APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Paul Hayes, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant, Carlos Ometrick Stasher, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and evading arrest.1 The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm found in his vehicle; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of his prior possession of a firearm; and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with prior convictions. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior possession of a firearm and by allowing the State to impeach Defendant with a prior conviction for possession of a firearm. However, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm Defendant’s convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Gregory Livingston, of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction; (2) the admission of the autopsy report prepared by a non-testifying forensic examiner and testimony from a medical examiner who did not conduct the autopsy; (3) the admission of a video recording from a police officer’s body camera showing the victim’s girlfriend crying following the shooting; and (4) the admission of Defendant’s statement that he previously killed others. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Richard Crawford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of especially aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Todd Johnathan Grubb, appeals from the Meigs County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the nine-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded
conviction for possession with the intent to sell or to deliver one-half gram or more of
methamphetamine. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in
confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tracy Lebron Vick, pleaded guilty to second degree murder as a Range II offender and received a forty-year sentence. The Defendant filed two motions to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed for the failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, through counsel, seeks an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 from the trial court’s order entered on July 23, 2025, denying his motion to continue the trial scheduled for July 28, 2025. The attachments to the application include, among other materials, the Defendant’s motion to continue filed on July 9, 2025, and the trial court’s order denying that motion. Upon review of the application and its supporting documents, we conclude that the Defendant has not demonstrated grounds for extraordinary relief under Rule 10. Accordingly, a response from the State is not required, and the application is respectfully DENIED.

The Petitioner, David Anthony Avery, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of his third motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking correction of his sentence. As grounds, the Petitioner asserts his sentence is illegal because attempted murder, a crime which he was convicted of, does not exist in Tennessee. Because the Petitioner’s motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner Derrick Darnell Moore and Co-Petitioner Demichael Tyrone Moore1 were jointly tried and convicted of first degree murder, among other offenses, for which they were each sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. Thereafter, they filed separate petitions for post-conviction relief, alleging that they were denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the Petitioners raised three shared claims, arguing that their respective trial lawyers (1) failed to call key witnesses to testify; (2) failed to seek suppression of cell phone data; and (3) failed to raise or preserve an objection to hearsay for the later appeal. In addition to these shared claims, Petitioner Derrick Moore presented two individual grounds for relief, contending that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that his lawyer (1) failed to effectively communicate and investigate the case; and (2) failed to fulfill promises made during opening statements. Co-Petitioner Demichael Moore raised one additional individual claim, asserting that his lawyer was ineffective in failing to object to testimony regarding his history of incarceration. Finally, both Petitioners asserted that the cumulative prejudicial effect of these alleged deficiencies entitled them to post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioners appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

Following a trial, a Weakley County jury found Defendant, Antwon Dejuan Wiley, guilty of aggravated robbery and theft under $1,000, for which the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court should have merged his conviction for theft under $1,000 with the aggravated robbery conviction based upon double jeopardy principles. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the merger of his conviction for theft under $1,000 into his aggravated robbery conviction and entry of amended judgments reflecting the merger.

Defendant appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated rape, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment based on either pre-indictment delay or the failure to follow the mandates of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5, that post-indictment delay deprived him of the right to a speedy trial, that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial following the victim’s in-court outburst, that the trial court violated his right to counsel, and that the trial judge should have recused himself. Upon review, we discern no error, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Sentrell Pittman, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count each of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to compel the victim to submit to a mental evaluation; 3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to allow the jury to visit the scenes of the incidents; 4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State’s violation of State v. Ferguson; and 5) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 seeking to allow cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual history. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William C. Sutton, received and signed a written trespass notice from Walmart informing him that he was banned from entering its retail locations for life. Less than a year later, the Defendant entered one of Walmart’s retail locations and left without paying for clothing items he concealed in a plastic bag. Before trial, the Defendant made an oral motion in limine to exclude the trespass notice as inadmissible hearsay, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently convicted the Defendant of burglary, for which he received a twelve-year sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Fredrick Devell Rice Jr., entered guilty pleas to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, tampering with evidence, and felony drug possession with intent to sell. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years and placed the Defendant on probation after service of twelve months incarceration. The Defendant subsequently tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl four times. At the Defendant’s probation violation hearing, the Defendant objected to an assessment report the State offered through a witness who did not prepare it as inadmissible hearsay, which was overruled by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony from the assessment report. After review, we affirm.

Reginal Jenkins, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, claiming there was insufficient evidence regarding identity and premeditation. We disagree with Defendant’s claims and affirm the judgments.

The Defendant, Devonta Ivy, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of aggravated robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, theft of property, and evading arrest. The trial court entered judgments ordering the Defendant to serve an effective eleven-year sentence consecutively to a previously unserved sentence from Mississippi. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support each conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior conviction. Following our review and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, we remand for entry of corrected judgments for Counts Three and Four due to clerical errors. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Green a/k/a Michael Cheairs, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of violating the sex offender registry requirements, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-208, arguing that the admission of and testimony about the violation report by someone other than the officer who prepared it violated the Confrontation Clause and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the report was the only evidence supporting his conviction. The State argues that the Defendant waived plenary review of the issue, and that he is not entitled to relief via plain error review. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant properly preserved the issue below and agree that the admission of the violation report via a substitute witness violated the Confrontation Clause. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the inadmissible statements in the report were the primary evidence of the Defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Defendant properly preserved his Confrontation Clause issue and that he is entitled to relief. I would conclude that Defendant’s issue is waived, and Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief.

Clarence Hayes, Petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his habeas petition in which he argued his judgment was void because the person for whose actions he was held criminally responsible was never convicted of murder. After the dismissal of the Petition, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for clarification and reconsideration. The habeas corpus court denied both motions and Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. Because the interest of justice does not warrant the timely filing of the notice of appeal, Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burdick, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his three post-conviction petitions, seeking relief from his convictions of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary and his effective sentence of forty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance warrants new trials and sentencing hearings, and that the consecutive sentencing statute is void for vagueness. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Victor Valle, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was entitled to and did not receive juvenile proceedings before the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts committed while Petitioner was a minor; the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; his indictment was insufficient to provide the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction; the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant has filed an application for interlocutory appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 9, seeking review of the trial court’s September 23, 2024 order and November 6, 2024 amended order denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment and granting the State’s motion to have the Defendant involuntarily judicially committed pursuant to the Tennessee Disability and Aging Act of 2024 (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 52-5- 404 (specifically regarding involuntary commitment for intellectually disabled defendants). The Defendant argues that interlocutory review of the trial court’s orders is required to prevent irreparable injury, to prevent needless and protracted litigation, and to develop a uniform body of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 9(a)(1), (2), and (3). The State has filed an answer in opposition to the Defendant’s application, arguing that three of the issues certified by the trial court ask for advisory opinions and that the three remaining issues do not satisfy the criteria for interlocutory appeal. Following our review, we grant the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal, in part, and deny the application, in part.

Pro se Petitioner, Asata Lowe, filed a “Petition for Delayed Appeal,” which was treated as a motion for a delayed appeal and summarily dismissed by the Blount County Circuit Court. In this appeal, Lowe argues that the post-conviction court erred when it “failed to consider whether [he] was denied ‘the right to an appeal from the original conviction’ and that the court made ‘erroneous findings of fact and legal conclusions.’” After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Tameka Hamilton, entered guilty pleas to various offenses including reckless endangerment, evading arrest, theft, identity theft, fraudulent use of a credit card, and forgery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant in a community corrections program. The Defendant subsequently violated her probation based on failure to complete the special conditions of the drug court program. In this appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Fred Beal, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-two years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. In this appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate a witness and to properly communicate with Petitioner, and that cumulative error prejudiced Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.