APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Tracy Looney, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Carmel Borum, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He specifically argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge ownership of the stolen automobile and in failing to require the State to prove the value of the automobile. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Joseph H. Goostree, complains on appeal that the trial court improperly sentenced him to serve the balance of his eight-year sentence after he admitted to multiple violations of the conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court and remand for entry of a judgment form dismissing Count 1 of the indictment.

The Petitioner, Oscar Polk, Jr., appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to argue at trial that the Petitioner was not tested for gunshot residue. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Johnny Jenkins, for second degree murder (Count 1), employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as related to Count 1 (Count 2), attempted second degree murder (Count 3), and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as related to Count 3 (Count 4). After trial, a jury convicted the defendant of employing a firearm in Counts 2 and 4, voluntary manslaughter in Count 1, and attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 3. Upon the defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court dismissed Count 2 but upheld his remaining convictions. The defendant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and several rulings of the trial court relating to the admission of evidence and jury instructions. Based upon our review of the record, we reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction in Count 1 for voluntary manslaughter. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide, which was charged to the jury, we remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction for reckless homicide and for resentencing on this modified conviction. The defendant’s convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 3 and employing a firearm in Count 4 are affirmed. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Sarah Brinkman, appeals from the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for her conviction of introducing contraband into a penal institution, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve 180 days’ incarceration before returning to probation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Lee Hufford, appeals from the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court revoking his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the violation of probation affidavit and arrest warrant, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0in; mso-para-margin-right:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0in; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}

The defendant, Jerry Ray Oaks, appeals his Carter County Criminal Court jury conviction of vehicular homicide, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw, that the defendant should have been permitted to argue the results of a vehicle inspection during closing argument, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of vehicular homicide. The trial court erred by finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of vehicular homicide and remand the case for a new trial.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. In my opinion, based on the proof presented at the suppression hearing and at trial, the trial court correctly determined that there were exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless blood draw. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction of vehicular homicide.

After a jury trial, Gregory Gill, Defendant, was convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving the attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to crossexamine a defense witness about his pending criminal charges; and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

Jason White, Defendant, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell within a drug-free zone and one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to deliver within a drug-free zone. Co-defendant Kristina Cole and Co-defendant Montez Mullins were also convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to sell within a drug-free zone and one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to deliver within a drug-free zone in the same trial. See State v. Kristina Cole and Montez Mullins, No. W2017-01980-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5810011, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2018), perm. app. filed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to sixty years as a career offender with release after service of 100% of the sentence. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing Defendant’s trial counsel to represent Defendant despite a conflict of interest; (2) the State constructively amended the indictment by obtaining a superseding indictment; (3) the trial court erred in admitting: testimony from Andrew Brown; Co-defendant Montez Mullins’ confession; text messages that Detective Mark Gaia retrieved from Co-defendant Cole’s three cell phones; and marijuana confiscated from Mr. White’s vehicle; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Detective Gaia without instructing the jury about witness credibility; (5) the State’s introduction of Co-defendant Mullins’ confession violated Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968); (6) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to sever his case from Co-defendants Cole and Mullins; (7) the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found Defendant guilty; and (8) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Daniel Dewayne Kincaid, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of one hundred and eighty days of split confinement for his convictions for DUI. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve one hundred and eighty days of split confinement before being released on supervised probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jacquez Russell, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (first degree murder), 39-12-101 (2018) (attempt), 39-17-1324 (2018) (employment). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of sixteen years for attempted first degree murder and six years for the firearm conviction, for an effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Creed Gettys Welch, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age and was sentenced to serve ten years at 100%. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and the trial court’s alleged failure to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Huey Liles, Jr., appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the statute imposing a blood alcohol or drug concentration test fee violates principles of due process. Because our supreme court has specifically concluded that the statute in question does not violate due process principles, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After his convictions for felony murder and aggravated robbery were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner, Corey Gilbert, sought post-conviction relief. In the petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel as well as prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Lynn Zeigler, appeals from a Maury County jury conviction of rape by “knowing or having reason to know [the victim] was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(3). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting trial counsel’s cross-examination of an expert witness about his suspension from the practice of forensic psychology for unprofessional conduct; (2) whether the trial court’s decision to limit cross-examination of the expert witness effectively interfered with trial counsel’s right to present a defense; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent. I cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the State’s expert witness.

Candy D. (“Mother”) appeals the August 11, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor child Melinda N. (“the Child”). Mother raises issues regarding whether a petition for adoption of the Child is defective on its face, whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support and for abandoment by willful failure to visit and that it was proven that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s August 11, 2017 order. As Mother’s parental rights properly have been terminated, Mother lacks standing to raise issues regarding alleged deficiencies in the petition for adoption.

Preston Jamar Shepherd, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief using the form provided in Appendix A of Rule 28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Petitioner checked seven of the twelve “Grounds of Petition” listed in the form, including ground (2), that his convictions were “based on use of coerced confession” and (9), that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. After ground (2), Petitioner wrote “(due to mental capacity),” and after ground (9), Petitioner wrote “([f]ailed to go over facts/evidence with [Petitioner], and properly inform).” The post-conviction court found that the petition failed to state a factual basis for relief and summarily dismissed the petition for failing to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(d). We determine that the petition stated a colorable claim, reverse the summary dismissal, and remand for entry of a preliminary order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-107(b).

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Toran Harper, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus seventy-five years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, alleging that inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony raise reasonable doubt of his guilt. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lonny Lavar Bardin, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of Class B felony rape and Class E felony sexual battery and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steven Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1994 convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. Because the petitioner has stated entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the form of the application of pretrial jail credit, we reverse and vacate the order of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition. The cause is remanded to the habeas corpus court so that that court may transfer the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the appropriate award of pretrial jail credit.

The Petitioner, Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and, after a hearing, denied relief. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.