APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on two grounds. First, although not addressed by the majority, I find the exceedingly late issuance of the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant to be problematic. A strong argument can be made that the November 19, 2024 warrant, which was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired on June 23, 2002, and decades after the new criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California were allegedly committed, would violate the Defendant’s due process rights under the test for pre-accusatorial delay. Though perhaps not as strong, an argument can also be made that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant, which alleged the Oklahoma and California offenses, because this second warrant was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s probationary sentence expired on June 23, 2002. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a)(1) (stating that “[w]henever it comes to the attention of the trial judge that a defendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty of a breach of the laws of this state or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judge shall have the power to cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand: . . . (A) A warrant for the arrest of the defendant as in any other criminal case; or (B) For a technical violation brought by a probation officer, and subject to the discretion of the judge, a criminal summons.”); see also State v. Moon, No. M2023-01192-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1672885, at *12 n.7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2025) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(a) (reiterating that probation revocation proceedings “may only be commenced within the applicable probationary period”). Because the November 19, 2024 warrant was issued decades after the criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California and more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired, this court could have concluded either that this warrant violated the Defendant’s due process rights or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter.

The Defendant, William Goldsberry, Jr., appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the violation of probation warrant due to a violation of his speedy trial rights and by revoking his probation in full, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish he committed a non-technical violation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kristopher Pappas, was convicted after trial by jury of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury, as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion and entered judgments for a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he acted in self-defense and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that aggravated assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remand for a new trial on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter for that count. We affirm the judgment of conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and the denial of judicial diversion as to the remaining count.

Billy J. Hancock, Defendant, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. State v. Hancock, No. M0212-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 on January 30, 2025, in which he argued that the trial court committed a clerical error by checking the “T.D.O.C.” box on the judgment form and by ordering his sentence to be served as a “100 percent violent offender.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim. Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Before the court is the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. The State argues that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for plain error review of his sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36, because no such pleading is contemplated by the rules of criminal procedure. The pro se Appellant has filed a response in opposition to the State’s motion.

This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Pejhman Ehsani,
for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State has filed
a response in opposition. The Defendant seeks review of the criminal court’s order denying
his motion to dismiss the charges against him in this case. Upon full consideration, the
application is denied for the reasons stated below.

Petitioner, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed the petition for not being in the proper form without giving him reasonable opportunity to correct the petition with the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to the negligence of his trial counsel. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted Defendant, Justin David Whaley, of
vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless driving, driving under the influence of an
intoxicant (“DUI”), reckless vehicular homicide, and multiple driving-related
misdemeanor offenses, and the trial court merged the convictions into one conviction for
vehicular homicide by intoxication and sentenced Defendant to nine years’ incarceration.
Defendant appealed, and while his direct appeal was pending, he filed a petition for writ of
error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted coram nobis relief in part, vacating Defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide
by intoxication and DUI but denying relief as to Defendant’s remaining convictions. Both
Defendant and the State appealed the trial court’s coram nobis order, and this court
consolidated Defendant’s direct appeal with both parties’ appeals of the trial court’s coram
nobis order. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for his
convictions for vehicular homicide and DUI; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained by a search warrant for a blood draw; (3) the admission of the results of
the analysis of his blood sample and the retrograde extrapolation as unreliable; (4) the
admission of testimony of a Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) employee
as improper lay opinion; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to visit the scene;
and (6) the jury instructions on mistake of fact and reckless vehicular homicide. Defendant
also contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants relief and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant coram nobis relief for all his convictions. In its crossappeal,
the State asserts that the trial court erred by granting partial coram nobis relief.
Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting coram nobis relief for Defendant’s
convictions of vehicular homicide by intoxication and DUI, and we reinstate those
convictions. Because the trial court only imposed sentences for the vehicular homicide by
intoxication conviction, we remand for a sentencing hearing for the remaining convictions and the entry of corrected judgments reflecting separate sentences for each conviction. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jonathan Hall, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of a related domestic violence charge and an effective eight-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of confinement, four years for the aggravated assault charge to be served at 100% and eight years for the possession of a firearm charge to be served at 85%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Darrell Peterson, of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a life sentence plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In 2022, the Petitioner, Keshon Ford, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder in exchange for a sentence of ten years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The habeas court entered an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the habeas corpus court erred when it denied his request for appointment of counsel and when it summarily dismissed his petition. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Lucian A. Clemmons, appeals from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he asserts constitutional and evidentiary claims related to the trial court’s exclusion of prior statements he made to the lead detective following his arrest. Additionally, as to the murder conviction, the Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict because the State failed to establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cody R. Mashburn, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and criminal simulation. As part of the plea, the parties agreed that the Defendant would be sentenced to an effective term of ten years, but the trial court would determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and imposed a sentence of full confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence because, among other things, it improperly sentenced the Defendant without considering the results of a validated risk and needs assessment. Upon our review, we agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify a permanent parenting plan to name him as the primary residential parent for his two daughters. The trial court found a material change in circumstance based on, inter alia, the mother’s remarriage and frequent out-of-state travel, and it concluded that modification was in the children’s best interests. This appeal followed. The mother contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding of a material change in circumstances. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Gibson County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Damone Pewitte, of three counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant broadly challenges whether the election process was sufficient to protect against the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. Specifically, the Defendant raises three inter-related issues regarding the election process on plain error review: (1) the State made its initial election outside the presence of the jury and did not mention its election to the jury until its rebuttal closing argument; (2) the State referenced examples of uncharged conduct during its closing argument; and (3) the language from the trial court’s unanimity instruction was different from the State’s election and closing argument. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Thomas Hunter, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony, at a bench trial in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2018) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten years at 100% for each offense, with five of the six sentences to be served consecutively. The court also ordered community supervision for life and placement on the sexual offender registry. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (2) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements, (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (4) the court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for the correction of a clerical error in the offense date on the judgment for Count 6.

The Defendant, Cristobal J. Quintana II, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; possessing an open container of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401(1) (2020) (DUI), 55-10-402(a)(2) (Supp. 2022) (subsequently amended) (sentencing for second-offense DUI), 55-10-416 (open container law), 55-12-139 (2020) (financial responsibility).  He was also found civilly liable by the trial court for violation of the implied consent law. See id. § 55-10-406 (2020) (subsequently amended) (implied consent).  The trial court imposed an effective eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, forty-five days of which was to be served in jail, and the balance on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for second offense DUI and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and the finding on the implied consent violation.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms for Counts 1, 2, and 3.

In June 2021, the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Chaisty Dawn Jones, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder perpetration of aggravated burglary in Count 2, aggravated burglary in Count 3, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in Count 4, and simple possession of marijuana in Count 5. At trial, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and convicted her as charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2 and imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the Defendant had a “duty to retreat” prior to acting in self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Count 1 and Count 2.

In 2018, the Defendant, Ronald Gray, pleaded guilty to several drug related charges in
exchange for a total effective sentence of eleven years. He was ordered to serve a portion
of his sentence in confinement and then released on May 1, 2018, to Community
Corrections. In 2019, the trial court entered an amended judgment to reflect an enhanced
sentence for his “plea to Violation of Community Corrections.” The order indicated that,
as of June 5, 2019, his Community Corrections was revoked, he was reinstated and
transferred to state probation, and he had to restart the eleven years of probation. In June
2020, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for the Defendant based upon a probation
violation. In 2024, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be incarcerated for the
duration of his sentence based on the probation violation. The Defendant appeals, but his
notice of appeal was not timely filed. As such, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Allen Fitzgerald Ailey, pleaded guilty in two cases to felon in possession of a weapon, possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to sell or deliver oxycodone. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received concurrent four-year sentences for the drug offenses to be served consecutively to a sentence of six years for the weapon offense, with the manner of service of Defendant’s sentences to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his entire ten-year sentence in confinement. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of judgments on the counts that were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

The Petitioner, Ronnie Lee Clayborn, appeals from the Fentress County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child and incest. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief on his claim that he was denied a fair and impartial jury. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Esau Caleb Kelly, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, attempted
second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony,
and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation, for which
he received an effective sentence of 24 years. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in affirming the jury verdict for the attempted second-degree murder
conviction and reckless endangerment by discharge of a firearm into an occupied habitation
conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Brian Armstrong, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to maintain communication and for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of an illegal search warrant. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant, Keith Hopkins, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and one count of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective four years’ probation with the condition that if his probation was revoked, he could not later petition to have the remainder of his sentence suspended. The trial court later revoked Defendant’s probation but nevertheless reprobated Defendant. After a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation based on the original probation order, reasoning that Defendant was on probation when “he never should have been.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate Defendant’s probation, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violations.

Defendant, Christophe Swearengen, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, one count of theft of property over $10,000, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years’ probation. After a revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked Defendant’s probation for violating the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation because his violation constituted his first technical violation. The State agrees. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial, reinstate Defendant’s probationary sentence, and remand the case for the trial court to determine the appropriate consequence of Defendant’s violation.