APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following an in camera proceeding, the trial court declared the parties divorced, and awarded the real property at issue to the husband. The wife filed a Motion to Alter and Amend, which resulted in a new hearing, and a new decree whereby the real property was equally divided between the parties. The husband claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in re-opening the case after his initial decree. We affirm the trial court, but we amend its final order to make sure there is no doubt that the parties have been legally divorced.

This case involves restrictive employment covenants. The plaintiff and the defendant are both private security companies. The trial court granted the plaintiff a restraining order enjoining the defendant from inducing former employees to breach the restrictive covenants in other states, from misrepresenting facts concerning the enforceability of the covenants, or from litigating or assisting others in litigating in other states regarding the enforceability of the restrictive covenants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This appeal involves a motion to modify an alimony award. Appellant, Thomas Henry Campbell (Husband), appeals from the Chancellor’s order denying his motion to modify alim

This appeal involves a petition for grandparent visitation filed by plaintiff, Regina Ellison, paternal grandmother of Garrett Ellison and Ethan Wayne Ellison, minor children of defendant, Cherri Ellison, and Terry Ellison, deceased. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial 2 court granted visitation. Cherri Ellison (Mother) has appealed and presents the following issues for review as stated in her brief:
1. Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 is unconstitutional because it authorizes courts to order grandparent visitation upon a finding that such visitation is in the “best interest” of the child without first requiring the finding of a danger of substantial harm to the child.
2. Whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s award of visitation rights to the appellee.

Defendant Charles E. Campbell (Husband) appeals the final decree of divorce entered by the trial court which distributed the parties’ property and ordered Husband to pay child support and alimony to Plaintiff/Appellee Brenda S. Cunningham Campbell (Wife). On appeal from the final decree, Husband contends that the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) in imputing income of $2,000 per month to Husband for purposes of calculating his child support obligation; (2) in allocating to Husband a $2,600 debt with the Hardin County Bank; (3) in awarding Wife the marital home valued at $44,000; and (4) in awarding Wife $150 per month and other amounts as alimony. We affirm.

This case involves the efforts of the State of Tennessee on relation of Deborah D. Willis, former wife of Cecil Willis, Jr., to obtain the revocation of a surrender executed by him surrendering his three children, Deborah May, Pamela R. and Andrew V. for adoption. The Juvenile Judge, who witnessed the surrenders, later entertained the petition to revoke and ordered the surrenders to be revoked. The respondent, Cecil Willis, Jr., has appealed to this Court, presenting the following issue: I. Whether a Trial Court has authority to revoke a “surrender of Child” by the natural father directly to the natural mother and stepfather almost four (4) years after its execution. Furthermore, whether a surrender simply becomes void after the passing of 120 days when an adoption has not yet occurred.

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. However, I write separately to express my concern with the language on page 10 of that opinion which states that, “[i]n order to be compelling enough to warrant the dramatic remedy of changed custody, the change of circumstances must be such that ‘continuation of the adjudicated custody will substantially harm the child.’” I acknowledge that this language appears in Wall v. Wall, 907 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tenn. App. 1995), an opinion of the middle section of this court. However, I further note that Wall cited Contreras v. Ward, 831 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. App. 1991). Contreras was a parental relocation case which stated the long recognized rule that “the best interest and welfare of the child must be the primary focus of attention.” Contreras, 831 S.W.2d at 290. The court also cited with approval from Sartoph v. Sartoph, 354 A.2d 467, 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), wherein the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that “[t]he custody of children should not be disturbed unless there is some strong reason affecting the welfare of the child. To justify a change in custody, the change in conditions must have occurred which affects the welfare of the child and not that of the parents.”

The facts of this case are relative (sic) simple. The plaintiffs contracted to purchase a house from the defendant. When the house was complete, excepting some "punch list items" the parties entered into a second contract. By the terms of the second contract, the defendant was to place $5,000.00 in escrow with the monies to be used toward the completion of the "punch list items. Part of the work was compleed on the "punch list" items.

The facts of this case, as material to this appeal, are relatively simple. The parties entered into a contract for the construction of a hotel in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. The contract was a standard 2
Associated General Contractors ConstructionManager contract styled "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager." The agreement contains two provisions that are germane to the issues under consideration here.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Plaintiff Virginia Lynn Woolsey appeals the trial court’s order removing Jennifer McPherson from her custody and placing the child in the custody of Defendant Douglas Harmon McPherson. McPherson appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay the $15,000 fee of the Guardian ad Litem. We affirm in all respects.

Charles Chandler Brown, Sr., (Father), appeals the trial court's order denying his petition to modify the custody arrangement previously agreed to by the parties and set forth i their final divorce decree. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the trial court's judgment with certain modifications.

A prisoner at the Lake County Regional Correctional Facility filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court of Davidson County, claiming that the Board of Paroles had acted illegally in revoking his parole, and in refusing to recondiser the revocation. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board of Paroles.  We affirm.