrence County Circuit Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by vouching for the credibility of a witness and repeatedly referring to the Defendant as a “monster”; (2) the trial court erred in failing to give specific unanimity and election of offenses jury instructions; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court applied the incorrect law in determining his sentence. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction but modify his sentence to twenty-five years and remand for entry of an amended judgment.