APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns a penalty assessed against a company by the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the Bureau”). The Bureau assessed a penalty against Jase Enterprises, LLC (“Jase”), a construction company owned by Jason Usery (“Usery”), for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage. After a contested case hearing, the administrative law judge (“the ALJ”) upheld the penalty assessment but modified its amount. Jase petitioned for judicial review in the Chancery Court for Henderson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court upheld the ALJ’s decision. Jase appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that it was not afforded due process and that the decision to assess a penalty against it was arbitrary. In particular, Jase argues that the evidence did not establish that Joe Sheldon (“Sheldon”) was a Jase employee. We find that Jase was afforded due process; it received adequate notice and had an opportunity to be heard. We find further that the penalty assessment against Jase was supported by substantial and material evidence, including Sheldon’s deposition. We affirm.

The plaintiff was injured when his car was hit by an uninsured driver. The plaintiff was initially paid $5,000.00 from the medical payments coverage of his automobile policy. A jury then found the plaintiff’s compensatory damages to total $80,000.00. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier then paid the plaintiff $45,000.00, representing the policy limit of $50,000.00 less the prior $5,000.00 payment. The plaintiff then sought to compel the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the additional $5,000.00 owed under the uninsured motorist policy. The trial court agreed and ordered the uninsured motorist carrier to pay the plaintiff an additional $5,000.00, resulting in total payment by the carrier to the plaintiff of $55,000.00. The uninsured motorist carrier appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. 

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 28, 2022.  Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Cody W. Bales, Defendant, pled guilty to statutory rape in July of 2019 and received a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation after the service of 12 months in incarceration. A probation revocation warrant was issued in April of 2021. After a hearing, the trial court revoked probation in full, ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. Defendant appeals. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of the father upon concluding that the petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit the child, (2) abandonment by failure to support the child, (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from the father’s custody, (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child as a putative father, and (5) risk of substantial harm to the child’s physical or psychological welfare if returned to the putative father’s legal and physical custody. The father timely appealed. Upon review of the final order, we conclude that the trial court did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) due to its failure to include sufficient findings of fact in its written order. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for the expedited entry of sufficient written findings of fact. We deny the petitioners’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Justin R. Allen (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decision regarding custody of his two minor children. Because the order appealed from is interlocutory, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

In this premises liability action, the plaintiffs sued three local governments and a parks and recreation commission, jointly created by the local governments, to recover for injuries suffered by one of the plaintiffs when she stepped into a hole while attending a concert at a park maintained by the commission. The trial court dismissed the action as to the three local governments, concluding that they were immune under the state’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Later, the trial court granted the commission’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the commission enjoyed immunity under both the GTLA and the state statutes known as the Recreational Use Statutes. We dismiss the appeal as to the three local governments, concluding we lack subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to timely initiate an appeal against them. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the commission retained immunity under both the GTLA and the Recreational Use Statutes.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan, calculation of child support, and classification of assets. We affirm the court’s decisions.

Appellant, Frances Diane Weeks Wright, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Probate Court (the “Trial Court”) that was entered on January 3, 2022. We determine that the January 3, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

This appeal arises from a detainer action filed by a bank following a foreclosure sale.  The defendant borrower filed a counterclaim for “Wrongful Foreclosure – Breach of Contract,” alleging that the plaintiff bank breached the deed of trust by failing to provide proper notice prior to acceleration.  The trial court originally granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff bank, finding that notice was properly sent, but this Court reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed such that summary judgment could not be awarded to either party.  On remand, the trial court permitted both parties to amend their answers.  The plaintiff bank then asserted res judicata based on a prior lawsuit in federal court and moved for summary judgment on that basis.  The trial court ultimately granted the plaintiff bank summary judgment, concluding that the defendant’s argument regarding lack of notice either was raised or should have been raised in her prior action in federal court in which she attempted to halt the foreclosure.  The defendant appeals.  We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Upon competing petitions for adoption of a minor child whose parents are deceased, the trial court conducted a bench trial and a comparative fitness analysis of the petitioner, who is the child’s maternal grandmother, and the intervening petitioner, who is the child’s paternal aunt. The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by the paternal aunt while also maintaining visitation with the maternal grandmother. Prior to the bench trial, the trial court set aside its own previously entered order granting what had been presented to the trial court by the maternal grandmother as an uncontested petition for adoption of the child despite the paternal aunt’s status as custodian of the child pursuant to a juvenile court order. In the trial court’s final order, it granted the paternal aunt’s petition for adoption and directed that the maternal grandmother would have unsupervised visitation with the child on alternate Sundays. The maternal grandmother has appealed both the order setting aside the initial grant of her adoption petition and the judgment granting the paternal aunt’s petition. Discerning no error in the trial court’s decision to set aside the initial adoption decree, we affirm the set-aside order. However, having determined that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court committed reversible error by conducting an in camera interview with the child without counsel or a court reporter present and then withholding the court’s summary of the testimony until entry of the final judgment, we vacate the court’s judgment granting the paternal aunt’s petition. We remand for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing solely to afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence in response to the child’s testimony and to enter a judgment after consideration of all proof presented during the trial and on remand.

A landlord and tenant entered into a lease-purchase agreement.  Near the end of the lease term, the tenant sought to exercise the purchase option.  The landlord claimed that the tenant could not do so because she defaulted on rent payments.  The landlord also argued that he terminated the agreement before the tenant exercised the option.  The trial court rejected both arguments and granted the tenant specific performance of the purchase option.  We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order.

A wife sought relief from a default judgment that granted her husband a divorce and awarded him alimony.  The wife argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the default because she was not properly served with the complaint and that jurisdiction was not proper under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-214.  The trial court denied the wife’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion.  Finding that the wife was entitled to a hearing on her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The former manager of a country music recording artist sued the artist and related business entities for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  He also sought damages from the artist’s business manager for inducement of breach of contract.  The defendants moved for summary judgment.  They argued, in part, that the undisputed facts showed that the parties had mutually agreed to modify the contract.  And the former manager had been paid in full under the terms of the modified contract.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  On appeal, the manager argues that genuine issues of material fact as to whether he agreed to modify the contract preclude summary judgment.  We conclude that the unambiguous course of dealing between the parties showed mutual assent to the modification.  So we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff Deborah Lacy brought this action against Dr. Nagendra Ramanna, alleging that he committed a battery upon her by shaking her hand too forcefully during a visit in which Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment for an alleged heart condition. Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after finding no evidence that the handshake caused injury to Plaintiff’s right hand. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a general sessions court judgment. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal to this Court within thirty days after entry of the circuit court’s final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

In this breach of contract case, Appellee law firm sued Appellant former client for unpaid attorneys’ fees.  Appellant argued that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim.  Alternatively, Appellant argued that the unpaid attorneys’ fees were unreasonable.  The trial court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim, and that Appellee’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this appeal, we review the trial court’s dismissal of the action upon its finding that it was an “abusive civil action,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, and res judicata. The appellee also seeks her attorney’s fees for this appeal. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal of the suit as to the former wife and award her the attorney’s fees she incurred defending this appeal. We remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Darrell Stamper, has appealed the December 16, 2021 order of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). As the December 16, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.