APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant initially filed suit against a doctor and the hospital where she had surgery. Nearly a year later, Appellant amended her complaint to add the doctor’s employer as an additional defendant. The first suit was voluntarily dismissed, and the plaintiff refiled against the doctor and her employer, relying on the savings statute. The trial court dismissed the claims against the doctor on the basis that Appellant failed to substantially comply with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 in the second action and therefore was not entitled to an extension on the savings statute. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the basis that the first complaint naming it was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

At issue is an election commission’s decision to set an election on proposed referendum measures to a local government’s charter.  In pre-election litigation over this decision, the trial court concluded, for various reasons, that the election commission’s decision to hold the election should be reversed.  The election commission now urges this Court to reinstate its decision to hold an election and to remand this matter to it with instructions to schedule a referendum election at a future date pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-3-204(a).  As explained in more detail in this Opinion, we conclude that this requested relief is not proper under the cited statute.  Moreover, because this appeal cannot serve as a vehicle to grant the election commission any relief, we consider the matter moot.  Notwithstanding this posture in the case, we do find it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to address one of the specific legal issues presented by this appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine.  As to that issue, which concerns the interpretation of a form requirement the local government’s charter places on petitions to amend the charter by referendum election, we agree with the trial court that the referendum petition at issue in this case ran afoul of the requirement in dispute.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will.  Mary Bell McGraw Marlin (“Decedent”), a property owner in Rutherford County, left her farm to her surviving children.  Decedent’s holographic will provided equal acres to each heir, although a survey purporting to show how to divide the land was missing.  After years of futile discussions over how to divide the farm, Decedent’s grandson Harry Marlin, III filed suit in chancery court seeking to partition the land.  The matter was referred to the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”).  After a hearing, the Probate Court entered an order dividing the land amongst the heirs.  Harry Marlin, III appeals.  He argues that the Probate Court erred by dividing the land into equal acres without regard to the economic value of the respective tracts.  We hold, inter alia, that Decedent’s will controls and it provided for equal acres, not equally valued acres.  We further find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Probate Court’s determination as to which tract each heir was to receive.  We affirm.

The State filed this action against the defendants for judicial enforcement of an order and assessment entered by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation concerning violations of the Water Quality Control Act.  The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State as to the defendants’ liability for upfront civil penalties and damages due under the order.  We affirm. 

Daniel Greenberg appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (the “trial court”), enrolling a California judgment under which Mr. Greenberg is obligated to pay child support to his ex-wife. Because his brief is not in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Father’s issues are waived and his appeal must be dismissed.

Martha Harrison Bane conveyed an approximately eight-acre tract of land to her son and daughter-in-law in 2003. Several years later, Ms. Bane sought to have the deed set aside on the basis of undue influence. A default judgment was entered against the defendants and the land was re-conveyed back to Ms. Bane by a Clerk and Master’s deed. Several years after that, the defendants had the default judgment set aside. The trial court then held a hearing on the original petition to have the deed set aside in February of 2018 and determined that the deed was valid. Ms. Bane’s estate appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a binding judicial interpretation of a contract executed by the three defendants. Plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, nor did their complaint allege that they were third-party beneficiaries of it. The three defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

This is a premises liability case arising from injuries sustained by Appellant Anthony Walker when he attempted to mow a section of ground within the common area controlled by Appellee, Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner’s Association. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm

The police seized a vehicle and commenced a forfeiture proceeding.  The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security notified the vehicle owner that a forfeiture warrant for the vehicle had been issued.  And the owner filed a written claim and request for a hearing.  But before the hearing could take place, the administrative law judge granted the Department’s request for a voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding.  In a subsequent order, the administrative law judge awarded attorney’s fees to the owner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325(a).  The Department petitioned for judicial review of the fee award.  The owner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the administrative decision was not final because the order did not address her request for attorney’s fees under a federal statute.  After denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that the fee award violated the state statute.  So it vacated the administrative decision.  On appeal, the owner argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and in ruling that the fee award violated the state statute.  We affirm.

This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding.  As to the mother of the child at issue, we vacate the trial court’s termination of her parental rights due to procedural concerns that are acknowledged by the Department of Children’s Services.  With respect to the father of the child, however, we conclude that one ground for termination was properly established.  We further conclude that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Appellee, a tenured high school teacher, petitioned for judicial review of Appellant Shelby County Board of Education’s decision to terminate his employment. Without making findings to explain its reasoning, the trial court remanded the case to the school board for a second hearing. From our review, neither party argued that the school board’s initial hearing was procedurally deficient. As such, the trial court’s decision to remand the case to the school board, without findings to support such decision, was error. Vacated and Remanded

Appellants purchased a home from Appellee that was contaminated with mold. Appellants therefore filed suit against Appellee. The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., we vacate and remand.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that seven grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to support; (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard; (4) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (5) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (6) persistent conditions; and (7) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody.  Additionally, the juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.  The mother appeals.  On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of abandonment by failure to visit.  We reverse the juvenile court in part and affirm in part, affirming the ultimate termination of parental rights.

In this action alleging violations of a federal securities law due to purported misrepresentations and omissions in an initial public stock offering, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all persons who purchased common stock during the initial public offering.  The trial court certified the class, determining that the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23 had been satisfied.  The defendants have appealed.  Although we dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77l, due to lack of standing, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s certification of the proposed class.

Father appeals the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time and an award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Specifically, Father argues that Mother is a high risk for abduction of the parties’ children and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her unsupervised visitation.  We affirm the trial court’s award of unsupervised parenting time to Mother, but we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her.

This appeal concerns the Open Courts Clause of the Tennessee Constitution.  Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”), an inmate, filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”) seeking judicial review of his March 10, 2020 parole proceedings before the Board.  The Trial Court dismissed Halliburton’s petition.  In so doing, the Trial Court relied on Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812, which provides that “on notice of assessment of any fees, taxes, costs and expenses under this part, a clerk of a court may not accept for filing another claim by the same inmate until prior fees, taxes, costs and other expenses are paid in full.”  This Court affirmed, holding in part that Halliburton waived his issue of whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 violates the Open Courts Clause in Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution.  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that Halliburton sufficiently raised the issue in his answer to the Board’s motion to dismiss.  Our Supreme Court granted Halliburton’s application for permission to appeal, and remanded for this Court to consider his Open Courts issue. We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 places a constitutionally permissible limitation on the right of inmates to file civil actions.  The statute does not permanently bar inmates from seeking redress; it simply requires they pay outstanding fees first.  Therefore, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 does not violate the Open Courts Clause.  We affirm.

Appellant appeals from various orders entered against him in two consolidated cases. Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal

This appeal arises from a conservatorship case in which the chancery court authorized the attorneys ad litem for the ward of the conservatorship to enter into a compromise and settlement regarding a dispute among the ward and his four siblings over their deceased father’s estate. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Chancellor abused his discretion in finding the settlement was in the ward’s best interest. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of her one-year contract of employment.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A bank brought an action against a borrower for failure to repay a promissory note.  The borrower asserted that the bank failed to mitigate its damages by failing to sell the shares of stock it held as collateral to pay off the loan at a time when the stock’s value was high.  After a bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the bank, holding that the parol evidence rule prevented consideration of his purported oral modification of the parties’ agreement. Borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This action involves a contractual dispute over the sale of a 2010 Honda Civic that a pro se appellant purchased from a used car dealer.  The appellant’s brief significantly fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.  Accordingly, we find that any issues on appeal are waived.  We dismiss the appeal.

Appellant filed this products liability action more than 10 years after undergoing a total hip replacement using Appellee's hip implant system. The trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant's lawsuit fell outside the 10-year statute of repose and any exceptions thereto. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the parental rights of a mother, Mary K. (“Mother”), to her minor children, Kailey A., Abigail K., Isaiah K., and Izzabella K. (collectively, “the Children”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse committed against the Children. The Greene County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had severely abused the Children and that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is the third appeal arising from a commercial construction project. Most recently, the case went to trial before a jury, which awarded the plaintiff subcontractor $1,729,122.46 in compensatory damages under four separate theories and $3,900,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court further awarded the plaintiff pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees and costs. We conclude the economic loss rule is applicable to construction contracts negotiated between sophisticated commercial entities and that fraud is not an exception under the particular circumstances of this case. Because punitive damages and interest are not authorized under the parties’ agreement, those damages are reversed. The compensatory damages of $1,729,122.46 awarded for breach of contract are affirmed. The award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial are vacated for a determination of the attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining the compensatory damages award. No attorney’s fees are awarded on appeal. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part.

Following the establishment of paternity, a father petitioned to change his child's surname. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court's order does not contain findings as to whether the name change is in the child's best interests. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand.