APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Joseph Edward Wilson, was convicted of two counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and one count of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court merged one of Defendant’s convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more and his conviction for the delivery of 0.5 grams or more because they were part of the same criminal episode. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve an effective twelve-year sentence. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the parties’ briefs on appeal, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences, but we remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment for the merged offense pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360 (Tenn. 2015). Additionally, on remand the trial court is directed to enter corrected judgments for each of Defendant’s remaining convictions to clarify which of Defendant’s sentences run concurrently.

Petitioner, Jason Wayne Staggs, pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court as a persistent offender to (1) burglary of a building, (2) theft of property valued over $10,000 and less than $60,000, and (3) evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to a plea agreement to an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration to be served at forty-five percent. Petitioner timely filed pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition in a written order. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty plea was unknowing. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Sean Patrick Goble, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313 (2018). The
post-conviction court denied relief on the basis that the results of the DNA analysis would not have exculpated the Petitioner of first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Darrell Wren, of second degree murder, attempt to commit second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective forty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for second degree murder and attempt to commit second degree murder and that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments and remand for the execution of a corrected judgment for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction.

A Shelby County jury convicted the juvenile defendant, Martiness Henderson, of first degree murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery. After conviction, the trial court immediately imposed a life sentence which the defendant now challenges as unconstitutional. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Manoochehre Lee Dadfar, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine and possession with the intent to sell a controlled substance and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Kelly Smith, Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Petition”), claiming that he is “being illegally restrained of his liberty by an illegal, void, and/or expired criminal conviction/sentence.” The habeas corpus court found that his sentence had not expired and that the Petition “demonstrate[d] no right to relief” and summarily dismissed the Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Makoyous Houston, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, contending that the proof adduced at the hearing was insufficient to support the revocation and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Helena Moore, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her community corrections sentence and order to serve her original two-year sentence in confinement, contending that she should have been returned to community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Zukowski, Petitioner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce judgment and sentence for his five convictions of rape of a child because (1) his consecutive sentences violated double jeopardy, (2) the indictment was deficient because the charges were multiplicitous, and (3) the trial court’s failure to require an election violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. The habeas corpus court found that Petitioner’s claims were not cognizable habeas corpus claims and summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Brewston Cole, pleaded guilty to possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule VI controlled substance with the intent to sell, and the trial court sentenced him to a two-year term of supervised probation. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s vehicle was lawful based on the length of the traffic stop. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Darion Merriweather, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his
guilty-pleaded conviction of carjacking, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Because the record establishes that counsels’ performance was deficient and that the petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief, vacate the petitioner’s guilty plea, and remand for trial.

In this procedurally complex and litigious case, the Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, was convicted in three sets of convictions, 1993, 1994, and 2003, of: (1993) especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, receiving an effective eighteen-year sentence; (1994) five counts of aggravated assault, receiving a ten-year concurrent sentence; and (2003) aggravated robbery, receiving a thirty-year Range II sentence. The Petitioner has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences. In this, his latest challenge, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2003 convictions. He contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court had improperly amended his judgment of conviction. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the grounds for relief had clearly been waived because they had not been raised in the Petitioner’s prior petition for post-conviction relief. In the alternative, the trial court stated that, if it considered the petition as a motion to re-open the prior post-conviction proceeding, the Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In 1998 and 1999, the Petitioner pleaded guilty to three different drug offenses. State v. Antonio Clifton, No. W2016-00175-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 6427862, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 31, 2016), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. Several years later, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion to correct an illegal sentence, both of which were denied based on the fact that his sentences had expired. The Petitioner filed this, his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to comply with procedural requirements and because the Petitioner’s sentence had expired. On appeal, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Steven Padgett King, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he sought application of the rule announced in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010). We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand to the post-conviction court for a new evidentiary hearing to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to Ward.

The Petitioner, Reginald Lamon Goldsmith, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in failing to appoint post-conviction counsel and summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred and conclude that the Petitioner has waived his due process claim.

A Davidson County Jury in Case No. 2017-C-1591 convicted Defendant, Rashida Tyquisha Groomster, of theft of property over $1,000 in value. She also pled guilty to theft of property less than $1,000 in value in Case No. 2017-B-1407. The trial court initially imposed an effective one-year sentence to be served in confinement. However, an amended judgment was subsequently entered indicating that Defendant was to serve her effective one-year sentence on community corrections. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for theft of property over $1,000 in value, that the trial court improperly denied her request for judicial diversion, and the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his second degree murder and tampering with evidence convictions, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Dantario Burgess, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Ronnie Ingram, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Erik Standback, of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Raymon Muhammad, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Raymond Watison, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he gave to the police following his arrest, that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony in violation of evidence rule 404(b), that the trial court erred by permitting the State to admit the defendant’s statements as rebuttal evidence, that the State knowingly presented false testimony, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the prosecutor impermissibly misled the jury during closing argument, and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Devin Whiteside, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery, alleging that his guilty pleas were invalid because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Clarence Reed Julian, pled guilty to criminal simulation in exchange for a sentence of two years as a Range II, multiple offender with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined after a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence, ordering Defendant to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine there is a clerical error in the judgment form. The judgment form wrongly designates Defendant as a Range I, standard offender and the technical record indicates that Defendant, as a Range I offender, has already received the benefit of Determinate Release from the Department of Correction. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment form, designating Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, requiring Defendant to complete his sentence as such an offender. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.