APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case is before this Court on appeal from the Chancery Court for Perry County wherein cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. The trial court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact such that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on its counter-claim against Plaintiff finding that Daniel's Landing Road is a public road. The standard of review is clear, we review the decision of the trial court de novo with no presumption of correctness on appeal. The issue on appeal is whether Daniel's Landing Road is a public road and, if so, whether it remains a public road absent abandonment or closing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 54-10-201, et seq. We conclude that Daniel's Landing Road is a public road and affirm the trial court.

Patient with a history of papillary carcinoma underwent a fine needle aspiration which confirmed a diagnosis of cancer in her neck region. Patient underwent surgery to remove the cancerous tissue which resulted in hypoparathyroidism and injury to her recurrent laryngeal nerve, risks commonly associated with the procedure. Patient brought informed consent action against doctor, claiming that, had the inherent risks of the procedure been disclosed to her, she would have sought a second opinion and had the procedure performed at a different facility by a different surgeon. The doctor moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Finding there are no material, disputed facts remaining, we reverse and remand.

In this divorce case, Husband appeals from the trial court's decisions classifying, valuing, and dividing the parties' property incident to their divorce and asserts that he is entitled to an award much greater than the $250,000 granted to him by the trial court. Wife also appeals the trial court's classification and distribution of property, asserting that Husband was not entitled to any portion of her separate property and that there was no marital property. An additional issue was raised by a post-judgment ruling by a successor trial judge setting aside the order of the prior judge declaring the parties divorced. We affirm the divorce and reverse the award to Husband.

This appeal involves the dissolution of an eighteen-year marriage by the Chancery Court for Lewis County. The trial court awarded the wife the divorce after concluding that the husband's continuing extramarital affair amounted to inappropriate marital conduct. To protect the "moral integrity of the marital relationship," the trial court granted the wife sole custody of the parties' two minor children and declined to grant the husband any visitation rights. In addition, the trial court ordered the husband to pay more than the minimum child support required by the child support guidelines because he was willfully underemployed and because he would not be exercising standard visitation with the children. The husband asserts on this appeal that the trial court's decisions with regard to custody and visitation, child support, and the division of the marital estate lack evidentiary support. We have determined that the trial court's disapproval of the husband's extramarital affair inappropriately colored its decisions regarding visitation and child support. Accordingly, we affirm the manner in which the trial court divided the parties' marital estate and reverse the trial court's visitation and child support awards.

The petitioner appeals the general sessions court's denial of an order of protection and questions the proper avenue to appeal a general sessions court's ruling on an order of protection. We hold that, because the general sessions court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery courts to hear petitions for orders of protection, this court is the proper one to hear an appeal of the grant or denial of such an order. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's denial of the order in this case, we affirm the trial court.

This case involves the alleged breach of an oral contract and a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Defendant's agent contacted the plaintiffs, an Elvis impersonator, the members of his band, and members of the Jordanaires to book them for a performance nine months hence. Plaintiffs reserved the time, but no written agreement was ever executed. Weeks before the performance, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that their services would not be required. Plaintiffs sued alleging breach of an oral contract and negligent misrepresentation and now appeal the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant on both issues. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Freddie Dean Smith and Anita Ann Smith (“Plaintiffs”) filed a medical malpractice action against
Tony O. Haley, M.D. (“Defendant”). Defendant moved for summary judgment with his affidavit
filed in support thereof. The motion was granted after Plaintiffs failed to file timely any competent
medical proof to defeat the motion. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider along with the affidavit
of Joseph Bussey, M.D. The Trial Court granted the motion and reinstated the case to the active
docket. Dr. Bussey later refused to give his deposition because he was not comfortable giving a
deposition after reviewing the medical records and because he did not believe the case was going to “go this far” when he provided the affidavit. Defendant moved to strike the affidavit of Dr. Bussey and requested the Trial Court to reinstate its previous dismissal. The Trial Court granted
Defendant’s motion. Seeking additional time to locate another medical expert, Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P., and for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rules 60.02(1) and 60.02(5), Tenn. R. Civ. P. The Trial Court denied this motion, and Plaintiffs appeal this denial. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal As Of Right;
Judgment of the Law Court Affirmed; and Case Remanded.
 

This case seeks declaratory judgment as to whether or not the defendant, Nicholas Reaves Ramsey, was a "covered person" within the omnibus clause of an automobile liability insurance policy. In a non-jury trial the trial judge held that Defendant was not covered under the omnibus clause. We affirm.