APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce action, the appellant (husband) appeals from the judgment of the trial court questioning the amount of child support he was ordered to pay, the division of marital property and alimony, including the amount, nature, and duration. The appellee (wife) seeks attorney fees for this appeal. No issue is presented relating to the granting of the divorce. We note that at the time of the trial, the husbanc had more than enough life insurance in force to satisfy this requirement.

This is a divorce case. Plaintiff-appellant Cheri Owens Tuncay was granted a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. Mrs. Tuncay appeals the trial court’s division of the marital debts as well as the court’s failure to award her alimony beyond $5,000 in attorney fees.

This is a divorce case.  On appeal, Brenda Pierce (wife) raises the issues of whether the tril court erred by refusing to grant her periodic alimony, by failing to grant her the divorce, and by failing to grant her discretionary costs and attorney's fees. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

The State of Tennessee filed a petition to rehear in the above styled case on November 24, 1997. The State contends this court should rehear the case pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, it contends our decision 1) conflicts with existing case law, 2) conflicts with a principle of law, and 3) overlooks a material fact upon which the parties were not heard. It is the opinion of this court that the motion is not well taken and, therefore, should be denied.

This is an action whereby the plaintiff seeks to enforce a convenant not to compete in an employment agreement between the defendant, Warren, and the plaintiff. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion did not set out any grounds for relief but simply stated that defendants "file this motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennesse Rules of Civil Procedure" and referred the court to grounds stated in their briefs in support of themotion. The brief is not included in the record. Apparently, the parties did not make a designation of record and the Clerk of the court correctly omitted the brief pursuant to Rule 24, Tennessee rulesof Appellate Procedure.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Citizens for Collierville (“CFC”) appeals from the order of the 2 Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, which declared valid the decision of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the Town of Collierville approving of Resolution 96-35 with respect to the application of Baptist Memorial Hospital (“BMH”) for a planned development pursuant to the Town of Collierville’s zoning ordinance. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Donnie F. Pollock, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court awarding the plaintiff a divorce on grounds of adultery and inappropriate marital conduct, awarding plaintiff, $8,000.00 alimony in solido and $500.00 per month alimony until she reaches 65 years or one of the parties dies; ordering defendant to pay $2,400.00 of plaintiff’s attorneys fees, and distributing the marital estate and liability for debts.

This appeal involves a suit filed by plaintiffs, Gina (“Mrs. Franklin”) and Barnee Franklin (“the Franklins”), against defendant, Allied Signal, Inc. (“Allied”), for personal injuries sustained when Mrs. Franklin tripped and fell on Allied’s premises on a metal loading ramp which protruded above the dock floor by one to two inches. The trial court granted Allied’s motion for summary judgment. The Franklins appeal and pose the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court committed error in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) whether the “open and obvious rule” bars plaintiff’s recovery or is only a factor to be considered in assessing comparative negligence. For reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This appeal involves the construction of a home. Plaintiffs engaged one of the defendants, Donald Van Hise, (hereafter, the defendant) to construct a home on their property. On May 24, 1994, defendant signed a proposal to construct the house, reserving the right to withdraw the proposal within 30 days, if not accepted by plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs signed an acceptance of the proposal. The other did not. On June 25, 1994, defendant tendered another proposal on different terms, which proposal was accepted by both plaintiffs. The second proposal contained an estimated time of completion of 3-1/2 - 4-1/2 months. Both proposals contained a base contract price subject to revision for changes during construction. Both contracts refer to “plans and specifications” but the record contains no plan and only a partial set of specifications. The plans and specifications were not specifically prepared for plaintiffs, but were “generic,” that is, sold on the general market, to be altered as desired; and alterations were made, producing part of the present controversy. Promptly after the second proposal was accepted.