APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff Demetra Lyree Parker appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant/Appellee W arren County Utility District. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Utility District responded promptly, adequately, and effectively to Parker’s allegations of sexual harassment against the Utility District’s general manager.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Winslow Watson, from a decision of the chancery court dismissing his petition for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-14-101 to -113. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

The appellant sought to enjoin both city and county officials from the sale of general obligation bonds. The Chancery Court of Franklin granted all  defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the  Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, we must determine  whether the trial court erred in not considering the petition for injunction on the merits as against either the city or the county defendants.

This is an action in negligence arising out of the June 1993 acts of the appellant, Harold Angus, in demolishing the “Glassman” building, located at 111 North Highland Avenue in Jackson, pursuant to a contract with the city. Angus’ demolition of the building, which had been declared condemned by the city code, is not disputed. Nor is it disputed that, as a result of the building’s demolition, damage was sustained to the building located adjacent thereto, identified as the “Carmen’s” building, and owned by the appellees, Robert J. McCurley and wife, Patricia G. McCurley.1 The two buildings shared a common “party wall.” At issue in this case is whether Angus was negligent in its demolition of the Glassman building so as to be held legally accountable to the McCurleys for the damages they sustained. The case proceeded to a trial by jury where, at the close of all proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the appellees on the issue of liability.2 Angus has appealed challenging the correctness of the trial judge’s decision in this regard. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression concerning the evidentiary standards applicable to disciplinary proceedings involving licensed physicians. The Tennessee Department of Health perfected an interlocutory appeal to the Chancery Court for Davidson County after an administrative law judge disqualified its expert witness for failing to satisfy the locality rule generally applicable in medical malpractice cases. The trial court reversed the administrative law judge’s decision after concluding that a physician’s conduct should be measured by a statewide standard of minimum competency rather than a particularized local standard of care. While the administrative law judge’s decision was correct with regard to two of thecharges, we affirm the trial court’s decision in part because several of the charges in this proceeding only require proof that a physician has failed to meet statewide, minimal competency standards.