APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anthony Thompson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Eddie Smith, appeals his conviction for second degree murder and his twentyone-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) excluding proof of the victim’s prior bad acts as corroborative evidence that the victim was the initial aggressor and (2) instructing the jury that Defendant had a duty to retreat before using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury in selfdefense. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Chambers, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony vandalism of property in an amount $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-408, a Class D felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years to be served on supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for felony vandalism. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marquette Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Petitioner, Terry Trammell, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of theft over $1000 and sentenced to twelve years in prison. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on direct appeal. State v. Terry Trammell, No. E2016-01267- CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1861792, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2017), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief and the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court on the basis that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel.

Defendant, Keisha Moses Richardson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury for violating an order of protection. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Having reviewed the entire record, the oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antywan Eugene Savely, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of the sale of a Schedule II drug, a Class C felony; the delivery of a Schedule II drug, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to sell or deliver a Schedule II drug, a Class D felony. The court merged the delivery conviction into the sale conviction and imposed a twelve-year sentence as a Persistent Offender. The court imposed a consecutive twelve-year sentence as a Career Offender for the conspiracy conviction, for an effective term of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the State could cross-examine him on a twenty-two-year-old felony conviction; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Juan Cerano, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to include records from the Department of Children’s Services with the appellate record on direct appeal of his convictions, which resulted in this court’s being unable to review whether the trial court properly ruled that the records were inadmissible at trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Petitioner, Ronald Hudson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that he should be afforded counsel and an evidentiary hearing because his petition was timely. The State agrees there is some evidence that the petition was timely but notes that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was clearly untimely. Because the notice of appeal is untimely and we find nothing that warrants the waiver of the timely notice of appeal requirement, we dismiss the appeal.

A Sevier County Jury found Defendant, Stephanie Brown, guilty of reckless homicide. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court properly admitted testimony about the hydrostatic or float test performed on the baby’s lungs; (2) whether the trial court properly admitted Defendant’s confession and denied her motion to dismiss the indictment; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for reckless homicide; and (4) whether the trial court properly sentenced Defendant. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darron Rogers, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver, Class E felonies; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that she knew him by the nickname of “Weed.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tina Nichole Lewis, was charged with one count of second degree murder through the unlawful distribution of fentanyl and amphetamine and one count of delivery of fentanyl and amphetamine. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges on the basis that the indictment was duplicitous because it charged a single count of each offense by listing two Schedule II drugs, fentanyl and amphetamine. The State appeals the dismissal of the homicide charge. We conclude that the indictment, which charged one single offense of homicide, was not duplicitous, and we accordingly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge.

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition without a hearing to determine whether due process dictates the tolling of the statute of limitations. The State concedes that the
post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without a hearing to address the Petitioner’s tolling argument. We agree. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations.

Eric Bernard Howard, Movant, filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Judgment Pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1” (the Rule 36.1 Motion). The trial court found that the Rule 36.1 Motion failed to state a colorable claim and summarily denied the Rule 36.1 Motion. We affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jimmy M. Cruse, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County Jail. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a sealed indictment, the Defendant-Appellant, Michael Wright, was charged by a Davidson County grand jury with alternative counts of first-degree premeditated murder and murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery of Gregory “Pee Wee” Johnson (counts one and two), and first-degree premeditated murder of Daresha Cole (count three). A petite jury convicted the Defendant as charged of felony murder in count one and first-degree premeditated murder in count three, for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (ICD); (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever offenses; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s social media posts; (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Reynolds, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant and other individuals were gang members in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (3) exculpatory evidence, namely the victim’s gunshot residue test and a photograph referenced by the gang report, were improperly withheld by the State; (4) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the above-referenced gunshot residue test and photograph; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient relevant to premeditation and that some of the evidence relative to gangs was improperly admitted. We remand for a new trial on one count of second degree murder, in which some gang evidence shall be excluded.

The petitioner, Cuben Lagrone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Christopher Bailey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of rape of child and sentenced to twenty-five years at one-hundred percent. Petitioner contends on appeal that the
post-conviction court erred in denying the petition for post-conviction relief because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to file a pre-trial motion in limine; (2) failing to object when the State asked the victim to testify about other times in which Petitioner forced the victim to perform oral sex; (3) asking the victim’s stepsister about her opinion of Petitioner’s character for truthfulness; (4) asking the victim why she slept downstairs; (5) failing to object when the State asked the victim about counseling and her medication; and (6) failing to argue during the Rule 412 hearing that Petitioner should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual behavior. Petitioner further argues: that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants post-conviction relief; that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for funding for an investigator; and that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s request to call the prosecutor as a witness at the post-conviction hearing. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Charles Bernard Griffin, appeals his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and possession of a firearm while having a prior felony conviction involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of seventy-five years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Reginald McWilliams, acting pro se, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief for failure to prosecute on the part of the Petitioner. Because the record does not establish an abuse of process, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion

The Appellant, Adonis Reynolds, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to two counts of burglary of a vehicle, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, two counts of theft, and one count of evading arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The trial court granted the Appellant judicial diversion and placed him on supervised probation for three years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and his judicial diversion and ordered that he serve his effective three-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and judicial diversion. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mario Johnson, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Defendant, Samuel McAlister, entered a partially open guilty plea in case number 18-501 for possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia; and in case number 18-956, for driving on a revoked license, failing to illuminate his license plate, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.