APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, J.P. Burrow, Jr., appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child,
two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of sexual battery by an authority
figure. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions because the proof consisted solely of the victims’ testimony with “no other
corroborating evidence.” Additionally, as to his conviction for sexual battery by an
authority figure, he argues that the evidence failed to show that he qualified as an authority
figure, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-527, at the time the offense
took place. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shaun Poole, pled guilty in the Henry County General Sessions Court to violating a no-contact order, and the court imposed a fully suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court and subsequently sought correction of his sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The circuit court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a Rule 36.1 challenge to a judgment entered in the general sessions court and dismissed the claim. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment dismissing the Defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. However, because the appellate record does not clearly establish the status of the Defendant’s remaining post-conviction claims, we remand the case for the circuit court to clarify the status of those claims and to conduct any further proceedings required by law.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Joe Patrick, of two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court ordered an effective sentence of sixty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Patrick, M2019-02026-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2102914, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2021), perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Feb. 10, 2022). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Victor Gordon, appeals from his convictions for rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery. Specifically, he argues the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for rape of a child because the State failed to present evidence of sexual
penetration. He further contends that he is entitled to plain error relief as to both
convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings
for the admission of the victims’ forensic interviews pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 24-7-123. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ricky Burnette, was convicted by a Knox County jury of theft between $2,500 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender. In this direct appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred when it determined that his convictions from 1991were admissible for impeachment purposes; (2) the trial court improperly limited the testimony of a witness concerning an ongoing investigation, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony regarding the contents of a stolen vehicle, (4) the trial court erred in failing to give a curative instruction after a witness referred to Defendant’s “classification,” (5) the trial court improperly bolstered the State’s expert witness by asking a hypothetical question, (6) the trial court improperly sustained an objection to the cross-examination of a State’s witness, (7) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight, and (8) the cumulative effect of these alleged errors entitles him to relief. Upon a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Scott Bradley Price, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and was sentenced
by the trial court as a Range II offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a vehicle as a
lesser-included offense. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s
verdict. We further conclude that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the
unauthorized use of a vehicle as a lesser-included offense, but that the failure to charge the
lesser-included offense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable
jury would have convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense under the facts of
this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Anthony Cartwright, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the Petitioner’s challenge to the amendment of his indictment does not state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In April of 2024, the Defendant, Justin James Cruger Wendricks, pleaded guilty to two
counts of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of
resisting arrest, and one count of driving on a suspended license, stipulating to the facts
contained in the warrant. The Defendant agreed to a sentence of eight years, suspended to
supervised probation after the service of twelve months of incarceration. In September of
2024, the trial court filed a probation violation warrant alleging that the Defendant had
absconded. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered
him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement.
After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Martin B.Montemayor, pled guilty to second-degree murderand received a life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court in Rutherford County denied relief after a hearing, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (2)he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was incorrectly sentenced as a repeat violent offender. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Oscar Romero, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of rape, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he asserts that the proof is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by excluding rebuttal evidence to impeach the victim, and that the court erred in its application of an enhancement factor during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants, Tony Banks and Tyrone Banks, were both convicted of misdemeanor assault following a bench trial, and they each received sentences of ten months. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and that the trial courterred by allowing a State’s witness to testify remotely through the use of a videoconferencing platform. After our review of the record and the applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Trent McGregor, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court
jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and
was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of four years in
the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant raises a single issue in this
appeal: whether the trial court erred in refusing the Defendant’s request for special jury
instructions on pretextual stops, unlawful detentions, and attempted unlawful arrests. We
conclude that the Defendant has waived our consideration of the issue based on the
inadequacy of his brief, which fails to provide any meaningful argument or appropriate
references to the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendants, EvelynD.Kennedy1
and Christoper L. Kennedy, bring this consolidated
appeal from their convictions for firstdegree felony murder and aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adultresulting in serious bodily injury,a Class B felony. SeeT.C.A. §§39-13-202(a)(2)(2018) (subsequently amended) (felony murder),39-15-508 (2025) (aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult resulting in serious bodily injury). The trial court sentenced both Defendants toconcurrent terms oflife for their felony murder convictions and twelve years for their aggravated neglect convictions. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) their convictions violate the ex post factoprotections of the State and federal constitutions and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting graphic autopsy photographs. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Bruce Bowen, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce his pretrial bond.  See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144.  The State opposes.  For the reasons discussed below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

The Defendant in this case, Jay Burroughs Chandler, was charged with fifty-four counts of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 by possessing material depicting a minor child engaged in sexual activity.  Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress, both of which the trial court denied.  After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged.  The trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in prison.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying both of his motions to suppress and in sentencing him.  We affirm the Defendant’s convictions.  We vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis on three key points.

A Maury County jury convicted Defendant, Ethan Allen Compton, of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and unlawfully carrying or possessing a weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A), which prohibits a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face. Upon review, we conclude that Code section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A) is constitutional on its face. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Demetrice Livingston, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief from his second degree murder conviction. On appeal, the
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition after
concluding that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel. After review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ronald David Ballard, was convicted in the Henderson County Circuit Court of fifteencounts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court mergedall counts andsentenced himas a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-eight years in confinementfor count one. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to showhe constructively possessed the firearm.Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Defendant’s convictionsbut remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on counts two through fifteenand for correction of the judgments pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015).

The Petitioner, Jason Henderson, Jr., appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,claimingthat he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sharod Demon Greer, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery and assault by offensive touching, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any touching of the victim was sexually motivated and (2) the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing when it imposed the maximum in-range sentence for aggravated sexual battery because it did not explain why the sentence was more justly deserved than a lesser sentence. After review, we affirm.

Defendant, Gerry Stitts, appeals from his jury convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

In 2016, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earnest Costosteno Woodley, of four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to four concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Nine years later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his criminal history did not qualify him as a repeat violent offender. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, William Lloyd Smith, III, pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and received an agreed sentence of eight years as a Range I offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation rather than allowing him furlough to a residential treatment facility previously approved by his probation officer. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Michael Fiedler, appeals his Henry County Circuit Court conviction of driving ona suspended license, for which he received a sentence of 180 days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred by finding that heknowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing or to make the requisite findingspursuant to State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000),insupportofits determination that confinement was particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses. The State responds that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a within range sentence. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.