APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a dispute over the proceeds of the sale of a family farm by a life tenant with an unlimited power of disposition. Following the life tenant’s death, the remaindermen named in the life tenant’s husband’s will filed suit in the Chancery Court for Marshall County against the executrix of the life tenant’s estate, the estate itself, and the beneficiaries named in the life tenant’s will asserting that the life tenant lacked capacity to sell the farm, that the executrix had unduly influenced the life tenant to sell the farm, and that the executrix had tortiously interfered with their inheritance from the life tenant’s husband. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found no lack of capacity or undue influence but determined that the remaindermen have an interest in the proceeds of the sale of the farm. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the lawyer the remaindermen had discharged earlier in the proceeding. The life tenant’s estate and her executrix now appeal the conclusion that the remaindermen named in her husband’s will have an interest in the proceeds of the sale; while the remaindermen appeal from the dismissal of their lack of capacity, undue influence, and intentional interference with inheritance claims and the award of fees to their former lawyer. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the life tenant was capable of selling the farm, that her executrix did not unduly influence her decision, and that the remaindermen’s former attorney was entitled to payment. We have also determined that the life tenant’s sale of the farm terminated the remaindermen’s interest as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment awarding the remaindermen $269,420.89 and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

This is a negligent supervision lawsuit. The plaintiff rented a unit from the defendants' selfstorage facility. An employee of the self-storage facility stole the plaintiff's property and disappeared. The plaintiff sued the storage facility and its owners, alleging negligent supervision of the dishonest employee. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded compensatory damages. The defendants appeal. We reverse, finding that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligent supervision.
 

Plaintiff, a licensed affiliate real estate broker, sued to collect a commission for locating a particular property for a prospective buyer. When the sellers refused to sell the property, the prospective buyer abandoned efforts to obtain the property. About six weeks later, the prospective buyer contacted one of the sellers and was able to negotiate with all of the sellers for purchase of the property and ultimately consummated the purchase for a higher sale price than originally contemplated. Plaintiff alleges that she had an oral agreement for $150,000.00 commission, or, alternatively, that she was acting as a facilitator and entitled to a commission for her services as such. From the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant, plaintiff has appealed. Tenn.R.App.P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court affirmed
 

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly awarded as discretionary costs fees of the defendant’s expert witnesses who did not testify because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit on the day of trial before any proof was taken. The fees in question were charged by the defendant’s medical experts for reserving time in their schedules to testify, thereby precluding any other income-producing professional activities. The award of discretionary costs is affirmed.

An inmate presently in custody in the Whiteville Correctional Facility sued the warden and the CEO and Chairman of Corrections Corporation of America in a pleading styled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He seeks release from that facility contending that the State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) released him when it surrendered him to a facility outside the borders of the State of Wisconsin for incarceration. The trial court dismissed the cause of action and we affirm.
 

This appeal results from the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff John Pitner’s cause of action against Defendant Fayette County, Tennessee (“County”) pursuant to Rule 41.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court ruled that Mr. Pitner, the former Director of Planning and Development for the County, failed to prove that the County was contractually obligated to pay overtime to him and that Mr. Pitner further failed to prove damages. We affirm on the basis that Mr. Pitner failed to prove the existence of a contract. Rule 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
 

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighboring landowners regarding whether there is an easement across the real property of Defendants Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton for the benefit of Plaintiffs Hulon O. Warlick, III, James Reed, and Wayne Matthews. Mr. Warlick filed a complaint and Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews filed a similar complaint against the Hamiltons asking the trial court to declare the existence of such an easement. The court issued a number of orders in the Warlick and Reed/Matthews matters enjoining the Hamiltons from interfering with the easement and from obstructing or preventing Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, or Mr. Matthews from accessing their properties. The Hamiltons nevertheless performed a number of acts in violation of these orders. Consequently, the trial court found the Hamiltons in civil contempt and assessed sanctions and damages against them in the amount of $25,156.80, which is equal to the attorney’s fees incurred by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews. On appeal, the Hamiltons argue that the trial court was without authority to assess attorney’s fees against them. We hold that, under the circumstances of the case at bar, the trial court had the authority to assess attorney’s fees against the Hamiltons pursuant to section 29-9-105 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. We therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court.
 

This is an interlocutory appeal from the Trial Judge’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement
entered by the parties. Defendant has appealed. We reverse and remand with instructions to enforce the arbitration agreement. Tenn. R. App. P.3 Interlocutory Appeal by Permission from the Trial Court; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

Plaintiff, an inmate in Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, appeals the Trial Court’s dismissal of his civil suit for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the “capricious, arbitrary and unjust” operation of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, for “malfeasance”, and for “civil rights intimidation.” The Trial Court found that (1) the doctrine of res judicata prevents Plaintiff’s suit on one of his alleged claims because judgment has been entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on that claim; (2) all of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory except for that one claim already resolved, and, therefore, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) with respect to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in the Tennessee Department of Correction grievance policy, and, therefore, that allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s Statement of Issues in this appeal alleges abuse of discretion by the Trial Court “by dismissing his civil rights claims” and cites Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-701, 4-21-702 and 4-21-801. Construing Plaintiff’s pro se appeal liberally, we deem it as challenging all three bases upon which the Trial Court dismissed his Complaint. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Claude Willis and Defendant Lola Mae (Wright) Willis regarding the terms of their divorce. The trial court granted an absolute divorce to Ms. Wright,¹ divided the parties’ marital property, allocated the parties’ marital debt, and awarded Ms. Wright alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, Mr. Willis argues that the trial court’s division of marital property and allocation of marital debt are inequitable, and that, assuming an award of alimony is appropriate in the case at bar, the court should have awarded Ms. Wright rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. Additionally, Ms. Wright requests on appeal that her award of attorney’s fees be designated as alimony. We affirm the ruling of the trial court; however, we modify the court’s ruling to reflect that attorney’s fees are awarded to Ms. Wright as alimony.

This appeal involves the question of whether the Appellants, Walter and Gordon Farris, complied with the statute of limitations when filing their complaint for legal malpractice and conversion. The Appellees, William S. Todd and Thomas S. Dossett, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellants moved to amend their complaint to include declaratory judgment relief for determination of the ownership rights of the parties in a particular art work. The Circuit Court for Sullivan County granted the motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the motion to amend. We affirm in part and vacate in part the Circuit Court’s judgment.
 

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a final decree of divorce entered in the Shelby County
Circuit Court. The Husband appeals the trial court’s order claiming error in several aspects of the
decision, including the determination as to his alimony obligation.