APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This Tennessee Public Participation Act appeal involves three parties and multiple issues. The plaintiff/appellee, Lisa Garramone (“Ms. Garramone”), while serving as a commissioner for the City of Nolensville, Tennessee, filed a complaint for, inter alia, false light invasion of privacy against four defendants, including appellants Jason Patrick (“Mr. Patrick”) and Dr. Joe Curtsinger (“Dr. Curtsinger”). Ms. Garramone alleged that the defendants acted in concert to spread defamatory information about her during her 2022 re-election campaign. Each defendant responded by filing a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (“the TPPA”). Mr. Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment; Dr. Curtsinger did not. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Garramone filed a notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice” of all of her claims under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), to which the defendants objected. While the TPPA petitions were pending, this court ruled on the interplay between the TPPA and Rule 41.01(1) in Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade I”), No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). Consequently, the trial court ordered the parties to reargue the TPPA petitions considering this court’s rulings in Flade I. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Ms. Garramone’s voluntary dismissal mooted Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition but that it was ineffective against Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition because of his pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court further held that Mr. Patrick established that the TPPA applied because Ms. Garramone’s claims were based on, related to, or in response to his exercise of the right to free speech. But the court held that Ms. Garramone failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for her tort claims as required by the TPPA. Thus, the court granted Mr. Patrick’s petition, dismissed Ms. Garramone’s claims against him, and ordered Mr. Patrick to submit his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Patrick sought $74,346.50 in attorney’s fees and $920.09 in costs, but the court awarded him only $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $66.91 in costs based on its determination that the TPPA’s fee-shifting provision—Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107—should be construed narrowly because it runs contra to the American Rule. Thus, the court found that Mr. Patrick was entitled to only those fees “reasonably incurred in obtaining the dismissal of the action,” which did not include, inter alia, services rendered to prepare a defense against Ms. Garramone’s tort claims. The court reasoned that “more than $46,600.00 of his total fees and $853.18 of his costs” were incurred after Ms. Garramone filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit with prejudice, which the trial court stated disposed of the case “for all practical purposes.”  Mr. Patrick appeals the amount of the award for his attorney’s fees and costs; he also seeks his attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Dr. Curtsinger appeals the denial of his TPPA petition as moot. For her part, Ms. Garramone contends the trial court erred by not denying Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition as moot when she filed her notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice.” After these consolidated appeals were filed and argued, our Supreme Court rendered two decisions pertaining to the TPPA, Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2024), and Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade II”), ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024). Based on the reasoning in Flade II, we hold that Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition did not curtail Ms. Garramone’s “free and unrestricted” right to voluntarily dismiss her claims against him; thus, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition as moot. We further find that Ms. Garramone’s characterization of her dismissal as “with prejudice” did not place it outside the ambit of Rule 41.01(1)’s summary-judgment exception. As for Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs, we rely upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charles and Flade II to find that the trial court erred by categorically excluding all fees and costs he incurred in preparing a defense to Ms. Garramone’s claims. Accordingly, we vacate the award of Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration of the reasonable amount to which he is entitled under § 20-17-106 and to enter judgment accordingly. We also find that Mr. Patrick is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to § 20-17-107, as explained in Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. 

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In an earlier appeal, we determined that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign judgment, but we vacated the enforcement decision to determine the outstanding amount owed under the judgment. In this appeal, the judgment debtor faults the trial court for not considering his equitable estoppel defense on remand. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the Department of Children’s Services withdrew noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground for termination, we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest.

The legal father of two children and the putative father of one of the children both appeal a juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights, but we reverse the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the putative father’s rights on the ground of failure to manifest willingness and ability.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the child by failure to engage in more than token visitation and further ruled that it was in the child’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee’s independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of workers’ compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee’s duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the workers’ compensation exclusivity question.

The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of Kelsie M. (“Mother”) to Nash M. (“the Child”), finding by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of severe child abuse and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment due to an insufficient record and remanded for preparation of the transcripts of the proceedings. On remand, the Trial Court entered orders providing for the payment of the transcripts and reinstated its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed again, and transcripts of the proceedings have been presented in the record. Based upon our thorough review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

The trial court granted Appellees’ respective motions averring that Appellant’s lawsuit failed to state a claim against them. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a hearing by a juvenile magistrate, Mother filed a timely petition for rehearing before the juvenile judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d). Over five hundred days later, section 37-1-107(d) was amended to eliminate the de novo hearing procedure and require a party seeking rehearing to file written exceptions to the magistrate’s order. Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s request for rehearing based on the amended statute. The juvenile court ruled that the amended statute would apply retroactively to Mother’s request for rehearing but granted her additional time to comply with the amended procedure. In this interlocutory appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court to apply the amendment to section 37-1-107(d) retroactively to this particular case and remand to the juvenile court for a de novo hearing.

The plaintiff, who is pro se, filed an inverse condemnation action against a city, county, and related governmental entities, alleging that the defendants constructed and operated an outdoor event venue on property partly owned by him without his knowledge or consent. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for a change in venue. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendants for two reasons. First, it concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-124. Second, the trial court found that the defendants affirmatively negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for inverse condemnation – that his property suffered a decrease in value – and therefore summary judgment was appropriate on that basis as well. The plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion, asking the trial court to consider the impact of a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. After a hearing, the trial court denied the post-judgment motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The pro se plaintiff asserted claims against the defendant for negligence and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, alleging faulty repair work on her vehicle. After the plaintiff presented her proof at a jury trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on all claims. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence to establish a prima facie case to show that the defendant was negligent or violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. As such, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Following a woman’s death in a nursing home facility, the woman’s daughter sued the facility and its affiliated entities for negligence and wrongful death. The defendants moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement that the woman’s daughter signed when the mother was admitted to the facility. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion but also granted the plaintiff’s request for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed with the trial court and granted the interlocutory appeal. Because the woman’s daughter, the plaintiff, did not have the requisite authority to sign the particular arbitration agreement at issue, we reverse and remand.

I concur in the decision to reverse the order compelling arbitration. I write separately to address the interpretation of the durable power of attorney by which the decedent, Lucy Leach, designated her daughter, Anita Buchanan, as her attorney-in-fact. In arguing whether the durable power of attorney authorized Ms. Buchanan to sign an arbitration agreement associated with Ms. Leach’s admission into a nursing home, the parties contend that Owens v. National Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876 (Tenn. 2007) controls. The majority describes Owens as “helpful background” in that “the trial court’s order and much of the parties’ arguments on appeal center around that case.” But, in my view, Owens also provides important context for interpreting the durable power of attorney.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety based on failure to serve the named defendants. Although we affirm the dismissal of the named defendants for insufficiency of service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations, we vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s attempt to hold the uninsured motorist carrier liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206.

This appeal concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment. Roland Brown (“Plaintiff”) sued HDR Logistics, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he sustained injuries from an incident in which Defendant’s employee backed his tractor-trailer into Plaintiff’s parked tractor-trailer. Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint and summons on Lisa Blackwell (“Blackwell”), Defendant’s designated agent in Tennessee for service of process. Defendant failed to respond, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant later filed a motion to set aside. Defendant submitted the affidavits of two individuals who said that the company did not receive notice of the lawsuit. Notably, the record contains no affidavit from Blackwell explaining what happened. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that its failure to respond was due to excusable neglect in that it lacked actual notice of the lawsuit even though its agent was served, and that the Trial Court failed to conduct a writ of inquiry on unliquidated damages as required. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. We hold further that Defendant failed to meet its burden showing the Trial Court did not conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. We affirm.

Jonathan Douglas (“Mr. Douglas”) filed a Complaint to Enforce Deed Restrictions seeking to enjoin Five Star Properties, Inc. (“Five Star”) from building a CrossMod home in a subdivision in which the parties each own property. Mr. Douglas argued that the CrossMod is a “mobile home” and is thus prohibited by the parties’ respective deeds. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Douglas. Five Star appeals that judgment. We conclude that the CrossMod home at issue is not a “mobile home,” reverse the judgment of the trial court, and vacate the injunction entered by the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the medical field. The trial court held the covenants unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff clinicians who provide anesthesia services at local hospitals in Tennessee. We affirm.

An LLC owned seven properties. The members of the LLC were a mother, father and daughter. Mother held the majority voting share. As manager of the LLC, Mother transferred most of its assets to another LLC, whose members were her daughter and son-in-law, without the knowledge of Father. Mother died and her estate sought to recover the assets for the original LLC. The trial court found that Daughter had a conflict of interest and that Mother/Decedent also had a conflict of interest. The trial court also found that the transactions violated Tennessee statutes and the “entire fairness test” of Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Properties, LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. 2014). The trial court declared the transactions void. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his personal injury action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the expiration of the statute of limitations. Because the action was barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm.

A decedent’s former employee filed a petition to dissent from the decedent’s last will and
testament and sought a declaration that she is the decedent’s widow. Following a trial, the
court dismissed the petition on the basis that the evidence rebutted the presumption of a
valid marriage between the decedent and the former employee. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the division of marital property, and an award of alimony entered as part of a final decree of divorce.  For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to both subjects and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellee filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a decision from the board of zoning appeals. Having determined that the petition did not comply with certain statutory requirements, we find that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take up the writ. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal.

This is an appeal from a three-day divorce trial in which both parties presented expert testimony regarding how to calculate the husband’s income for purposes of paying support. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding proof of marital fault, the valuation of marital property, and the alimony and attorney fees awarded to the wife. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

This is a case involving a contractual relationship between sophisticated business entities in which the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to order beverage products manufactured by the Defendant-Appellee. The delivered products were nonconforming, and the Plaintiff-Appellant thereafter filed suit asserting common law tort claims and alleging violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Upon motion of the Defendant-Appellee, however, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. As part of its order of dismissal, the trial court held that the asserted common law tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine and ruled that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.