APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In October 2017, the Madison County Circuit Court revoked Jay R. Hassman’s (the Petitioner) probation for relocating to the State of Florida without permission and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Petitioner did not appeal the trial court’s revocation of his probation to this court. Instead, he filed a “Motion for New Revocation Hearing” in the trial court, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. Jay R. Hassman v. State, No. W2018-00784-CCA-R3-PC, 2019 WL 244585 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2019). The trial court denied relief on the basis that the motion was untimely as a motion for reduction of sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and that the motion could not be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. The Petitioner appealed the denial of his “Motion for New Revocation Hearing” to this court, which was recently denied. Id. Two months after he filed the “Motion for New Revocation Hearing,” on June 4, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, claiming that the State of Tennessee breached the terms of his plea agreement, which was alleged to have been conditioned upon the Petitioner’s ability to “move out of State.” The Petitioner further claimed that due process considerations should toll the untimely filing of the post-conviction petition because “the breach of the plea agreement did not become known to [him] until” his arrest for the probation violation in October 2017. By order on June 8, 2018, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition as time-barred and because “the issues raised by the petition could have been raised at the revocation hearing or on appeal.” On July 2, 2018, the Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a “Motion for New Trial,” “disagree[ing]” with the trial court’s June 8 order and findings, and respectfully requesting the trial court to reconsider. On September 12, 2018, by written order, the trial court denied the Petitioner’s “Motion for New Trial.” The Petitioner is now before this court and seeks review from the denial of his “Motion for New Trial.” Because no appeal as of right flows from the Petitioner’s filing, we decline review and dismiss.

In 1983, while incarcerated on other charges, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to the rape of another inmate. The trial court sentenced him to five years, to run concurrently with his existing sentence. In 2002, the Petitioner obtained parole, but his parole was revoked when he failed to register as a sex offender pursuant to the sex offender registry requirements. Sometime before 2010, the Petitioner filed his first petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that his sentence for rape was illegal because the application of the sex offender registry to his sentence violated ex post facto principles. The petition was denied, and that decision was affirmed by this court on appeal. Joseph R. Wiggins v. State, No. W2010-00091-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3075644, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 6, 2010), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed this, his second habeas corpus petition in 2010. The habeas corpus court again denied the petition. On appeal, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

A Sumner County grand jury indicted the defendant, James Wallace Norton, with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor over one hundred images, twenty-three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Following trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of all counts, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in consolidating his two indictments, declining to force the State to make an election regarding which images constituted aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, admitting testimony regarding the defendant’s internet search history, and admitting the cell phone and contraband images without a proper showing of the chain of custody. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the applicability of the enhancement factors used in determining his sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Earl Clark, Jr., of aggravated robbery and drug and weapon offenses, and he received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated robbery conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Junior Parker, complains on appeal that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the balance of his consecutive two-year sentences upon finding that Defendant had violated the conditions of probation. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The petitioner, Jason Perry, appeals the ruling of the Knox County Criminal Court granting him relief from a sentence imposed pursuant to Code section 40-35-121(b), the gang enhancement statute previously declared unconstitutional by this court, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that the illegal sentence issue was not a material element of his plea agreement and arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas. The record supports the determination of the trial court. For reasons discussed more fully below, however, we affirm that court’s ruling not as a grant of post-conviction relief but as a grant of habeas corpus relief.

The Appellant, Cumberland Bail Bonding, argues that the trial court erred in suspending its bonding privileges due to a violation of Rule 26.05(B) of the Local Rules of the Thirty-First Judicial District, a rule requiring a bonding agent to be present for a defendant’s court appearance. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Terry Leon Lancaster, was indicted on four counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery for events that took place during the summer of 2015 when the victim, then aged twelve, was staying at Defendant’s home while attending vacation bible school. At trial, the trial court dismissed Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment after a motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury found Defendant guilty of the remaining counts of the indictment, two counts of rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty years as a multiple offender. Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Angela Greene, filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her convictions of first degree murder in the perpetration of a theft, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and the accompanying life sentence. The Petitioner raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including insufficient trial preparation, failure to request a continuance when cocounsel became ill, failure to raise objections during trial, failure to ask the Petitioner on direct examination whether she killed the victim, and a conflict of interest due to his prior representation of a State’s witness. Following the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Darius Alexander Cox, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant received a total effective sentence of forty years. After the denial of his motion for new trial, Defendant appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument, and that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other crimes because the evidence was not relevant to a material issue other than Defendant’s character. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell alprazolam, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and speeding, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s ruling admitting certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Almonda Duckworth, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court denying the petition.

Following a bench trial, Larry Joe Carroll (“Defendant”) was convicted of criminal trespass, criminal simulation valued at $1,000 or less, and criminal impersonation, for which he received an effective sentence of two years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for criminal simulation valued at $1,000 or less and criminal impersonation. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joe T. Brooks, appeals as of right, from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and order of nine months’ incarceration for his conviction of reckless endangerment. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve nine months of confinement before being returned to supervised probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ronnell Barclay, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and six counts of exploitation of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of
thirty-five years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals and argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the factual basis for the charge of rape of a child, that the State withheld exculpatory statements made by the victim, and that the prosecutor made improper statements during rebuttal closing argument. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alejandro Vasquez, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that due process considerations should toll the running of the statute of limitations because he is a native Spanish speaker and cannot speak English. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The Defendant, Robert Antwan McElmurry, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, David Levon Byers, Jr., was convicted of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, possession of drug paraphernalia, and “improper lane change” in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-123, for which he received an effective sentence of four-years to be served on supervised probation. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress challenging the constitutionality of the traffic stop, which was denied by the trial court. The sole issue presented in this appeal as of right is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Kenneth Guthrie, entered a best interest plea to attempted rape in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six months day-for-day with the balance of the sentence to be served on probation. Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly denied a sentence of full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Sharrad Sharp, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and two counts of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that six of the
twenty-five counts of the indictment are void because they failed to state an offense, that it was plain error for the State to play the victims’ forensic interviews in their entirety for the jury and introduce those interviews into evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. The State acknowledges that six of the convictions should be vacated because the indictment failed to provide the Appellant with adequate notice. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Appellant’s convictions of aggravated child abuse in count one, aggravated child neglect in counts five and six, and aggravated assault in counts two, seven, and eight must be reversed and vacated and the charges dismissed because the indictment failed to provide the Appellant with adequate notice of the offenses charged. The Appellant’s remaining convictions of aggravated sexual battery in count seventeen and child abuse in counts eighteen and nineteen and the resulting effective sixteen-year sentence are affirmed.

The Defendant, William Scott Hunley, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession with intent to deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his conviction of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Stevie Gibson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to argue at trial that Petitioner could not form the requisite mens rea for the charges of first degree murder and aggravated robbery due to his voluntary intoxication at the time of the offense. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied a full and fair hearing due to the post-conviction judge’s refusal to recuse himself. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Steven Kelly, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. By agreement of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a suspended nine-year sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence failed to prove that he had the intent to sell the cocaine. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.