APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a suit to recover money advanced by a construction lender to a building supply company to pay for building supplies which the bank mistakenly thought had been delivered to the bank’s debtor. Plaintiff, Farmers & Merchants Bank (Bank) sued defendant, Midway Supply Company, Inc., (Midway) to recover the sums advanced after Midway failed to deliver the supplies and applied the advanced funds to pay other accounts of the Bank’s debtor. From the judgment of the Circuit Court awarding judgment to Bank for the advanced funds less certain credit, Midway has appealed.

This extraordinary appeal involves an automobile collision. The driver of the automobile that was struck from behind and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson
County against the driver and record owner of the automobile that struck her. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the driver’s liability. The defendants applied for an extraordinary appeal after the trial court declined to grant them an interlocutory appeal. We have determined this is a proper case for an extraordinary appeal and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a partial summary judgment because of the existence of material factual disputes regarding liability. Accordingly, pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b),1 we reverse the partial summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

This appeal involves a dispute over a sizeable estate. After learning that they had been excluded from their relative’s will, thirteen of the testatrix’s heirs challenged the will in the Chancery Court for Sumner County on the grounds of improper execution, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The proponents of the will asserted that the contestants lacked standing because their challenge, even if successful, would only revive an earlier will from which they had likewise been excluded. The trial court found that the contestants had standing but, following a bench trial, determined that the contestants had failed to prove their improper execution, lack of testamentary capacity, or undue influence claims. On this appeal, the contestants take issue with the decision to uphold the will; while the proponents take issue with the conclusion that the contestants had standing to challenge the will. We have determined that the contestants had standing to challenge the will and that the trial court properly determined that the will should be admitted to probate in solemn form. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded.
 

This appeal involves a custody dispute over twin daughters born after their parents separated following a brief marriage. The father filed for divorce in the Putnam County General Sessions Court shortly after learning that the mother was pregnant, and the mother counterclaimed for divorce and for sole custody of the unborn children. Following a bench trial, the general sessions court granted the father a divorce based on the mother’s inappropriate marital conduct, awarded the father sole custody of the children, and directed the mother to pay child support. On this appeal, the mother asserts that the general sessions court’s decision interferes with her constitutional right to make primary care-taking decisions for her children, that she is comparatively more fit than the father to be the custodial parent, and that the general sessions court should have awarded joint custody. We have determined that the custody arrangement does not impermissibly interfere with the mother’s parental rights and that the evidence fully supports the general sessions court’s custody decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment awarding sole custody to the children’s father. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed and Remanded
 

I concur with the results reached by the majority in this case. With respect to the issue of counseling, I agree with the majority that the statute has become inapplicable in the present case due to the child having reached majority. I write separately because of my concern that the majority
opinion might be interpreted as limiting a trial court’s discretion to order counseling to that specifically set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-101(e)(1), the text of which is set forth in the majority opinion. I interpret the statute to be permissive rather than prohibitive. For example, I can envision a trial court ordering a non-custodial parent to undergo counseling for anger management as a condition of exercising visitation rights. I do not believe the aforementioned statute prohibits this.

The appellant owned an undivided one-third interest in a residence prior to his marriage to the appellee. They occupied the residence for about two years, during which time the evidence reveals that the appellee engaged herself in constant repairs, thereby increasing the liveability and value of the residence. She was awarded 75% of the increase in the value of this residence during the marriage, of which the appellant complains.