APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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James Dortch, Sr. vs. Evonne Dortch

M1999-02053-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves a dispute over the division of a marital estate following a seventeen-year marriage. Both parties sought a divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. During a short bench trial, they stipulated that each of them had grounds for divorce but contested the classification, valuation, and division of their separate and marital property. The trial court declared the parties divorced and undertook to divide their marital estate equally. Both parties are dissatisfied with the division of the marital estate. The husband asserts that the trial court made a significant mathematical error in calculating the amount required to equalize the division. For her part, the wife asserts that the trial court misclassified items of separate property as marital property. We have determined that the trial court properly determined that the parties should receive equal shares of the net marital estate. However, we also find that the trial court misclassified a number of items of the wife's separate property and erroneously calculated the amount to be awarded to the wife to equalize the division of the marital estate. Accordingly, we have corrected the errors and affirm the judgment as modified herein.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Muriel Robinson
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/17/01
Recognized Ground of Equity. Chambers v. City of Chattanooga, 71 S.W.3D 281, 284 (Tenn. Ct. App.

M2006-02424-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/17/01
Connie McGahey vs. James Wilson

M2000-01931-COA-R3-CV
Upon divorce, the parties entered into an agreement that provided the parties would retain ownership as the marital residence as tenants in common, but could not sell the property without mutual consent. Mrs. McGahey now desires to partition the property over her former husband's objection. The special master found that the contract provision barring partition was unenforceable. The chancellor found the provision enforceable but only for a reasonable period of time (sixteen years). Mr. Wilson now appeals the trial court's judgment ordering partition by sale. Resolution of this appeal requires us to examine the effect of a contract barring partition between tenants in common when no time limitation or purpose for the restriction against sale was stated in the agreement. We hold the contract provision to be unenforceable.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/17/01
James Ray vs. Thomas Richards

M2000-01808-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for personal injuries resulting from an alleged assault which occurred on October 20, 1998. The jury found for Defendant. Plaintiff appeals raising two issues: (1) Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of Plaintiff's character, reputation, conduct, and criminal records, and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the neighbor's petition describing Plaintiff as a public nuisance into evidence. We affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/17/01
Peggy Lane, et al vs. Luella Spriggs, et al

E2001-00163-COA-R3-CV
This case involves the validity of an unsigned warranty deed in the plaintiffs' chain of title. Following a bench trial, the court below reformed the deed to add the missing signature. The defendants appeal, arguing, among other things, that the unsigned deed is inoperative and cannot be reformed. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
Cocke County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Investors Group I, LTD. vs. Knoxville's Community Dev. Corp.

E1999-00395-COA-R3-CV
The complaint seeking damages for breach of contract was signed and filed by a general partner of Investors Group I, Ltd., a limited partnership. The Chancellor dismissed the case, holding the complaint was void because a limited partnership is a legal entity, and can neither appear pro se nor by a general partner who is not a licensed attorney. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Originating Judge:Sharon J. Bell
Knox County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Dennis Mauk vs. Debra Perry, et al

E2001-00485-COA-R3-CV
The plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration regarding the proper interpretation of a will. The trial court found a will provision leaving "real property and contents" to the decedent's son, the plaintiff Dennis Mauk, is not ambiguous and that the word "contents" includes a 27-year old mobile home on the decedent's property. The decedent's other four children appeal, contending the will is ambiguous. They argue the trial court erred in failing to consider parol evidence as to the meaning of the subject language. They further contend the trial court erred in ordering a $6,000 bequest to the appellants to be paid into court, thus making it subject to the debts of the estate. We modify the trial court's judgment to provide that the share of personal property bequeathed to each of the decedent's children should be burdened with one-fifth of the decedent's debts. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas R. Frierson, II
Hawkins County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Kimberly J. Svacha, et al vs. Waldens Creek Saddley Club, et al

E2000-03121-COA-R3-CV
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment relying, at least in part, on oral testimony from one of the plaintiffs. This testimony was not transcribed, filed with the trial court, and provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. Due to the somewhat peculiar procedural aspects of this case, we conclude that defendants had the responsibility to file a transcript of this testimony. Because we cannot evaluate the propriety of the grant of summary judgment without having before us this evidence relied on by the trial court, we vacate the grant of summary judgment.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Rex Henry Ogle
Sevier County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al

E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:John K. Wilson
Hawkins County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners

E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Tex Helton, et al vs. Colonial Loan Assoc., Inc. et al

E2001-00060-COA-R3-CV
Tex Helton and his wife sue Colonial Loan Association, Inc., and Lakeview Motors, Inc., seeking damages in connection with Colonial Loan's repossession of an automobile sold to them by Lakeview Motors. The Trial Court granted a summary judgment as to Colonial Loan. The claim as to Lakeview Motors has been concluded and this appeal only concerns the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Colonial Loan. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:John K. Wilson
Hawkins County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Donald Miller, et al vs. Choo Choo Partners

E2001-00007-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Jerry Grace, et al vs. Mountain States Health Alliance

E2000-03031-COA-R3-CV
In this medical malpractice suit the Trial Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Mountain States Health Alliance, d/b/a/ Johnson City Medical Center Hospital and five Doctors. The Trial Court overruled the Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend his determination that all Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. As to the Doctors, the determination was predicated upon the motion to alter or amend not being timely filed, and as to the Medical Center on the grounds that the delay in submitting materials accompanying the motion to alter or amend was not justified. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
Washington County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Shirley Shelburne vs. Frontier Health, et al

E2000-02551-COA-R3-CV
This is a negligence action that finds its genesis in the suicide of a county jail inmate. Prior to his death, the decedent had been evaluated by Richard Kirk, a member of a crisis response team operated by the defendant Woodridge Hospital, a facility owned and operated by the defendant Frontier Health. Kirk concluded the decedent did not suffer from any psychiatric illness and did not require further care or treatment. The widow of the decedent, Shirley A. Shelburne, individually and as the next friend of her son, Travis Lee Shelburne, sued Frontier Health on the basis of vicarious liability. In response to the defendant's third motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment, which was denied. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that this case should be remanded for the trial court to reconsider the evidence submitted in support of the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000); (2) that Frontier Health is not entitled to summary judgment, which was granted on the basis of Kirk's alleged statutory immunity; and (3) that Frontier Health's third motion for summary judgment constitutes an improper "appeal" of the denial of its second summary judgment motion by a different trial judge. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.
Carter County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Arvil Holt, et a; vs. Zula Parton

E2000-02695-COA-R3-CV
Arvil A. Holt and Beulah Holt Jones ("Plaintiffs") filed this will contest against one of their sisters, Zula Holt Parton ("Defendant"), regarding their Mother's will ("Will"). The case was tried by a jury. During the second day of the jury's deliberations, the Trial Court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury regarding their answers to special interrogatories in a "Special Verdict Form" and their apparent deadlock on the general verdict. The jury foreperson indicated on two occasions that the jury would like to deliberate further. Over objection of Defendant's counsel, however, the Trial Court did not allow for further jury deliberations and entered its judgment. Defendant appeals. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Ben W. Hooper, II
Sevier County Court of Appeals 07/13/01
Kenneth Warren v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, Nashville Memorial Hospital

M2000-02579-COA-R3-CV
This is a malicious prosecution case. The defendants obtained a warrant against the plaintiff after observing a man matching the plaintiff's description attempting to break into a car on the defendants' property. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted a lawsuit against the defendants for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendants acted with probable cause and without malice in obtaining the warrant.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Barbara N. Haynes
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Kelly Stillwell vs. Thomas Stillwell

E2001-00245-COA-R3-CV
Thomas Stillwell ("Father") appeals the Trial Court's order which he claims improperly modified the original decree establishing child visitation. Father claims this was in error because there was no showing of a material change in circumstances. Father also appeals the Trial Court's order which prohibited him from possessing a firearm when he is exercising visitation with his son. We affirm the Trial Court's determination on visitation, as modified, and vacate the prohibition on Father's possessing a firearm in the presence of his child.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:John B. Hagler, Jr.
Bradley County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Jerome Felix Havely vs. Almeda Matthews Havely

E2000-02275-COA-R3-CV
In 1983, Jerome Felix Havely and Almeda Matthews Havely were divorced. They had entered into a Property Settlement Agreement which was incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce ("Divorce Judgment"). Neither the Divorce Judgment nor the Property Settlement Agreement mentioned the military pension of Jerome Felix Havely ("Plaintiff"). Approximately one month after the entry of the Divorce Judgment, Almeda Matthews Havely ("Defendant") filed a motion essentially seeking relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 in which she alleged that the Divorce Judgment should be set aside because she had not been aware of her entitlement to Plaintiff's military pension. This motion was dismissed in 1984 by the trial court for failure to prosecute. This matter lay dormant for fourteen plus years until Defendant filed two more Rule 60.02 motions. Defendant's third and final Rule 60.02 motion, filed in 1999, is the subject of this appeal. After three notices of hearing were filed, the trial court dismissed Defendant's motion without providing its reasons for the dismissal. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Joyce M. Ward
Hamblen County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Thomas White v. Kathy White

M2000-02674-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from the Appellant's filing of a Petition to Modify the Final Decree of Divorce in the Circuit Court of Sumner County. The Appellant requested a downward deviation in child support and a reduction in alimony. The Appellant also requested that he no longer be required to reimburse the Appellee for health insurance coverage. The Appellee filed a Counter-Petition requesting an upward deviation in child support. Following a trial on the Petition and Counter-Petition, the trial court entered an order reducing the Appellant's child support obligation to $1,000.00 per month. The trial court declined to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. The Appellant appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Sumner County setting child support at $1,000.00 per month and refusing to modify the award of rehabilitative alimony and health insurance coverage. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's decision.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Arthur E. Mcclellan
Sumner County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Doris Jean Bryant v. Tennessee Conference of The United

M2000-01797-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Carol L. Mccoy
Davidson County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Sherri Vaughn vs. Nathan Vaughn

E2000-02281-COA-R3-CV
In this divorce case, the husband has appealed the award of alimony, child visitation and support, and the Court's division of marital property. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Originating Judge:L. Marie Williams
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Provident Life & Accident Ins. vs.Tina Shankles, et al

E2000-02073-COA-R3-CV
This is an interpleader bill filed by Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company against four named Beneficiaries in a policy of insurance issued to their father, Arnold Joe Johnson. Two of the Beneficiaries were children by a former marriage of Mr. Johnson, who were added as such shortly before his death. The two Beneficiaries by a subsequent marriage insisted that the provisions of a divorce decree precluded Mr. Johnson from adding his other two children as Beneficiaries. The Trial Court found that all four should share in the proceeds of the policy equally and entered a summary judgment to that effect. We vacate and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:W. Neil Thomas, III
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV

E2000-02221-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Originating Judge:W. Neil Thomas, III
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Humphreys County Utility Dist. vs. Schatz Underground Cable, Inc.

M2000-02650-COA-R3-CV
In this negligence action, Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages in connection with the rupture of a gas line. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:Allen W. Wallace
Humphreys County Court of Appeals 07/12/01
Catherine Jackson vs. Bruce Jackson

E2001-00287-COA-R3-CV
Catherine Dean Jackson ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint for divorce against her husband, Bruce Lane Jackson ("Defendant"). The parties entered a stipulation, which was approved by the Trial Court, in which they agreed both parties were entitled to a divorce and agreed that Plaintiff be granted custody of their minor child. The parties, however, did not agree on the remaining issues of alimony and the division of marital property and liabilities. Over approximately four years, the Trial Court referred these issues to a Special Master on three occasions. Upon each referral by the Trial Court, the Special Master held a hearing in which he heard arguments and, during the first two hearings, heard testimony from the parties and witnesses. After each hearing, the Special Master filed his report, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the report as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1). Among other findings, the Special Master recommended that Plaintiff receive "rehabilitative alimony for life . . . " in the amount of $1,000 per month and that Defendant pay the parties' entire 1994 tax liability. With the exception of modifying the Special Master's alimony recommendation to alimony in futuro, the Trial Court adopted the Special Master's recommendations which precipitated Defendant's appeal. Due to the Special Master's failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 53.04(1), we vacate the portion of the the Trial Court's judgment relative to alimony and the 1994 tax liability, affirm the remainder of the judgment, and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Samuel H. Payne
Hamilton County Court of Appeals 07/12/01