APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Timothy Aaron Baxter, Defendant, appeals from the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because Defendant failed to attach a copy of each judgment order at issue, we affirm the summary denial of the motion.

Defendant, Richard Cole, pleaded guilty to one count of vandalism of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to eight years to be served on supervised probation. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued. Defendant admitted to the violation and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence to be executed. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Lorenzo Romell Brown, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove that venue was proper in Warren County, his convictions for aggravated assault must be merged, and the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction but remand for a new sentencing hearing and for merger of Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions.

The Defendant, Verdell L. Williams, Jr., was convicted in a Davidson County Criminal Court bench trial of four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Jonathan Smith, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Demarqushon Marquis Hinton, of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, theft of a firearm valued at less than $2,500, reckless driving, failure to obey a traffic control device, and failure to stop at a stop sign. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-four years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted second degree murder and firearm convictions, and he argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Danny Young, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering the execution of his original sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to place on the record its reasons for revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted of aggravated robbery, first-degree felony murder, and premeditated first-degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. State v. Gregory, No. M2012-00546-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6187919, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), perm app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2014). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following nine grounds: (1) trial counsel’s failure to lodge a pretrial objection to a note found in the Petitioner’s truck and the failure of the post-conviction court to permit juror testimony under Rule 606(b) regarding the impact of the same; (2) trial counsel’s failure to object during the State’s closing argument; (3) trial counsel’s failure to prepare for trial; (4) trial counsel’s failure to investigate, call, or cross-examine key witnesses; (5) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (6) trial counsel’s failure to present a shooting incident reconstruction and a firearms expert; (7) trial counsel’s failure to ensure the Petitioner could hear during trial; (8) trial counsel’s failure to secure the presence of the Petitioner and Jacqueline Peek for a court ordered deposition; and (9) trial counsel providing the jury with a report that contained inflammatory information about the Petitioner. The Petitioner also argues that trial counsel violated an ethical duty of loyalty by simultaneously representing the Petitioner and two potential defense witnesses. Finally, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief based on the cumulative error doctrine. Upon review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Shamika Fifer, was indicted on charges of first degree murder (Count 1), attempted first degree murder (Count 2), and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3). At trial, a Shelby County jury convicted her of Count 2 but could not reach a verdict as to Counts 1 and 3. During a subsequent hearing, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in Count 1 and Count 3 was dismissed by the State. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years’ confinement. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, John Todd, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations because of his alleged mental incompetence. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding the Petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case of mental incompetence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of due process tolling. The Petitioner appeals, claiming the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the tolling issue because he presented a prima facie case of his mental incompetence. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the Petitioner is entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations.

The Petitioner, Curtis D. Staggs, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis as time-barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. He contends that the coram nobis court should have held a hearing on his petition because the newly discovered evidence he intended to present would have established that he was innocent of the conviction offenses. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Barry McRae, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of the effective eight-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded convictions for two counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corbin Ramon Hightie, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of his ten-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternative sentencing and by denying his request to award sentence credits for time he successfully served on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Parvel Gudger, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of aggravated sexual battery, continuous sexual abuse of a child,[1] rape of a child, and incest, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty-two years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a recording of the victim’s forensic interview, (3) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (4) his sentence is excessive.  We ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the State’s elections of offenses were sufficient to protect the Defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict for the charges of rape of a child and incest.  Following our review, we conclude that the State failed to elect an offense as to the rape of a child and incest charges and that this failure resulted in plain error.  Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for rape of a child and incest and remand for a new trial on those charges.  We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jonathan Duncan, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery by the Wilson County Grand Jury for his involvement in the death of Ellis Sanders, the victim. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, arguing: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; 2) Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury was violated because jurors slept during trial, the trial court required the jury to work “extensive and unreasonable hours,” and the trial court interfered with the jury by holding ex parte meetings; and 3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of uncharged bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect merger of the first degree murder and felony murder convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Harry Raymond Coleman, Jr., of second degree murder, among other offenses. The trial court sentenced him to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. More specifically, the Petitioner argued that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense centered around his post-trial diagnosis of Bipolar I disorder. He also claimed that trial counsel failed to call witnesses who would have supported his claim of self-defense. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, G’Andre Fields, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s DNA. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Alexander Friedmann, of vandalism of property over $250,000, for which he received a sentence of forty years in confinement at 35%. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the indictment is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the costs to rekey the jail and review surveillance footage; (3) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the product of a judicial subpoena; (4) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (5) the State failed to timely provide evidence to which the defendant was entitled; (6) improper argument by the State affected the verdict; (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (8) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence; and (9) cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The record and the Defendant’s brief have been filed. For the reasons stated below, the Court hereby suspends the requirement of a responsive brief by the State and affirms the trial court’s order pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Denver Richardson, as charged of first degree premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly admitted four of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (4) the trial court erred in denying jury instructions on self-defense and defense of another; and (5) cumulative error requires reversal of his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Matthew Saunders, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of judicial diversion and entry of judgments of conviction in two cases. Specifically, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his diversion by failing to timely disclose multiple social media accounts when he registered as a sex offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brent Paul Moon, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective three-year probationary sentence for felony evading arrest, simple possession of methamphetamine, and driving on a revoked license. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated and, as such, the probation violation should be dismissed. Next, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements at the revocation hearing because no “good cause” existed for the statements’ entry and that the statements were not reliable. Lastly, he claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and running the revocation sentence consecutively to the sentence for his new criminal convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for correction of a clerical error on the Defendant’s judgment form for simple possession of methamphetamine.

In 2024, the Defendant, Dana Kelly Teasley, pleaded guilty to eighteen counts of theft and fraud-related charges, and the trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of twelve years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, was convicted by a Smith County Criminal Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving while in possession of methamphetamine, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding photographs relating to his passenger, Natasha Jordan, in violation of the Defendant’s due process rights to present a defense; (2) whether the trial court erred in preventing a defense witness’s testimony about her knowledge of Ms. Jordan; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding impeachment evidence relating to an arresting officer’s employment history in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him; (4) whether the State violated State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), for failing to preserve the patrol vehicle video recording of the Defendant’s traffic stop; (5) whether the Defendant is entitled to a resentencing hearing due to the trial court’s admission of a video recording at sentencing of the Defendant that was not beforehand disclosed by the State; (6) whether the trial judge erred by not recusing himself; and (7) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors rendered the Defendant’s trial unfair. Based on our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. However, pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015), we remand for the trial court to enter a corrected judgment in count three to reflect that the sentence imposed for the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction of possession of methamphetamine while driving was merged into the felony possession of methamphetamine conviction in count one.

In 2019, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Andre Bowen, of facilitation of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of seventy-two years of incarceration. On appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Bowen, No. W2019-01210-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1400929, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2021). The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought relief pursuant to a writ of error coram nobis. Bowen v. State, No. W2022-00229-CCA-R3-ECN, 2022 WL 17408878, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2023). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appeals offering multiple grounds for a due process tolling of the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.