APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Judy Plunk (“plaintiff”) as administratrix of her husband’s estate, filed  suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, (FELA) against the Illinois Central Railroad (“defendant” or “railroad”) seeking damages stemming from the death of her husband, Jerry Plunk (“decedent”), who was the engineer of a train owned and operated by defendant that was involved in a head-on collision with another train. The case was tried by a jury. At the  conclusion of plaintiff’s proof and again at the conclusion of all the proof, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict which was overruled each time by the trial court. The case was submitted to the  jury, who found plaintiff’s decedent 70% negligent and defendant 30% negligent in causing the collision, and awarded plaintiff $285,000.00 as damages. On appeal defendant has raised five issues for our consideration: whether the trial court erred in (1) failing to grant  defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that decedent was the sole cause of the accident; (2) admitting into evidence testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Dennis Runcie; (3) allowing other railroad employees to testify as “experts” regarding “good railroad practice”; (4) admitting into evidence testimony of plaintiff’s economist expert, Fred Johnson;  and (5) failing to order plaintiff’s counsel to dismiss with prejudice  allegations of defendant’s vicarious liability in two collateral cases pending in Mississippi and to cease representation of certain plaintiffs in the Mississippi litigation. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse in part and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial in keeping with the provisions of this opinion.

Plaintiffs Betty J. Collins, Panther Park Missionary Baptist Church, and six Church trustees appeal the trial court’s final judgment which established the boundary line between the parties’ respective properties. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that an existing fence row represents the boundary line between the properties.

Indicted for first degree murder, the defendant, Willie D. Graham, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Ray Anthony Shervington. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of six years.

This case involves a contractual dispute between the lessor and lessee of certain commercial property. The appellant, Lunn Real Estate Investments, Inc. (Lunn), leased the subject premises to the appellee, Boiler Supply Company, pursuant to an agreement executed by the parties on January 1, 1989. On August 31, 1995, Lunn served Boiler Supply with written notice that it was requiring the latter to vacate the premises by October 1, 1995.1 On October 5, 1995, Lunn filed a detainer action in the general sessions court seeking possession of the property. By order entered April 19, 1996, the court found the claim for possession moot due to Boiler Supply’s vacating of the premises on November 30, 1995, but awarded Lunn a judgment for two months holdover rent plus attorney’s fees.2 Lunn appealed the decision to circuit court where, after a hearing, a judgment was entered for Lunn for $17,790. Lunn now appeals from that decision to this Court requesting additional compensatory damages, due to Boiler Supply’s alleged failure to maintain the premises in accordance with the contract, and attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Ronnie D. Boyd, the Assessor of Property of Montgomery County, Tennessee, appeals the trial court’s judgment which ruled that eighty-nine percent (89%) of a parcel of real property owned by Petitioner/Appellee Batson East-Land Company, Inc., was entitled to “Greenbelt” status for the tax year 1991. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling and, thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This suit was filed in General Sessions Court to collect a dishonored check, but was appealed to the Circuit Court where a complaint was filed stating more details of transactions involving the transfer of ownership of two automobiles, a Honda and a Chevrolet.

The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed in the Trial Court a petition for the writ of certiorari from the action of the Board of Paroles on April 18, 1996, rescinding its order of April 9, 1994, granting the prisoner a parole. At the time of the rescission, the prisoner had not been released from custody.