APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff, Wade Spurling, D.C., appeals from the order of the trial court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) T.R.C.P. Spurling filed a complaint titled “Complaint For Deceit in Inducement to Contract, Promissory Fraud, Fraud, Intentional Interference With Performance ofContractual Obligations and Breach of Contract.” The complaint alleges that Plaintiff owned and operated Spurling Chiropractic Clinic (SCC). He entered into negotiations with Defendant Michael K. Plambeck (Plambeck) for Plambeck to purchase SCC.

In this contract action, the Trial Judge entered judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the amount of $50,431.29, and dismissed defendant’s counterclaim which had sought damages for plaintiff’s alleged breach of the distributorship agreement.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant made an intentional misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a tract of unimproved real property. Following a bench trial, the court found that the defendant, Dean Russell Carrico (“Carrico”), had fraudulently misrepresented a material fact, resulting in a judgment of $21,911.97 for the plaintiff, Dr. Robert W. Bagby (“Bagby”). The trial court also found that Carrico’s conduct violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, T.C.A. § 47-18-101, et seq. (“the Act”). Carrico appealed, raising three issues that present the following questions for our review:

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on defendants’ premises, the Trial Judge granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed.

This is a post-divorce case. Paul William McGaffic filed a petition seeking to modify his child support and periodic alimony in futuro obligations. As pertinent to the issues on
this appeal, the trial court refused to modify its existing child support and alimony in futuro decrees. Mr. McGaffic appealed, raising issues that essentially present the following questions: 1. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its alimony in futuro award by either terminating it, or reducing it and/or converting it to an award of rehabilitative alimony? 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its child support award?

This is a suit for declaratory judgment. The petitioner, TRW Koyo Steering Systems Company (“TRW Koyo”), seeks a declaration that a document filed by the defendant, John D. Snavely (“Snavely”), in the Monroe County Register of Deeds’ office is a cloud on its title to real property in Monroe County. The trial court granted TRW Koyo summary judgment, decreeing that the purported lien filed by Snavely “is...of no legal effect and, thus, is lifted and removed from [TRW Koyo’s] title.” Snavely appealed pro se.

In this divorce action brought by Gloria E. Hill-Evans (Mother) against Bredell Michael Evans, Sr. (Father), the trial court awarded custody of the parties’ two minor sons to Mother with Father to have reasonable visitation. However, the trial court’s decree further provided that visitation be suspended “until both of the parties and the children have completed a counseling program which is satisfactory to the court, and the court has been furnished a report that the counseling course has been successfully completed. When the counseling process has been successfully completed, the court will consider the defendant’s visitation rights.”

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant and his wife, Diane, alleging that defendant “entered into agreement with plaintiff for plaintiff to grade and excavate . . . in order to make said land usable”. Plaintiff further averred that he expended over $29,000.00 for heavy equipment and operators on excavation, and “purchased and installed piping at the cost of $3,604.00, for a total due in the amount of $33,530.09".

This dispute arose out of the sale of a residence in Signal Mountain, Tennessee. The trial court found that the sellers, Thomas F. Cofer and wife, Cynthia H. Cofer, had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”) in connection with the sale of their five-bedroom, two and a halfbath residence to the plaintiffs, Theoren J. Murvin and wife, Melody S. Murvin. The Cofers appealed, arguing that the Act does not apply to this transaction, and that the evidence does not show that the Cofers “knowingly withheld information from the [Murvins] to constitute fraud.”

The plaintiff, Fredrika A. Steiner, has appealed from the summary dismissal of her suit against the defendant, The Parman Corporation, for damages for personal injury sustained in a fall on the premises of  defendant.

This appeal involves a prisoner’s medical malpractice suit stemming from the repair of an epigastric hernia. The prisoner filed a pro se complaint against the surgeon who had performed the surgery, the hospital where the surgery was performed, and a physician and physician’s assistant employed by the prison. The Circuit Court for Davidson County first granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the physician’s assistant and later granted the summary judgment motion filed by the hospital. The prisoner appealed from the order summarily dismissing his claims against the hospital. We have determined that the prisoner’s appeal must be dismissed because he has not complied with the mandatory requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) and 4(a).

The plaintiffs, Ginger C. Snead and James D. Snead, sued the defendant, Lois A. Metts as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on July 22, 1994. It is undisputed that the car driven by Ms. Metts struck the car driven by Ms. Snead in the rear while the Snead vehicle was stopped at a stop sign. Ms. Snead sued for injuries and damages and Mr. Snead sued for loss of consortium.
 

This case involves a petition for the modification of alimony payments. The ex-husband
appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to reduce his alimony obligations to his ex-wife. We
affirm.