APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This personal injury case arose when Plaintiff Barbara Cornett sustained injuries while operating a lawn mower manufactured by Defendant Deere & Company and sold by General Equipment and its owner Vernon Keith. Ms. Cornett sued, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. She also sought punitive damages. The first trial concluded with a directed verdict for the defendants at the conclusion of the evidence. The trial court, however, granted Ms. Cornett a new trial.1 In the second trial, the court granted directed verdicts to Vernon Keith on all issues, to both General Equipment and Deere & Company on the issues of negligence and punitive damages and to General Equipment on the strict liability claim. The jury returned a defense verdict on the remaining breach of warranty and strict liability claims. Ms. Cornett appeals, alleging ten errors. We affirm.

This appeal involves a law firm’s efforts to enforce a statutory attorney’s lien on the proceeds of a post-verdict personal injury settlement. After the law firm withdrew from representing the plaintiff because of a dispute arising from the settlement, the Circuit Court for Robertson County, the court where the underlying personal injury action had been tried, granted the law firm’s motion for a lien on the settlement proceeds for its fee and costs advanced on the plaintiff’s behalf. Thereafter, the trial court granted the law firm’s motion to execute on the lien and directed the plaintiff to pay her former law firm $51,091.99. On this appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by directing her to pay her former law firm because the lien was not properly perfected and because the procedure followed by the trial court did not permit her to assert her available claims and defenses against her former law firm. While we have determined that the law firm properly perfected its lien, we find that the trial court did not have the authority to adjudicate the fee dispute between the law firm and its former client. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order granting the motion for execution of the attorney’s lien.

This case involves a petition for termination of parental rights. The Respondent/Appellant, James Bostick Osborne, appeals from an order of the Juvenile Court of Davidson County terminating his parental rights as the biological father of Sherry Money Hendren. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This case originated as a paternity action. Shannon Rea Roberts (“Ms.  Roberts”) sought to establish that Creig McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”) was the father of her child, Dylan Daniels Roberts (“Dylan”) (DOB: February 14, 1997). The part of the case now before us concerns the petition to  intervene filed in that proceeding by Janice Roberts (“Grandmother”), who is the mother of Shannon Rea Roberts and the grandmother of Dylan. In her petition, Grandmother seeks court-ordered “reasonable visitation  rights” with Dylan. McLaughlin moved to dismiss Grandmother’s petition, relying on Rule 12.02(6), Tenn.R.Civ.P., and asserting that the petition  “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”¹ Id. The trial court granted McLaughlin’s motion, finding² that T.C.A. § 36-6-306 (Supp. 1998) does not authorize an award of grandparents’ visitation under the undisputed material facts of this case. Grandmother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition.  We affirm.

This case is before the court on interlocutory appeal from the Chancery Court of Davidson County under Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 9. The trial court order granting the interlocutory appeal presents a single issue: "1. Whether the defendant Gregory's affirmative defenses of waiver, laches and estoppel, abandonment, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing are matters of law to be decided by the court and not material facts in dispute, which would be decided by the jury in the case."

The plaintiff petitioned the court for a declaration that she was entitled to a one-half interest in a farm that had been part of her father’s estate. Her brother responded by claiming to be the sole owner under the provisions of their father’s will, or in the alternative, under a theory of adverse possession. The trial court found that the effect of the will was to divide the property equally between the siblings, and that the brother failed to prove ownership by adverse possession. We affirm the trial court.

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint ["Torts Suit"] for damages suffered as a result of Defendants' removal of a dwelling he constructed on Young-Graham family cemetery property, and for back wages as a maintenance worker at the cemetery and punitive damages. The Trial Court, after consideration of the pleadings and Affidavits filed by the parties, entered an Order granting the Defendants summary judgment, which judgment the Plaintiff appeals. The appeal was submitted on briefs and addressed only the Defendants' removal of the dwelling the Plaintiff constructed on cemetery property. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the Trial Court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint.
 

This is a child support case. Respondent/Appellant, Jeffrey Allen Dill (Father), appeals the trial court’s order modifying the amount of child support to be paid to Petitioner/Appellee, Shawn Michelle (Stewart) Dill (Mother).

This is a suit initiated in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County by Alexander & Associates, Inc., an insurance agency, seeking to recover from Debra Bond-Owens, its former employee, reimbursement for payments made to her which it contends were “unearned advanced salary in the amount of $5701.37, plus interest.”
 

This is a construction case. The defendant owner hired the plaintiff contractor to build a movie theater. The contract contained an arbitration clause. The owner terminated the contractor before the construction was completed. The contractor filed suit against the owner regarding an amount of money required to be held in escrow pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-11-144, which permits the contractor to seek “any remedy in a court of proper jurisdiction . . . .” The trial court stayed the proceedings and ordered the parties to arbitration. We reverse and remand.

I concur i themajority opinion. I agree that the majority's approach to determining gross income for current child support is correct in this case. I write separately to express my view that the two-year-average approach utilized by the majority in this case may not be appropriate in all cases.