APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee’s independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of workers’ compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee’s duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the workers’ compensation exclusivity question.

The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of Kelsie M. (“Mother”) to Nash M. (“the Child”), finding by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of severe child abuse and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment due to an insufficient record and remanded for preparation of the transcripts of the proceedings. On remand, the Trial Court entered orders providing for the payment of the transcripts and reinstated its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed again, and transcripts of the proceedings have been presented in the record. Based upon our thorough review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

The legal father of two children and the putative father of one of the children both appeal a juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights, but we reverse the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the putative father’s rights on the ground of failure to manifest willingness and ability.

The trial court granted Appellees’ respective motions averring that Appellant’s lawsuit failed to state a claim against them. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a hearing by a juvenile magistrate, Mother filed a timely petition for rehearing before the juvenile judge under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d). Over five hundred days later, section 37-1-107(d) was amended to eliminate the de novo hearing procedure and require a party seeking rehearing to file written exceptions to the magistrate’s order. Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s request for rehearing based on the amended statute. The juvenile court ruled that the amended statute would apply retroactively to Mother’s request for rehearing but granted her additional time to comply with the amended procedure. In this interlocutory appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court to apply the amendment to section 37-1-107(d) retroactively to this particular case and remand to the juvenile court for a de novo hearing.

The plaintiff, who is pro se, filed an inverse condemnation action against a city, county, and related governmental entities, alleging that the defendants constructed and operated an outdoor event venue on property partly owned by him without his knowledge or consent. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for a change in venue. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendants for two reasons. First, it concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-124. Second, the trial court found that the defendants affirmatively negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for inverse condemnation – that his property suffered a decrease in value – and therefore summary judgment was appropriate on that basis as well. The plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion, asking the trial court to consider the impact of a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. After a hearing, the trial court denied the post-judgment motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The pro se plaintiff asserted claims against the defendant for negligence and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, alleging faulty repair work on her vehicle. After the plaintiff presented her proof at a jury trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on all claims. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to present enough evidence to establish a prima facie case to show that the defendant was negligent or violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. As such, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Following a woman’s death in a nursing home facility, the woman’s daughter sued the facility and its affiliated entities for negligence and wrongful death. The defendants moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration pursuant to an agreement that the woman’s daughter signed when the mother was admitted to the facility. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion but also granted the plaintiff’s request for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed with the trial court and granted the interlocutory appeal. Because the woman’s daughter, the plaintiff, did not have the requisite authority to sign the particular arbitration agreement at issue, we reverse and remand.

I concur in the decision to reverse the order compelling arbitration. I write separately to address the interpretation of the durable power of attorney by which the decedent, Lucy Leach, designated her daughter, Anita Buchanan, as her attorney-in-fact. In arguing whether the durable power of attorney authorized Ms. Buchanan to sign an arbitration agreement associated with Ms. Leach’s admission into a nursing home, the parties contend that Owens v. National Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876 (Tenn. 2007) controls. The majority describes Owens as “helpful background” in that “the trial court’s order and much of the parties’ arguments on appeal center around that case.” But, in my view, Owens also provides important context for interpreting the durable power of attorney.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety based on failure to serve the named defendants. Although we affirm the dismissal of the named defendants for insufficiency of service of process and expiration of the statute of limitations, we vacate the dismissal of the plaintiff’s attempt to hold the uninsured motorist carrier liable under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206.

This appeal concerns a motion to set aside a default judgment. Roland Brown (“Plaintiff”) sued HDR Logistics, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he sustained injuries from an incident in which Defendant’s employee backed his tractor-trailer into Plaintiff’s parked tractor-trailer. Plaintiff served a copy of the complaint and summons on Lisa Blackwell (“Blackwell”), Defendant’s designated agent in Tennessee for service of process. Defendant failed to respond, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendant later filed a motion to set aside. Defendant submitted the affidavits of two individuals who said that the company did not receive notice of the lawsuit. Notably, the record contains no affidavit from Blackwell explaining what happened. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant appeals, arguing that its failure to respond was due to excusable neglect in that it lacked actual notice of the lawsuit even though its agent was served, and that the Trial Court failed to conduct a writ of inquiry on unliquidated damages as required. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. We hold further that Defendant failed to meet its burden showing the Trial Court did not conduct an appropriate evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. We affirm.

Jonathan Douglas (“Mr. Douglas”) filed a Complaint to Enforce Deed Restrictions seeking to enjoin Five Star Properties, Inc. (“Five Star”) from building a CrossMod home in a subdivision in which the parties each own property. Mr. Douglas argued that the CrossMod is a “mobile home” and is thus prohibited by the parties’ respective deeds. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Douglas. Five Star appeals that judgment. We conclude that the CrossMod home at issue is not a “mobile home,” reverse the judgment of the trial court, and vacate the injunction entered by the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action concerning the enforceability of covenants not to compete in the medical field. The trial court held the covenants unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff clinicians who provide anesthesia services at local hospitals in Tennessee. We affirm.

An LLC owned seven properties. The members of the LLC were a mother, father and daughter. Mother held the majority voting share. As manager of the LLC, Mother transferred most of its assets to another LLC, whose members were her daughter and son-in-law, without the knowledge of Father. Mother died and her estate sought to recover the assets for the original LLC. The trial court found that Daughter had a conflict of interest and that Mother/Decedent also had a conflict of interest. The trial court also found that the transactions violated Tennessee statutes and the “entire fairness test” of Rock Ivy Holding, LLC v. RC Properties, LLC, 464 S.W.3d 623 (Tenn. 2014). The trial court declared the transactions void. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his personal injury action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the expiration of the statute of limitations. Because the action was barred by the statute of limitations, we affirm.

A decedent’s former employee filed a petition to dissent from the decedent’s last will and
testament and sought a declaration that she is the decedent’s widow. Following a trial, the
court dismissed the petition on the basis that the evidence rebutted the presumption of a
valid marriage between the decedent and the former employee. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the division of marital property, and an award of alimony entered as part of a final decree of divorce.  For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to both subjects and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a three-day divorce trial in which both parties presented expert testimony regarding how to calculate the husband’s income for purposes of paying support. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding proof of marital fault, the valuation of marital property, and the alimony and attorney fees awarded to the wife. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and affirm the decision of the trial court as modified.

The appellee filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a decision from the board of zoning appeals. Having determined that the petition did not comply with certain statutory requirements, we find that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take up the writ. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand for the entry of an order of dismissal.

This is a case involving a contractual relationship between sophisticated business entities in which the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to order beverage products manufactured by the Defendant-Appellee. The delivered products were nonconforming, and the Plaintiff-Appellant thereafter filed suit asserting common law tort claims and alleging violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Upon motion of the Defendant-Appellee, however, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. As part of its order of dismissal, the trial court held that the asserted common law tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine and ruled that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

In this child support dispute, the mother filed a petition to extend child support for an adult child due to the child’s severe disability. The father filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Following a bench trial, the court entered an order determining that the parties’ adult son was severely disabled and directing the father to pay child support “going forward” and retroactively. The father sought to amend the final judgment, again raising the issue of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and also requesting that the final order be set aside until the child could undergo a vocational evaluation. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Upon consideration, we decline the mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This case stems from a mother’s request to relocate outside the state with the parties’ minor child. The father filed a petition opposing relocation, and a trial was held on the matter. The trial court determined that allowing relocation was not in the child’s best interests and granted the father’s petition. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

In this divorce action, the trial court distributed the parties’ assets and liabilities, determined the amount of the husband’s child support obligation with regard to the parties’ two children, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife. The husband timely appealed. Upon our thorough review, we vacate and remand to the trial court the issues of the husband’s child support and alimony obligations for further determination. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

In this post-divorce matter, the parties dispute the interpretation of a provision of their marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) concerning one of Husband’s retirement plans. On the parties’ cross petitions to enforce the MDA, the trial court found the MDA to be unambiguous and agreed with Wife’s interpretation of the disputed provision. Discerning no error, we affirm. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is granted pursuant to the terms of the MDA; her request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.