APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Creed Gettys Welch, was convicted after a jury trial of one count of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age and was sentenced to serve ten years at 100%. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and the trial court’s alleged failure to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Huey Liles, Jr., appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury conviction of second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), claiming that the statute imposing a blood alcohol or drug concentration test fee violates principles of due process. Because our supreme court has specifically concluded that the statute in question does not violate due process principles, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Lynn Zeigler, appeals from a Maury County jury conviction of rape by “knowing or having reason to know [the victim] was mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503(a)(3). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting trial counsel’s cross-examination of an expert witness about his suspension from the practice of forensic psychology for unprofessional conduct; (2) whether the trial court’s decision to limit cross-examination of the expert witness effectively interfered with trial counsel’s right to present a defense; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent. I cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of the State’s expert witness.

Candy D. (“Mother”) appeals the August 11, 2017 order of the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor child Melinda N. (“the Child”). Mother raises issues regarding whether a petition for adoption of the Child is defective on its face, whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), whether the Trial Court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that clear and convincing evidence was shown of grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to support and for abandoment by willful failure to visit and that it was proven that it was in the Child’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s August 11, 2017 order. As Mother’s parental rights properly have been terminated, Mother lacks standing to raise issues regarding alleged deficiencies in the petition for adoption.

After his convictions for felony murder and aggravated robbery were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner, Corey Gilbert, sought post-conviction relief. In the petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel as well as prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Preston Jamar Shepherd, Petitioner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief using the form provided in Appendix A of Rule 28 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Petitioner checked seven of the twelve “Grounds of Petition” listed in the form, including ground (2), that his convictions were “based on use of coerced confession” and (9), that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. After ground (2), Petitioner wrote “(due to mental capacity),” and after ground (9), Petitioner wrote “([f]ailed to go over facts/evidence with [Petitioner], and properly inform).” The post-conviction court found that the petition failed to state a factual basis for relief and summarily dismissed the petition for failing to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(d). We determine that the petition stated a colorable claim, reverse the summary dismissal, and remand for entry of a preliminary order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-107(b).

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Toran Harper, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus seventy-five years. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, alleging that inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony raise reasonable doubt of his guilt. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lonny Lavar Bardin, Defendant, was convicted following a jury trial of Class B felony rape and Class E felony sexual battery and sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Steven Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 1994 convictions of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder. Because the petitioner has stated entitlement to habeas corpus relief in the form of the application of pretrial jail credit, we reverse and vacate the order of the habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition. The cause is remanded to the habeas corpus court so that that court may transfer the case to the trial court for the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the appropriate award of pretrial jail credit.

The Petitioner, Jerimyah Sherrell Shutt, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court appointed counsel and, after a hearing, denied relief. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusions and opinions of the majority. Therefore, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Richard Shane Frazier, of aggravated assault and violating an Order of Protection. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served consecutively to previous sentences for other convictions. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant, Jenelle Leigh Potter, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court merged the conspiracy conviction and ordered concurrent life sentences for both murder convictions. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant her request for a change of venire; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit premeditated first degree murder; (3) the criminal responsibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated, section, 39-11-402, is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the trial court erred when it failed to enjoin the prosecutor from publishing his book about this case until after the final adjudication of this case. Following our review, we affirm the convictions for first degree premeditated murder, but hold that merger of the conspiracy conviction was error. We reinstate the Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remand to the trial court for sentencing on that count.

In 2016, the Defendant, Timothy Wayne Woodard, was indicted for nine counts of removal of government records and nine counts of theft of property. The Hamblen County District Attorney’s Office denied the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office from the case, alleging that its response to his application revealed a conflict of interest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the District Attorney’s Office was not disqualified from considering the Defendant’s application for pre-trial diversion. The Defendant filed application for extraordinary appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron Charles Garland, of first degree felony murder and robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his statements to police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree felony murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a trial, a Washington County jury found Defendant, Barbara Mae Potter, guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and one count of tampering with evidence. At sentencing, the trial court merged Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder into the two convictions for first degree premeditated murder and imposed concurrent life sentences for those offenses. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence for tampering with evidence and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with Defendant’s life sentences. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in changing the venue of the trial to Washington County; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for the lead prosecutor to withdraw from the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s “motion to
 pre-emptively strike witness”; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to sever; and (6) issues raised in Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis entitle her to a new trial. Following a thorough review, we reinstate Defendant’s conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, affirm the convictions, and remand for sentencing on conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder.

Defendant, James Hall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. However, the judgment for case 2015-C-1974 contains an error that warrants remand for correction.

The pro se petitioner, Victor Eugene McConnell, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. The petitioner asserts the State breached the plea agreement in this case, entitling the petitioner to habeas corpus relief. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Elvis Louis Marsh, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, delivery of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, conspiracy to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Eric Henry, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his two-year sentence for reckless endangerment in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following the denial of a suppression motion, the defendant, Whelchel Randall Hogan, entered a guilty plea in Dickson County Circuit Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the initial seizure of the defendant and the validity of the search warrant issued in this case. The defendant asserts the police did not have reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure of the defendant and the search warrant issued in this case lacked probable cause. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1994, the petitioner, Hugh A. Niceley, was convicted of eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery, occurring over the course of several years from 1988 until 1992. For his crimes, the petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty-three years, to be served at 30 percent. In 1999, the trial court entered a new judgment as to Count 9, requiring the sentence be served at 100 percent, as required by the applicable statute. As a result, the petitioner asserts the 1999 judgment created an illegal sentence, arguing his sentence in Count 9 should be served at 30 percent, as originally ordered. The trial court disagreed, as do we. Accordingly, the order of the trial court requiring service of Count 9 at 100 percent is affirmed.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Antoine Dewayne Clark, of aggravated arson, and he was sentenced to serve thirty years in prison. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s questions during voir dire; in allowing testimony regarding the injuries suffered by the victims; in denying a mistrial based on the introduction of evidence that the Defendant was wearing an ankle monitor; and in permitting hearsay testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.