APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves post-divorce petitions for change of custody and child support. The mother, Elizabeth Davis Black (Tepas), has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court transferring custody of the eleven year old daughter, Chelsea, from the mother to the father, Michael Walter Black, and relieving him of the obligation of child support while the child was in the custody of the father by agreement of the parties.

I concur i the resulst of the majority opinion, but would base that result on different reasoning.

In this divorce action, the wife appeals from the Trial Court’s Order of child support and the evaluation of the marital estate and its distribution.

In this post-divorce case, the trial court denied the petition of Terri Lee Wooten, formerly Wolfe (“Mother”), seeking sole custody of the parties’ daughter, Kelsea Wolfe, age five and a half. In the same order, the court granted the counterclaim of Patrick Alan Wolfe (“Father”) by modifying Mother’s visitation rights. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to change the child’s custody. She also claims that the court erred in modifying the visitation schedule set forth in the divorce judgment.

In this divorce case, the appellant Etta Mechelle Parks argues that the trial court erred in awarding her former husband, Craig Dewayne Parks, custody of their two boys, ages seven and almost four. We do not find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s custody decree. See Rule 13(d), T.R.A.P.; Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in placing the children’s sole custody with Mr. Parks. See Grant v. Grant, 286 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tenn.App. 1954).

Following the trial of this matter, the court ordered the parties, Leslie A. Hassell (Wife) and Thomas W. Hassell (Husband), to be entitled to a divorce pursuant to T.C.A . § 36 -4 -129 ( b ) . Husband was ordered to pay Wife $500 per month as alimony in futuro and that award is the sole issue presented by Husband to this court on appeal.

The Trial dismissed plaintiffs’ causes of action for personal injury on the basis that the statute of limitations had run before the action was properly brought, pursuant to Rule 3, T.R.C.P.

This case involves the possession of real estate after foreclosure proceedings. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Appellees were entitled to possession of the real estate in question. We affirm.

This suit was initiated by Plaintiff-Appellant, Wendell Goodwin, against Defendants-Appellees, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, and a number of  other Defendants, seeking damages because of an illness Mr. Goodwin contracted -- specifically a stomach cancer known as peritoneal mesothelioma -- resulting from his occupational exposure to asbestos products manufactured and distributed by the Defendants, including Pittsburgh Corning and Owens-Corning. The Trial Court, in sresonse to the answers supplied by the jury through special interrogatories hereinafter set out, entered a judgment in favor of the Defendants because the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of repose, T.C. A . 29 -28 -103(a).

Samuel L. Banks, a doctor, and Cathy J. Stancil, a nurse, appeal a jury verdict rendered against them in favor of their former patient, Jacqueline Sue Rogers.  Ms. Rogers brought two actions of medical malpractice in the Hamilton County Circuit Court.  One action was brought against Dr. Banks, her treating  physician.  The other action was brought against Nurse Stancil.  Nurse Stancil performed the majority of the procedure in question. Judge Robert M. Summitt denied motions for directed verdict after Ms. Rogers presented her case and again after Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil presented their case.  Both actions were submitted to the jury.  The jury returned a general verdict against both Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil for $60,000.  Dr. Banks and Nurse Stancil both filed motions for judgments not withstanding the verdict as well as motions for a new trial.  Judge Summitt overruled these motions and upheld the jury award.  We now reverse the judgment below and dismiss boith suits with prejudice.

Property owners alleged in a petition for common law certiorari that the city of Decherd acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to rezone their property from residential to commercial. The Chancery Court of Franklin County dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The captioned appellant is a prisoner in the punitive custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. On February 19, 1997, he filed in the Trial Court a petition for declaratory judgment alleging that on November 16, 1996, he filed with the Department a petition for a declaratory order correcting an erroneous entry showing two life sentences which have been merged.

This appeal involves a biological father's obligation to support his thirteen year old son.

This breach of contract case is before us on a Rule 54.02, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. appeal. The only question for our decision is whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for certain consequential damages arising from the defendant’s breach of contract. We reverse the trial court.

This is a post-divorce decree proceeding to adjust the amount of periodic alimony. The wife has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court increasing the alimony from $1,000 per month to $1,350 per month.

The plaintiff, Ervin Smith, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court as to his rights in regard to an alleged public right-of-way on property adjoining plaintiff’s land.

In this construction contract dispute, the Chancery Court of Montgomery County granted a judgment plus prejudgment interest to Razorback Marble Manufacturing Company, Inc. On appeal, Roberts Construction Company, Inc. and D. D. Roberts, Individually, raise issues pertaining to the Contractor’s Licensing statutes and the Notice of Non-Payments statute. Razorback insists that it was due a larger judgment and a greater award of prejudgment interest.