APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Isaac McDonald, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately review or provide him copies of discovery materials, by failing to adequately explain the terms of his plea agreement, and by coercing him into pleading guilty. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court failed to find he qualified as a dangerous offender and, accordingly, its imposition of partially consecutive sentences was improper. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Steven Griffin, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court failed to find he qualified as a dangerous offender and, accordingly, its imposition of partially consecutive sentences was improper. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Keelan Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for judicial diversion. Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set forth its reasons for denying diversion and by failing to comply with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Mario Perkins, Petitioner, appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding because the “grounds alleged in the petition do not satisfy any of the criteria set out in Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated section] 40-30-117 as ground to reopen, and have clearly been raised outside the statute of limitation[s]. . . .” Because the notice of appeal in this case fails to satisfy the requirements for an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c), we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Doryon Booth, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original four-year sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his probation and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision to revoke his suspended sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioners, Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze, seek post-conviction relief from their respective convictions related to their infant son’s death in 2000 from abusive head trauma (“AHT”). The post-conviction court afforded the Petitioners an evidentiary hearing at which they presented purported “new scientific evidence” through various experts in an effort to establish their actual innocence. The State, through the Office of the District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District (“District Attorney”), admitted the facts asserted by the Petitioners and agreed that the Petitioners were actually innocent of these offenses. Nonetheless, the post-conviction court determined that the Petitioners had failed to carry their burden of producing clear and convincing proof to establish their actual innocence, a determination which the Petitioners now challenge. On appeal, the State, through the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter (“Attorney General”), contends that the Petitioners failed to prove their actual innocence based on new scientific evidence, instead proffering only new opinions on previously presented evidence, which supports the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. In addition to the underlying substantive merits of their actual innocence claims, the Petitioners also raise certain procedural issues: (1) whether review of Mr. Maze’s appeal, which began as a motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition, is permissive or an appeal as of right; (2) whether Mrs. Maze’s petition for post-conviction relief, her first, is time-barred; (3) whether the State improperly changed its position on appeal in violation of due process, judicial estoppel, and waiver; (4) whether the post-conviction court’s ruling infringed upon prosecutorial discretion and violated the party-presentation principle; (5) whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Mrs. Maze relief without independent review of her actual innocence claim; and (6) whether this case should be remanded to the post-conviction court for consideration of the original medical examiner’s recent recantation of his trial testimony, which has occurred during the pendency of this appeal. After review, we determine that a remand is unnecessary and affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the court in affirming the post-conviction court’s rulings based on the record that was properly before it at the time. Its analysis is both well-reasoned and persuasively stated. But I respectfully dissent from the decision to deny the motion for a limited remand—and thereby deny the post-conviction court the opportunity to consider how Dr. Bruce Levy’s affidavit bears on the findings it previously made

Finality is a fundamental value in our system—but it is not the only one. When the State’s own chief medical examiner recants the very testimony that established the cause and manner of death, the effect is not just to raise new questions. If credited, it calls into doubt the foundation of the trial and the reliability of the post-conviction court’s findings, which relied on that same testimony.

If a foundation is in question, it usually calls for an inspection of the ground. In my view, a limited remand answers that call.

In 2017, the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion for a period of three years. Following his later conviction for another crime in April 2022, the trial court rescinded the diversion, entered an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced the Defendant to serve a term of three years for the aggravated assault conviction. In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in his aggravated assault case and that his original plea was invalid. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as being untimely, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we agree that the post-conviction petition was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Takyris Seandale Simms, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bryan Ray Dudley, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his suicide attempt following the victim’s murder and by neglecting to instruct the jury regarding proximate causation. Because we conclude that both the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and notice of appeal were untimely filed and that the interests of justice do not merit the waiver of the untimeliness of the Defendant’s notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

In 2021, the Defendant, Damon Bridges, pled guilty to multiple drug-related offenses, including several that were subject to enhanced penalties under the Drug-Free Zone Act. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. In 2024, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that later amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act rendered his sentence unlawful. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s request for relief, and the Defendant appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David A. Yost, Jr., appeals from his guilty-pled convictions for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a person with a prior felony drug conviction, simple possession
of marijuana, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received
an agreed-to, effective eight-year sentence. The trial court initially denied the Defendant’s
request for alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in
confinement. Following the Defendant’s appeal of this sentencing determination, this court
reversed and remanded the case based on the trial court’s failure to make the appropriate
findings and articulate its reasoning for imposing a sentence of incarceration. On remand,
the trial court again ordered confinement. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges,
for a second time, the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing as an abuse of discretion.
After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Whitcliffe McLeod, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition for failure to prosecute. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Nelson, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal
Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, rape, three counts of aggravated rape, and aggravated
assault, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of forty years at 100% in
the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of his aggravated kidnapping and rape convictions
and argues that the trial court erred in declining his request for a special jury instruction on
the lack of consent as an essential element of aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because his sentence in the above-referenced cases was enhanced by prior convictions that were subsequently invalidated by a federal court. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(3). The State has responded in opposition to the motion, arguing that the federal court did not invalidate the Petitioner’s prior convictions but merely ordered that he be resentenced. Upon our review of the application and the State’s response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.

This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-117. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the State and deny the application.

The Defendant, Ezekiel Abraham Schmaltz, appeals his Knox County jury convictions of
two counts of observation without consent and one count of assault, for which he received
an effective sentence of two years and six months’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant
argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct by discussing punishment with the prospective jurors during voir
dire, (3) the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic proof of the victim’s prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate her credibility, (4) the trial court erred by restricting the
Defendant’s ability to cross-examine two State’s witnesses, and (5) the cumulative effect
of trial errors entitles him to a new trial. Following our review, we remand the case for
merger of the Defendant’s convictions of observation without consent into a single
conviction and the entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a life sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he was not sentenced by a jury, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John F. Curran, III, appeals his Hardin County convictions for passing a worthless check and filing a false lien, for which he received a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to establish territorial jurisdiction because the offenses took place on federal property; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse; (3) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw when counsel explained he lacked knowledge and experience in federal maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction; (4) the trial court violated the Defendant’s due process rights by initially granting his pretrial motion to present affirmative defenses but later ruling those defenses could not be presented to the jury; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for passing a worthless check because the payment was for a pre-existing debt and not to induce services; (6) the State committed two Brady1 violations when it failed to disclose evidence proving the State lacked jurisdiction over the case, which led to false testimony from State witnesses; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence other than the statutory minimum and by imposing an illegal sentence when it failed to cite the victims for each count, failed to order restitution for passing a worthless check, and took no action to remove the lien from the property at issue. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Joseph Wert, appeals from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding a text message exchange between two non-testifying individuals discussing the victim’s statement on the day of the shooting; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to read in front of the jury several unauthenticated text messages on the victim’s ex-wife’s cell phone between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument when it referenced the text messages between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter, and the trial court erred by overruling his contemporaneous objection thereto; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction regarding the presumed reasonableness of his use of deadly force against the victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(c), commonly known as “castle doctrine.”; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he contends that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alan Joseph Robertson, appeals the Hickman County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his sale of methamphetamine in an amount of 0.5 gram or more conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, has filed an application for permission to appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10B. The Petitioner asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (“SFFA”), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to his case.

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is hereby DENIED. The Defendant’s Motion to Supplement the Record is also DENIED as moot. Costs associated with this appeal are hereby taxed to the Defendant.

Defendant, Joseph Kade Abbott, pled guilty in two consolidated cases to three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure in exchange for concurrent six-year sentences, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years’ incarceration to be served at 100%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.