APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns claims for nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and enforcement of a local zoning ordinance. The plaintiff, Howard Levy, alleged that his neighbor, James Franks, engaged in an intentional and malicious course of conduct that included paving over a corner of Levy’s property, building a wooden fence along Levy’s property line, and routing construction vehicles over the parties’ shared driveway. Levy also alleged that the fence violated the Zoning Ordinance of Franklin, Tennessee, and that Franks was operating a construction company on his property in violation of the same. The trial court dismissed Levy’s fence-zoning claim at the summary judgment stage because he had not produced evidence that he was “specially damaged” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-208(a)(2). At the close of Levy’s proof during the bench trial, the court dismissed the remaining claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. The court also enjoined Levy from interfering with the installation of underground power lines under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.04(2). This appeal followed. We conclude the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the injunction, which was unrelated to any of the underlying claims, but we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, arguing that termination was not in his child’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Plaintiffs filed suit against the former father-in-law of one of the Plaintiffs, complaining that, following alleged statements the former father-in-law made to a third party, the third party moved money that had been invested with the former son-in-law. The former father-in-law sought to dismiss the claims that were asserted against him, both pursuant to a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and pursuant to a petition under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After initially dismissing the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim and denying a motion to alter or amend, the trial court held a separate hearing regarding dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Ultimately, the trial court ruled that dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act was appropriate and concluded that the former father-in-law was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees in connection with this litigation, both in relation to the Tennessee Public Participation Act petition and the Rule 12 dismissal. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal under Rule 12, vacate its dismissal—and award of costs and attorney’s fees—under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, and affirm the award of costs and attorney’s fees that stemmed from the trial court’s Rule 12 dismissal.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. Tamara R. (“Mother”) is the mother of minor child Tayla R. (“the Child”). Jesse R. (“Legal Father”) is the Child’s legal father, having married Mother on the day that the Child was born. The Child was removed into state custody based on Mother’s drug use while pregnant and environmental concerns in the home. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the Child’s foster parents Autumn M. (“Foster Mother”) and Drannon M. (“Foster Father”) (“Foster Parents,” collectively), filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Chancery Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights to the Child. The Chancery Court terminated Mother’s and Legal Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Aside from a few token visits with the Child, Mother and Legal Father essentially did nothing on their case, declining to cooperate with DCS or even allow DCS inside their residence, an RV camper. Neither Mother nor Legal Father paid any child support whatsoever for the Child. We affirm.

A patient brought a health care liability action against his psychiatrist and the psychiatrist’s employer, alleging the psychiatrist engaged in improper sexualized conduct that caused him psychological injury.  The patient secured an expert witness in support of his suit, but the expert withdrew following the expert’s deposition.  The patient obtained a new expert witness.  However, relying on the cancellation rule, the trial court determined a conflict existed between the second expert’s affidavit and deposition testimony relating to the issue of damages.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and also granted the defendants’ request for an award of discretionary costs.  The patient appeals.  We affirm.

A husband appeals the trial court’s final judgment of divorce with respect to two issues.  Because the husband failed to comply with the applicable briefing rules, we have concluded that he waived his first issue.  We find no support for the husband’s second issue.  Having determined that the husband’s appeal is frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand to the trial court for the assessment of damages.

The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The mother appealed and challenges the court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence established grounds for termination and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no error and affirm.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, the appellant’s oral motion for recusal made during trial was denied. She then filed a written motion for recusal that apparently has yet to be resolved by the trial court. Because no order denying the motion has been entered, we dismiss the appeal.

For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied.  Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power).  This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.”  Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354.  Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part.

Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

Parents filed competing petitions to modify a parenting plan.  The parents agreed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification.  But they disagreed over the residential custody schedule and decision-making provisions. After a hearing, the trial court modified the schedule and granted joint decision-making.  Because neither decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

In this contract dispute, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Ms. Ward hired Kedalo Construction LLC (“Kedalo”) to renovate her store. She claimed that the work was not completed or was not done properly. After Kedalo attempted to remedy the situation, Ms. Ward was still not satisfied. Kedalo then said she was not their problem anymore. Ms. Ward created a website and Facebook page criticizing the company.  Kedalo sued for defamation. Ms. Ward responded with a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After many filings and a deposition, the trial court dismissed the petition. Ms. Ward appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Shortly after the City of Memphis (“the City”) made public announcements regarding untested sexual assault kits, three women filed a class action complaint alleging that the announcements caused them severe emotional distress. More than a year after the announcements, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff. The three original plaintiffs’ claims were either voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations. The City sought summary judgment against the only remaining plaintiff on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and this Court granted the City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. Concluding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the new plaintiff’s claims, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In its divorce decree, the trial court “adopted” Wife’s proposed parenting plans without signing or attaching the plans. More than a year after the resolution of Husband’s subsequent motion to alter or amend, the trial court eventually signed the parenting plans pursuant to a motion to enter by Husband. Because we determine that Husband’s argument that the trial court’s order only became final when the plans were signed is without merit, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed. Wife is awarded her appellate attorney’s fees.

This Tennessee Public Participation Act appeal involves three parties and multiple issues. The plaintiff/appellee, Lisa Garramone (“Ms. Garramone”), while serving as a commissioner for the City of Nolensville, Tennessee, filed a complaint for, inter alia, false light invasion of privacy against four defendants, including appellants Jason Patrick (“Mr. Patrick”) and Dr. Joe Curtsinger (“Dr. Curtsinger”). Ms. Garramone alleged that the defendants acted in concert to spread defamatory information about her during her 2022 re-election campaign. Each defendant responded by filing a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (“the TPPA”). Mr. Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment; Dr. Curtsinger did not. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Garramone filed a notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice” of all of her claims under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), to which the defendants objected. While the TPPA petitions were pending, this court ruled on the interplay between the TPPA and Rule 41.01(1) in Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade I”), No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). Consequently, the trial court ordered the parties to reargue the TPPA petitions considering this court’s rulings in Flade I. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Ms. Garramone’s voluntary dismissal mooted Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition but that it was ineffective against Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition because of his pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court further held that Mr. Patrick established that the TPPA applied because Ms. Garramone’s claims were based on, related to, or in response to his exercise of the right to free speech. But the court held that Ms. Garramone failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for her tort claims as required by the TPPA. Thus, the court granted Mr. Patrick’s petition, dismissed Ms. Garramone’s claims against him, and ordered Mr. Patrick to submit his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Patrick sought $74,346.50 in attorney’s fees and $920.09 in costs, but the court awarded him only $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $66.91 in costs based on its determination that the TPPA’s fee-shifting provision—Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107—should be construed narrowly because it runs contra to the American Rule. Thus, the court found that Mr. Patrick was entitled to only those fees “reasonably incurred in obtaining the dismissal of the action,” which did not include, inter alia, services rendered to prepare a defense against Ms. Garramone’s tort claims. The court reasoned that “more than $46,600.00 of his total fees and $853.18 of his costs” were incurred after Ms. Garramone filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit with prejudice, which the trial court stated disposed of the case “for all practical purposes.”  Mr. Patrick appeals the amount of the award for his attorney’s fees and costs; he also seeks his attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Dr. Curtsinger appeals the denial of his TPPA petition as moot. For her part, Ms. Garramone contends the trial court erred by not denying Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition as moot when she filed her notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice.” After these consolidated appeals were filed and argued, our Supreme Court rendered two decisions pertaining to the TPPA, Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2024), and Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade II”), ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024). Based on the reasoning in Flade II, we hold that Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition did not curtail Ms. Garramone’s “free and unrestricted” right to voluntarily dismiss her claims against him; thus, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition as moot. We further find that Ms. Garramone’s characterization of her dismissal as “with prejudice” did not place it outside the ambit of Rule 41.01(1)’s summary-judgment exception. As for Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs, we rely upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charles and Flade II to find that the trial court erred by categorically excluding all fees and costs he incurred in preparing a defense to Ms. Garramone’s claims. Accordingly, we vacate the award of Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration of the reasonable amount to which he is entitled under § 20-17-106 and to enter judgment accordingly. We also find that Mr. Patrick is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to § 20-17-107, as explained in Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. 

A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In an earlier appeal, we determined that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign judgment, but we vacated the enforcement decision to determine the outstanding amount owed under the judgment. In this appeal, the judgment debtor faults the trial court for not considering his equitable estoppel defense on remand. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the Department of Children’s Services withdrew noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground for termination, we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest.

This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee’s independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of workers’ compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee’s duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the workers’ compensation exclusivity question.