APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury in a personal injury case awarded damages that were significantly lower than the plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury’s verdict was below the range of reasonableness and indicative of an improper compromise. We affirm.

A tenant appeals an order granting a landlord possession of real property. Because the order does not dispose of the landlord’s claim for damages or the tenant’s counterclaim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The defendant appeals from an order granting the plaintiff possession of real property. Because the order appealed does not dispose of the plaintiff’s claim for damages, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

This is the third recusal appeal filed by the pro se petitioner relative to the underlying consolidated cases. Because the petitioner has not demonstrated a basis for recusal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in denying the motion to recuse.

The trial court dismissed a prisoner’s petition for a writ of certiorari on the basis that no verified petition was timely filed. On appeal, the prisoner concedes that his verified petition was filed at least one day late but contends that this Court should adopt an exception permitting the late filing due to obstruction by prison staff that prevented the prisoner from filing a timely verified petition. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal stems from an extension and modification of an order of protection. Upon motion by Appellee, the trial court extended the initial order of protection between the parties for one year and modified the terms of the order. Appellant challenges the extension on procedural, statutory, and constitutional grounds. After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s extension and modification of the order of protection.

The appellee sustained severe injuries after falling off of a ladder at his job. The appellee was performing work on a building owned by the appellant when the accident occurred, and he claims the ladder was owned by the appellant. The appellant’s workers’ compensation policy had lapsed and was not in effect at the time of the accident. The appellee filed a common law tort action against the appellant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the appellee a judgment of $471,038.36. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the appellee’s damages for lost wages and future lost earning capacity and modify the trial court’s judgment to correct such error. We also remand this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the appellee is entitled to an award of noneconomic damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Because the Shelby County Probate Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over this breach of contract case, we vacate the probate court’s order and remand with instruction to transfer the matter to the Shelby County Chancery Court.

This appeal concerns third-party claims for breach of contract filed by a real estate developer against several real estate investment companies. The trial court entered an agreed order extending the time for the third-party defendants to file a “responsive pleading.” Then, prior to the deadline for filing their responsive pleadings, the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. But the developer argued that the third-party defendants waived their right to file a Rule 12 motion because the agreed order only extended the deadline for “responsive pleadings.” During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the third-party defendants asked for an award of their attorney’s fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c)(1), which requires courts to “award the party or parties against whom the dismissed claims were pending at the time the successful motion to dismiss was granted the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the proceedings as a consequence of the dismissed claims by that party or parties.” The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but held that the third-party defendants could not recover their attorney’s fees and costs under § 20-12-119(c)(1) because “the written motion to dismiss did not include a request for an award of fees or cite to the statute.” This appeal followed. We conclude that the agreed order did not constitute a waiver of the third-party defendants’ right to file a motion to dismiss and affirm the dismissal of the claims at issue. However, we conclude that the third-party defendants are entitled to an award of their costs and attorney’s fees under § 20-12-119(c)(1). Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions to award the third-party defendants their reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs.

Appellant, Shamika Sykes, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court that was entered on March 13, 2025. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

The appellants filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court magistrate entered a plan that modified the residential parenting schedule and gave the mother sole decision-making authority over all educational and non-emergency health care decisions. The father argues that the magistrate did not maximize his participation in the children’s lives as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106(a) and that there was no basis for modifying the allocation of decision-making authority. We affirm the judgment in all respects. We have also determined that the mother, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice in the parking lot of a grocery store, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the store, the owner of the parking lot, and the company hired to perform snow and ice removal services for the parking lot. The trial court granted summary judgment to all of the defendants because the court found that the proof at the summary judgment stage showed conclusively that reasonable minds could not differ that the man was at least fifty percent at fault for the injuries he alleged to have suffered. Discerning that the evidence shows that a dispute of material fact exists, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a permanent parenting plan in which the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and awarded the mother supervised visitation. We now affirm.

Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for parental relocation and its entry of a modified permanent parenting plan naming Father/Appellee the child’s primary residential parent. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This action involves the proper use and zoning of a parcel of real property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, determining that the owner’s use of the property as a quarry was not prohibited because the subject property was unzoned. The trial court based its ruling on the municipality’s inability to produce a validly enacted zoning ordinance that applied to the specific parcel. The municipality and its planning commission have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We also find that the property owner’s motions to consider post-judgment facts and to dismiss the appeal are not well taken, and we deny those motions.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of mandamus. Because Appellant improperly joined her original mandamus action with Appellee’s petition for judicial review, an appellate action, we affirm the dismissal.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s granting of a petition to extend an order of protection for ten years after finding that the respondent violated the original order of protection multiple times and failed to appear for hearings throughout the litigation. Because none of the issues the appellant raises were raised in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-617(a)(1), we award the appellee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal and remand for calculation of the amount.

This is an action for breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The defendants, who are Minnesota residents and who have no business activities in Tennessee except for this one transaction with the plaintiff, responded to the complaint by filing a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish several statutory grounds of termination as applied to the mother. The court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest. We now affirm.

Petitioner seeks to appeal a denial of her motion to recuse. Because she did not include her trial court motion and supporting documents, the record is insufficient to determine this appeal. We affirm.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., dissenting.  The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority's thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.

A trial court declined to grant an ex parte order of protection. Following the subsequent contested hearing over whether to issue an order of protection, the trial court did not determine whether the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence the underlying offense predicate for issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b). Instead, the trial court determined that issuance of an order of protection was unwarranted because the petitioner had failed to prove ongoing existing danger posed by the alleged perpetrator. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court, while noting a seeming tension between this approach and the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b), concluded the result followed from this court’s decision in Dulaney v. Chico, No. E2022-00047-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2253373 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023). Noting that this court’s prior decision is unpublished, the petitioner appeals, asserting that the trial court’s approach is inconsistent with the statute. While our understanding of the statutory scheme diverges from that set forth in Dulaney v. Chico, we affirm the trial court’s decision. We do so because we conclude that the absence of existing ongoing danger is a proper consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605(b) when no ex parte order has been issued and because the trial court properly understood its discretion in this case.

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., concurring. The majority provides a well-researched analysis of the interplay between the legislative purpose of a statute and its actual operation in the court system. However, I depart from the majority’s thoughtful conclusion as applied to the order of protection statutes, which I view as a statutory anomaly with a distinct objective and purpose that requires judicial adherence.