APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Madaryl Hampton, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Hancock County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Rex Corlew, as
charged of allowing a dog to run at large causing serious bodily injury, a Class E felony.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-8-408(b), (g)(4) (Supp. 2021). Following a sentencing hearing,
the trial court ordered Corlew to serve two years in confinement and to pay the $3000 fine
set by the jury. On appeal, Corlew argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction because it supported his affirmative defense that he exercised reasonable care
in attempting to confine or control his dog. After review, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

Defendant, Timothy Dewayne Pinion, was convicted after a jury trial of vehicular homicide
by recklessness, reckless endangerment, two counts of driving under the influence (DUI),
driving with a revoked license, failure to drive on the right side of the roadway, and
violation of the financial responsibility law. For these convictions, Defendant was
sentenced to an effective fourteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in
confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that his dual convictions for vehicular homicide
by recklessness and reckless endangerment violate principles of double jeopardy. After a
thorough review of the record, we affirm.

A Stewart County jury found Defendant, Lloyd Allard, guilty of two counts of aggravated rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and twenty-eight counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 144 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the entirety of his custodial statement after he invoked his right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on chain of custody grounds; (3) his sentence is excessive; and (4) the evidence produced at trial supported his insanity defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, John M. Fletcher, of initiating a false report
to a law enforcement officer and presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges
the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon our review, we hold
that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for presenting
a false or fraudulent insurance claim. However, we also conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his conviction for initiating a false report, and we vacate that
judgment and remand for dismissal of that charge. We respectfully affirm the judgments
of the trial court in all other respects.

The defendant, Jerry Donald Brown, III, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Norma Jean Hardin, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering that she serve her full sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation and disposition of the
defendant’s probation.

The Defendant, Robert Allen Turner, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed and received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant did not file a direct appeal of his convictions but filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court ultimately determined that the Defendant was entitled to a delayed appeal. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction and that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Range II, multiple offender for that conviction. Based upon our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to grant a delayed appeal because the post-conviction petition was untimely. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Nearly twenty years ago, Petitioner, Nickolus L. Johnson,1 shot Bristol Police Officer Mark
Vance in the face as Officer Vance entered a home responding to a disturbance call, killing
the officer. State v. Johnson, 401 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2013). A Sullivan County jury
convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. After his
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, id. at 7, Petitioner subsequently
sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief after extensive
hearings. Petitioner raises numerous arguments on appeal assailing his conviction and
sentence based primarily on ineffective assistance of counsel as well as several standalone
constitutional claims. After a thorough review of the record, the applicable law, the parties’
briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment in all respects.

Jimmy Smith, Defendant, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Lacorious Tyquez Fuller, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court conviction for conspiracy to deliver more than 150 grams of heroin, for which he received a sentence of 17 years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s admission of a video recording of a controlled purchase between Defendant and two confidential informants. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Taeshaun K. Patterson, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, facilitation of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class D felony, facilitation to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and robbery in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation), 39-12-103 (2018) (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-13- 401 (2018) (robbery), 39-12-302 (2018) (sentencing classification for acting in concert). The Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court should have held a sentencing hearing for the first degree murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, in light of State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), we remand for the entry of an amended first degree felony murder judgment form to reflect in the special conditions section that the Defendant is entitled to an individualized parole hearing after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six years of his life sentence.

The Petitioner, Radames Antonio Rivera, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to strike two jurors who had prior connections with the parties and by failing to effectively cross-examine a principal State witness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, John Michael Storey, pled guilty as a Range III, persistent offender to reckless homicide and the sale and delivery of fentanyl. As part of the plea, the parties agreed to have the trial court decide the length of the sentences and the manner of their service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted an alternative sentence or, alternatively, should have modified his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to provide for probation or split confinement. Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely as to the trial court’s original sentencing decision, and we dismiss that part of the appeal. We respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The Petitioner, James Lee McClain, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for aggravated assault and witness coercion. The Petitioner argues he received the ineffective assistance of both pretrial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he contends both attorneys who represented him during the pretrial stage were ineffective by failing to discuss discovery materials and case strategy with him, failing to adequately prepare for trial, and failing to file “critical” motions, resulting in the Petitioner’s having to represent himself at trial. Additionally, he argues appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to include sufficiency of the evidence and severance issues in his direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, David Anthony Avery, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 claiming that his sentences were illegal because his criminal case was a civil matter, that the United States District Court had original jurisdiction over all civil cases, and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentences. We determine that the motion failed to state a colorable claim and affirm summary dismissal of the motion by the trial court.

Petitioner, Anthony Tucker, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Francis, pled guilty to the offenses of aggravated assault and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years to be served in custody. On appeal, the Defendant challenges both the length of the sentence and the manner of its service. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James Carter Millinder, appeals the trial court’s decision ordering his agreed-upon nine-year sentence to be served consecutively to an unserved sentence in another county. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred by sentencing him in a manner not contemplated by the agreement between the parties and that this error rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Given the deficiencies in the Defendant’s appellate brief, as well as the absence of transcripts of the guilty plea and sentencing proceedings from the appellate record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2012, the Defendant, Reginald D. Bond, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of attempted rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and ordered him to community supervision for life and to register as a sex offender. After his release, the Defendant was convicted of violating the sex offender registry, and the trial court sentenced him to six years, suspended to probation. He violated his probation by being charged with new offenses, so the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, seeking to correct an illegal sentence, contending that his sentence was illegal because the community supervision and sex offender registry requirements violated double jeopardy. The trial court summarily denied Rule 36.1 relief. On review, having determined that the Defendant has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate, failure to develop a reasonable trial strategy, and failure to object to the use of Petitioner’s nicknames and to testimony regarding statements made by a non-testifying co-defendant. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this consolidated appeal, Shelby County juries convicted the Petitioner, Curtis Keller, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of evading arrest (No. 10-02756); and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” (No. 10-07532). The Petitioner received effective sentences of 300 years (No. 10-02756) and 210 years (No. 10- 07532). The Petitioner appealed his convictions in both cases. See State v. Keller, No. W2012-01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6021332 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2013), perm. app. granted, cause remanded (Tenn. Feb. 11, 2014) and State v. Keller, No. W2012- 01457-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4922627 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015). The Petitioner then filed a series of motions and petitions, which this court has addressed on appeal. Keller v. State, No. W2019-01652- CCA-R3- ECN, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2021), perm. app. denied; Keller v. State, No. W2020-00590-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 2886338 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 9, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2021). In the consolidated matter herein, the Petitioner filed: a petition “new post-conviction” relief and a “supplemental” petition for writ of error coram nobis in No. 10-02756; a petition for DNA post-conviction analysis in Nos. 10- 07532 and 10-02756; and a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 in No. 10-07532. The trial court denied the petitions, and the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. After this appeal was docketed, counsel filed a motion for a late-filed notice of appeal for all five underlying petitions. On review, having determined that all of the Petitioner’s filings in No. 10-02756 and his petition for DNA analysis in No. 10-07532 were untimely, we deny his motion for a late-filed notice of appeal and dismiss the appeal with respect to those filings. The remaining motion, the Petitioner’s motion to correct an illegal sentence in No. 10-07532, was timely filed and, 09/12/2024 2 upon review, we conclude the Petitioner has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the petition.

Defendant, Curtis Bradley, was indicted on one count of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury and one count of false imprisonment. He entered a negotiated plea agreement to the lesser-included charge of reckless aggravated assault with the trial court to determine the length of sentence and whether Defendant would receive judicial diversion. The false imprisonment charge was dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and ordered Defendant to serve three years, suspended to probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for judicial diversion and by imposing more than the minimum sentence. Based on our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Tomar Donyelle Beard, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it excluded the Defendant’s expert from testifying and denied the Defendant’s motion for a continuance. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, David Lynn Richards, Jr., appeals his Knox County Criminal Court
convictions for three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure (Counts 1, 2, and 9),
two counts of rape (Counts 3 and 4), three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure
(Counts 5, 6, and 7), and one count of incest (Count 11).1 On appeal, the Defendant argues:
(1) if newly discovered forensic biological evidence had been presented to the jury, then it
likely would have changed the result of his trial; (2) if newly discovered forensic electronic
evidence had been presented to the jury, then it likely would have changed the result of his
trial; (3) if the newly discovered records related to victim’s mental health history had been
presented to the jury, then it likely would have changed the result of his trial; (4) his due
process rights were violated under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); (5) the trial court committed plain error by
permitting the State to play the entire recording of victim’s forensic interview; (6) he
received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; (7) the State’s erroneous election for the
rape offense in Count 4 failed to protect his right to a unanimous jury verdict in that count;
(8) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for sexual battery by an authority
figure in Count 1 and his conviction for rape in Count 4; (9) his dual convictions for sexual
battery by an authority figure in Counts 1 and 2 violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy; (10) the trial court abused its discretion by denying all forms of alternative
sentencing and by imposing a partially consecutive sentence; and (11) the cumulative effect
of these errors entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.2