APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion for New Trial filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Johnny D. Young. The motion was based upon allegations of a quotient verdict, improper admission of evidence, and improper argument by counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Although Plaintiff prevailed in his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) action against Defendant, Plaintiff alleged five grounds in a Motion for New Trial, attaching as exhibits affidavits of five jurors, a court officer and Plaintiff’s trial counsel. Defendant responded with contradictory affidavits from four jurors. By entry of a Memorandum and Order, the Trial Court denied four of the grounds for new trial asserted by Plaintiff, and reserved final ruling on the issue of quotient verdict pending testimony by the jurors to resolve the contradictory statements in the affidavits filed by the parties. A hearing was held during which

This is an appeal from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion for New Trial filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Johnny D. Young. The motion was based upon allegations of a quotient verdict, improper admission of evidence, and improper argument by counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Although Plaintiff prevailed in his Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) action against Defendant, Plaintiff alleged five grounds in a Motion for New Trial, attaching as exhibits affidavits of five jurors, a court officer and Plaintiff’s trial counsel. Defendant responded with contradictory affidavits from four jurors. By entry of a Memorandum and Order, the Trial Court denied four of the grounds for new trial asserted by Plaintiff, and reserved final ruling on the issue of quotient verdict pending testimony by the jurors to resolve the contradictory statements in the affidavits filed by the parties. A hearing was held during which the Trial Court questioned, and then heard examination by counsel for the parties of, all twelve jurors. After Plaintiff voiced allegations of improper communication between jurors at this first hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel and a paralegal for Plaintiff’s counsel testified at a second hearing. The Trial Court subsequently entered a second Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial in its entirety. The issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in the application of evidence gathered in the post-trial proceedings, with peripheral assertions of error concerning the conduct of the trial. We affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Motion for New Trial, as all issues raised by Plaintiff were properly, and articulately, resolved by the Trial Court.
 

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

This appeal involves a pregnancy discrimination claim asserted by an employee of a Nashville pizza restaurant. After refusing to accept a temporary reassignment requested by her employer, the employee quit her job and filed suit, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted the employer ’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the employee’s proof after concluding that she had not made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment because of her pregnancy. The employee asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for the employer and by amending its final order on its own motion. We have concluded that the trial court correctly directed a verdict for the employer in this case and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

In this inverse condemnation action, Defendant Smith County appeals the trial court’s final judgment that suggested a $15,000 additur to the $7700 verdict rendered by the jury in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Charles W. McKinney. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of damages.

This is an appeal by Ms. Bogan (Appellant) from an Order of the Chancery Court for Sullivan County which reduced Mr. Bogan’s (Appellee) alimony payments to her from $2,300 monthly to $945 monthly after Appellee’s retirement

I dissent from the judgment of the majority opinion “reinstat[ing] the prior award of $2,300 monthly alimony as provided in the parties’ original divorce decree.” In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced Mr. Bogan’s monthly alimony obligation from $2,300 to $945. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.