APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a trial, a Washington County jury found Defendant, Barbara Mae Potter, guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of tampering with evidence. At sentencing, the trial court merged Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder into the two convictions for first degree premeditated murder and imposed concurrent life sentences for those offenses. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence for tampering with evidence and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentences. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in changing the venue of the trial to Washington County; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for the lead prosecutor to withdraw from the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s “motion to
 pre-emptively strike witness”; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to sever; and (6) issues raised in Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis entitle her to a new trial. Following a thorough review, we reinstate Defendant’s conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, affirm the convictions, and remand for sentencing on conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder.

Defendant, James Hall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the judgment for case 2015-C-1974 contains an error that warrants remand for correction.

Lonny Lavar Bardin, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of Class B felony rape and Class E felony sexual battery and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steven Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1994 convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. Because the petitioner has stated entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the form of the application of pretrial jail credit, we reverse and vacate the order of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition. The cause is remanded to the habeas corpus court so that that court may transfer the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the appropriate award of pretrial jail credit.

The Petitioner, Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and, after a hearing, denied relief. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusions and opinions of the majority. Therefore, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Shane Frazier, of aggravated assault and violating an Order of Protection. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served consecutively to previous sentences for other convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant, Jenelle Leigh Potter, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court merged the conspiracy conviction and ordered concurrent life sentences for both murder convictions. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant her request for a change of venire; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit premeditated first degree murder; (3) the criminal responsibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated, section, 39-11-402, is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the trial court erred when it failed to enjoin the prosecutor from publishing his book about this case until after the final adjudication of this case. Following our review, we affirm the convictions for first degree premeditated murder, but hold that merger of the conspiracy conviction was error. We reinstate the Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remand to the trial court for sentencing on that count.

In 2016, the Defendant, Timothy Wayne Woodard, was indicted for nine counts of removal of government records and nine counts of theft of property. The Hamblen County District Attorney’s Office denied the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office from the case, alleging that its response to his application revealed a conflict of interest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the District Attorney’s Office was not disqualified from considering the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed application for extraordinary appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 1994, the petitioner, Hugh A. Niceley, was convicted of eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery, occurring over the course of several years from 1988 until 1992. For his crimes, the petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty-three years, to be served at 30 percent. In 1999, the trial court entered a new judgment as to Count 9, requiring the sentence be served at 100 percent, as required by the applicable statute. As a result, the petitioner asserts the 1999 judgment created an illegal sentence, arguing his sentence in Count 9 should be served at 30 percent, as originally ordered. The trial court disagreed, as do we. Accordingly, the order of the trial court requiring service of Count 9 at 100 percent is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Victor Eugene McConnell, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts the State breached the plea agreement in this case, entitling the petitioner to habeas corpus relief. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Elvis Louis Marsh, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, delivery of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, conspiracy to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Eric Henry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his two-year sentence for reckless endangerment in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Whelchel Randall Hogan, entered a guilty plea in Dickson County Circuit Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the initial seizure of the defendant and the validity of the search warrant issued in this case. The defendant asserts the police did not have reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure of the defendant and the search warrant issued in this case lacked probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s actions were a proper exercise of the community caretaking function, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Defendant was not seized when the officer approached the Defendant with activated blue lights. Without a seizure, there would be no need for the officer’s actions to be deemed the exercise of the community caretaking function.

The petitioner, Christopher L. Shaw, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia, and felony evading arrest. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of relief.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Antoine Dewayne Clark, of aggravated arson, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in prison. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s questions during voir dire; in allowing testimony regarding the injuries suffered by the victims; in denying a mistrial based on the introduction of evidence that the Defendant was wearing an ankle monitor; and in permitting hearsay testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nathan Todd Cooke, was convicted by a Van Buren County Circuit Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2017). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the admission of the blood alcohol test result was plain error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Kelvin Anthony Lee, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, and the Lauderdale County Circuit Court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his sentence of life without parole violates Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Moten v. State, 935 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); and Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contesting his transfer from Tennessee to Kentucky for trial. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court was without jurisdiction to order his transfer because he was not served with an arrest warrant. On appeal, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition.

On August 26, 2016, the Defendant, Heather Montgomery, was convicted of two counts of sale of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park and two counts of delivery of less than fifteen grams of heroin within 1,000 feet of a park. Counts 2 and 4 were merged into Counts 1 and 3, and the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective 8-year term, to be served at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion is neither excluding the testimony of a confidential informant or granting a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments.

Defendant, Torvarius E. Mason, was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Thomas Clinton Wood, was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to three years in confinement as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Charles Pennington, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present a defense regarding the victim’s ownership of the gun and failure to
cross-examine his codefendants regarding the details of their plea agreements. Petitioner also asserts that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured testimony from one of his codefendants. Although we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal in the interest of justice, we conclude that Petitioner’s grounds for relief are waived because they were not raised in the post-conviction court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Howard, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion for new trial. After a review of the record, we hold that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient in this regard and that the Petitioner was presumptively prejudiced by the deficiency. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition and remand this case with instructions to that court that it grant the Petitioner a delayed appeal, beginning with the right to file a delayed motion for new trial.