APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case concerns the administration of a generation-skipping exempt trust. On review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. Specifically, the trial court did not adjudicate: (1) the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees; (2) Appellees’ prayer to remove David M. Sullivan as trustee; (3) Appellees’ motion to disqualify David M. Sullivan from acting as legal counsel for the Trust; or (4) Trustee’s motion for sanctions against Appellees and Appellees’ legal counsel. Appeal dismissed.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; (4) severe child abuse; (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; and (6) mental incompetence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that three of the statutory grounds were not supported by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support, abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child’s welfare prior to incarceration, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

In this boundary line dispute in which the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment concerning the boundary between the parties’ adjoining parcels of real property, the trial court, following a bench trial, entered declaratory judgment adopting the boundary line of a survey presented by the plaintiffs over other competing surveys. The court, however, did not adopt a boundary line alternatively propounded by the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession of a disputed portion of land. The court dismissed all other claims with prejudice, including, inter alia, competing trespass claims and the plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. The plaintiffs have appealed, raising issues regarding the trial court’s denial of their adverse possession and trespass claims and requests for damages and injunctive relief. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim and the court’s declaration of the parties’ boundary line. However, determining that the trial court erred in applying an intent to trespass as a necessary element of civil trespass, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim. We remand for the trial court to (1) apply the proper intent standard for trespass to determine, with the boundary line as declared by the trial court, whether the defendants trespassed on the plaintiffs’ property; (2) if trespass occurred, determine the type(s) of damages to be awarded; and (3) if trespass occurred, set the amount of damages to be awarded with discretionary costs as appropriate. Discerning that the trial court made no findings regarding the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, we also remand for consideration of that request based on relevant factors and entry of an order granting or denying injunctive relief with appropriate findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deem the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal to be waived.

The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A mother and stepfather filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court dismissed the petition after finding that the mother and stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of any ground for termination. Because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact in its order dismissing the petition, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to enter an order making sufficient findings of fact.

This appeal concerns a divorce. Larry Mark Mangum (“Husband”) sued Laney Celeste Mangum (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment, which Wife appealed. In Mangum v. Mangum, No. E2018-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1787328 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 24, 2019) (“Mangum I”), we vacated the Trial Court’s judgment except as to the divorce itself. We remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that consider all of the relevant and applicable statutory factors guiding child custody and property division matters, respectively. On remand, the Trial Court entered a new final judgment in light of our Opinion in Mangum I. Wife appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in fashioning the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor sons (“the Children”) as well as in its classification, valuation, and division of the parties’ property. Husband raises the separate issue of whether this appeal is frivolous. We find that the Trial Court, in considering all of the relevant statutory factors, complied with our instructions on remand. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with respect to its application of the statutory factors.

A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan. Because the order appealed does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Narcotics officers seized two vehicles and approximately $23,000 in U.S. currency while executing a search warrant at a residence. An administrative law judge ordered the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security to return the seized property to the purported owner. The judge determined that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, resulting in an illegal seizure. And, if not, the Department failed to prove that it strictly complied with the forfeiture statutes. The Department petitioned for judicial review. After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the administrative decision for further proceedings. We affirm.

This appeal involves a challenge to a chancery court’s granting of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement related to litigation over the partition of family-owned property. The appellant is incarcerated, which caused complications for all parties in efficiently resolving their dispute. The chancellor concluded the appellant was bound by the settlement reached by his agent, who was acting with both actual and apparent authority. On appeal, the appellant contends the chancellor erred in finding his agent had actual and apparent authority to agree to a settlement on his behalf. We conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the chancellor erred in finding the appellant conferred actual authority upon his agent; accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s granting of the appellees’ motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(a)(iv); and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(3)(A). Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of persistence of conditions, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on all remaining grounds, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Appellant filed for disability benefits with the Appellee, Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (“CFPPF”). The CFPPF board denied Appellant’s application by letter dated October 27, 2020. On June 28, 2021, Appellant filed a request for rehearing with the board; the board denied rehearing by letter dated August 19, 2021. On September 10, 2021, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review in the trial court, and the CFPPF moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02. The trial court held that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) applied and further held that the board’s October 27, 2020 was not compliant with the UAPA requirements for final orders. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the October 27, 2020 letter was a final order so as to trigger the sixty-day time for filing for review in the trial court and dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Because the October 27, 2020 order was not UAPA-compliant, it did not constitute a final order so as to trigger the running of the sixty-day statute of limitations. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Reversed and remanded.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by wanton disregard, (2) persistence of conditions, (3) sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child, (4) incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility.  She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child.  Finding that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for the failure to manifest an ability and willingness ground, we vacate that termination ground.  We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.

A reverse mortgage borrower died.  The administrator of his estate petitioned the probate court to enjoin the lender from foreclosing and to set aside the loan and mortgage based on lack of capacity and fraud.  While the injunction against the lender was in place, the mortgaged property was sold.  On the administrator’s motion, the probate court ordered the administrator to escrow the payoff amount for the reverse mortgage pending the outcome of the litigation.  After a bench trial, the probate court dismissed the estate’s claims against the lender.  The administrator then asked the court for leave to release the escrowed funds in an amount equal to a payoff provided by the lender shortly before the sale.  The lender objected because the sale had occurred over four years before.  The lender requested payment of interest accruing since the sale and recovery of its attorney’s fees and costs.  The probate court sided with the administrator and denied the lender’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  We affirm.

This appeal challenges a grant of summary judgment to an insurance company on a breach of contract claim for failing to honor a life insurance policy.  The chancery court concluded the policy was void because of misrepresentations made by the decedent in obtaining coverage. The beneficiary, the spouse of the decedent, argues disputed facts exist both as to whether any misrepresentations were made and whether any of the purported misrepresentations increased the insurer’s risk of loss.  Accordingly, the beneficiary contends that the chancellor erred in awarding summary judgment.  We find no error and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

This appeal involves a counterclaim asserting defamation filed by the original defendant, a construction company, concerning statements that the original plaintiffs/homeowners made online and to third parties that were allegedly damaging to the construction company’s reputation. The homeowners sought dismissal of the defamation claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-101, et seq., known as the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the homeowners’ motion to dismiss and ultimately entered judgment against them. The homeowners have appealed solely the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. Determining that the trial court should have analyzed the motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of the TPPA rather than applying a traditional Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 analysis, we vacate the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s monetary award to the defendant construction company and remand that issue for further consideration once the motion to dismiss has been properly adjudicated.

This appeal involves a long-running dispute between two groups of property owners in the real estate community development of Renegade Mountain over composition of the board of directors and resultant control of the community organization. Plaintiffs, members of the Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. (“RMCC”), a homeowner’s association, brought this action in 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their status as directors and officers of RMCC. The Defendants contested the validity of the election at which Plaintiffs were allegedly elected. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration of whether the purported developer possessed developer’s rights. After two prior appeals and a subsequent retrial, the trial court held that Defendant Moy Toy, Inc., a property owner, does not have developer’s rights. The trial court further ruled that Plaintiffs were properly elected as members of RMCC’s board and enforced an easement of enjoyment to use certain property in the development that was designated as “common areas,” in favor of Plaintiffs and all other members of RMCC. Defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s findings that the parties stipulated that the old golf course property was not “common property,” and that Plaintiffs “have no interest” in it because the parties agreed and stipulated only that the old golf course property was “not an issue” in this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children.  Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the children on multiple bases.  Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Patient, by next of kin, sued hospital alleging negligence during his treatment. Trial court granted hospital’s motion to dismiss based on patient’s failure to file the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Patient appealed the dismissal. Because the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations commenced running when the patient was discharged, we affirm.

This is an appeal following a four-day divorce trial. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding the grounds for divorce, the role and testimony of an expert witness, the valuation and division of marital property, judgments for attorney fees and accountant fees, and a finding of criminal contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm as modified and remand for further proceedings.

This is a contract dispute. The trial court dismissed Appellant's action for failure to state a claim based on the statutes of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-725 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-109(a)(3). We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

In a previous appeal from a divorce, this Court vacated the trial court’s award of alimony to the wife.  We remanded for reconsideration of the amount of alimony after determining the husband’s ability to pay.  On remand, the parties stipulated that the husband’s gross income was less than the amount the trial court originally relied upon in setting alimony.  But the court made no change in its alimony award.  The husband appeals.  We affirm.

George Green Taylor, III (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Father’s ex-wife, Jenny Sue Taylor (“Mother”), responded to the petition contending, inter alia, that Father’s proposed plan was not in the children’s best interests. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that a slight change in the parties’ children’s summer schedule was warranted and ordered an upward deviation in Father’s child support for extraordinary educational expenses. Father appeals. The trial court’s ruling on Father’s child support is modified to reflect that Father’s base child support obligation is $731.00 per month, and we affirm as modified. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that an upward deviation in Father’s child support is warranted and in the children’s best interests, but we remand for entry of an order and child support worksheet reflecting the monthly amount owed for said upward deviation. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mother is entitled to her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

This appeal involves a contractual dispute related to the plaintiff’s employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.