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| Kenneth Nelson v. Metric Realty
M2000-03204-COA-R3-CV
Plaintiffs appeal the action of the trial court in converting a T.R.C.P. Rule 12.02 motion of those referred to as "affiliated defendants" into a T.R.C.P. Rule 56 motion and then granting it, and in sustaining a motion for summary judgment in favor of those described as "advisor defendants." The action against all Defendants asserted tortious interference with contract. Defendants appeal the trial court action in overruling their motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations. We affirm the action of the Chancellor in granting summary judgment to the "affiliated defendants" and in granting the motion for summary judgment of the "advisor defendants." We further hold that the statute of limitations had expired as to all defendants. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Originating Judge:Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr. |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 09/26/02 | |
| Matthew Poliak v. James Adcock
M2000-02325-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves a dispute between a father and his adult daughter's live-in boyfriend. The boyfriend filed a personal injury suit against his girlfriend's father in the Circuit Court for Davidson County after the father assaulted him with a piece of two-by-four. The father admitted that he had assaulted his daughter's boyfriend but asserted the defenses of self-defense, provocation, and defense of property. In response to the boyfriend's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court determined that the father had failed to produce evidence to substantiate any of these defenses. The father perfected this appeal after the trial court certified its order as final in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We have determined that the trial court was correct when it determined that the father's evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the assault could not, as a matter of law, support his affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Originating Judge:Barbara N. Haynes |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 09/24/02 | |
| Daniel Goodwin vs. John Dunlap
W2002-00014-COA-R3-CV
This is a legal malpractice action originally filed by individual plaintiff and a corporation. The individual plaintiff was acting pro se for himself and also for the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based upon his affidavit that he complied with the standard of care representing the corporate plaintiff, that he had no attorney/client relationship with the individual plaintiff. No countervailing affidavit concerning the standard of care was filed by the plaintiffs and the dismissal of the corporation's case was also premised on the rule that a corporation cannot act pro se by a nonlawyer agent. Individual plaintiff's affidavit does not specifically refute defendant's affidavit concerning no attorney-client relationship between the individual plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:D'Army Bailey |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Edward/James/Leigh Hutchinson vs. Nancy Neuman & James Day
W2001-02886-COA-R3-CV
This is a will construction case. The husband devised a life estate in land to his wife, and at her death, to his devisees. The husband devised other land in fee simple to his wife, and gave her the rest and residue of his estate. The husband died in 1954 and the wife died in 1998. The remaindermen under the husband's will argued that certain real property was included in the wife's life estate and, thus, at her death, devolved to them. The beneficiaries of the wife's will argued that the real property in question was not included in the life estate or mentioned in the husband's will, and thus the land went to the wife in fee simple by operation of the residue clause in the husband's will and should now devolve to them. The trial court found that the husband intended to include the land in question in the life estate to the wife. Therefore, the land devolved to the husband's devisees. The beneficiaries of the wife's estate appeal. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Dewey C. Whitenton |
Fayette County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Dagmar Moss vs. Alvin Moss
W2001-02809-COA-R3-CV
Wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences, and husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the same grounds. The chancery court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and alimony in solido in the amount of $1,000.00, to be paid toward her attorney fees, but denied wife's claim for alimony in futuro. Wife appeals. We affirm as modified and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:Dewey C. Whitenton |
Hardeman County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Harold W. Horne |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Gale Smith & Co. v. The Governors Club
M2001-01616-COA-R3-CV
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant real estate developer developed a golf club. The plaintiff insurance broker entered into an insurance binder with the manager of the golf club. The "master" binder covered five separate properties with which the manager was involved. The binder listed another of the manager's entities as the insured. The manager was later terminated by the defendant and a new management company was hired to manage the golf club. The insurance broker then issued a separate policy naming the defendant as the insured and sent invoices for the unpaid premiums to the new management company. The management company declined to pay the premiums. The insurance broker then filed suit against the defendant. The trial court entered a judgment for the insurance broker for all unpaid premiums due under the insurance binder, plus interest. We affirm, finding that manager had the apparent authority to enter into an insurance contract and that there was a contract for insurance between the parties.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Timothy L. Easter |
Williamson County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie
W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:Howard W. Horne |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Vernessa Ekelem vs. Ifeatu Ekelem
W2001-02986-COA-R3-CV
This is a divorce case. Both parties are physicians. Both have children from previous marriages, and they have three children together. The parties' three children were minors at the time of the divorce hearing. The father earned substantial income in 1996, which fell precipitously when he started his own medical practice in 1998. His medical practice, however, owns luxury vehicles, and the father owns a large home with significant acreage. The trial court found the father's earning capacity to be at the level of the mother's income, set child support based on that earning capacity, and established the father's parenting time with the parties' children. The father was ordered to assume the parties' tax debt, and to cease making derogatory remarks about the mother. On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in setting child support, in setting parenting time, in assigning the tax liability to him, and in enjoining him from making derogatory comments about the mother. We affirm as modified, and remand, awarding the mother attorney's fees for this appeal.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Ron E. Harmon |
Madison County | Court of Appeals | 09/20/02 | |
| Connie Pugh vs. Poplar Apartments
W2001-02050-COA-R3-CV
This case involves allegations of unlawful ouster. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendant landlord. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:Kay S. Robilio |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | |
| Christian Yeubanks vs. Methodist LeBonheur
W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV
This is a procedurally complex medical malpractice case. A child was injured in a car accident. She was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where she died. The child's mother filed suit, alleging liability on the part of three physicians, and vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the actions of the three physicians. She also asserted that the second physician's medical group was liable for that physician's actions. The complaint was later amended to include independent allegations of liability against the hospital. The mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the first physician; however, the claim of liability against the hospital for the actions of the first physician remained. Immediately before the trial, the mother asserted that the hospital was liable for the actions of a fourth physician. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding a claim against the fourth physician was not admissible. Near the close of her proof, the mother voluntarily dismissed her claims against the second physician and his medical group. At the conclusion of the mother's proof, the trial court granted motions for directed verdict for the claims based on the independent actions of the hospital and for the claims against the hospital based on the actions of the first physician. The trial court then denied a motion for directed verdict on the claim of vicarious liability against the hospital for the actions of the third physician. The trial court then heard a motion to strike testimony related to claims against the third physician. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the third physician and against the hospital based on the actions of the third physician. The trial court awarded costs against the mother and ordered that, prior to refiling her case, the mother would be required to pay the costs. The mother appeals, arguing that consideration of the motions for directed verdict was premature, that the trial court's decision is not final and appealable, that the trial court improperly excluded evidence on claims that the hospital was liable for the actions of the fourth physician, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for the independent claims of negligence against the hospital, and that the trial court erred in awarding costs against the mother and in requiring her to pay those costs prior to refiling her case. We reverse the portion of the trial court's decision requiring the mother to pay the awarded costs prior to refiling her case. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:D'Army Bailey |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | |
| Watson & Son Landscaping vs. Power Equip.
W2002-00136-COA-R3-CV
This is a sales/UCC case. A landscaper contracted to purchase a used piece of machinery, an excavator, from an equipment company. The excavator had a defective hydraulic system. Under the terms of the sales contract, the equipment company was to repair the defective hydraulic system. The equipment company attempted to do so and delivered the excavator to the landscaper. The hydraulic system, however, did not work properly and the equipment company was unable to repair the excavator to the landscaper's satisfaction. The landscaper then had the excavator repaired by a third party. The landscaper sued the equipment company for failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the contract, and for breach of contract. The trial court awarded actual damages for the difference in value between the excavator bargained for and the excavator actually received, as well as consequential damages. The equipment company appeals. We modify the actual damages to the cost to repair the excavator, and we reverse the award of consequential damages, finding that the proof of consequential damages was too speculative to support such an award.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris |
Madison County | Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | |
| Sheri English vs. Chris Pretti
W2001-01657-COA-R3-CV
The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, finding that the carrier's liability was offset by the workers' compensation award which the Plaintiff received for her injuries. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:John R. Mccarroll, Jr. |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | |
| Norman Hamby vs. State
W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV
This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff's fall into a ventilation pit on the University of Tennessee at Memphis (referred to herein as UT) campus when an aluminum grate covering the opening collapsed while Plaintiff was standing on it. The Commissioner of Claims of the Western Division held that the accident was not foreseeable and that UT did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the grating over the pit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
|
Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | ||
| In Matter of R.C.V. and O.V.
W2001-02102-COA-R3-JV
This is a termination of parental rights case on appeal for the second time. This Court in the first appeal reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the parties primarily because the trial court failed to provide counsel to the parties pursuant to Rule 39, Tenn. R. Juv. P. On remand, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of parental rights pursuant to the applicable statutes and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court also held that the appointment of a special judge in this instance was not unconstitutional nor was the parent denied due process in the termination proceeding. As appealed, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:George E. Blancett |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/19/02 | |
| James Edwards vs. Banco Lumber
E2002-01038-COA-R3-CV
James and Margaret Edwards ("Plaintiffs") sued Banco Lumber Company Inc., ("Banco") claiming Banco had trespassed on their property and removed timber. Banco filed a third-party complaint against Nathan Byrd, Betty Byrd, Fred Byrd, and Barbara Byrd (the "Byrds") for indemnification relying on a Timber Deed and Contract between Banco and the Byrds. Plaintiffs nonsuited their action against Banco and an Order was entered on May 16, 2000, dismissing only Plaintiffs' action. Apparently realizing this was not a final order, the Trial Court entered a "Final Order" three days later which disposed of not only Plaintiffs' claims but also Banco's third-party complaint against the Byrds. Plaintiffs re-filed their lawsuit against Banco one year and two days after the first order was entered, but less than a year after the "Final Order" was entered. Plaintiffs also sued the Byrds, for the first time, in this second complaint. The Trial Court held the entry date of the first Order should be used when determining whether the second complaint had been re-filed within the one-year time period under the "Saving Statute." The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Banco and the Byrds holding the statute of limitations had run. We vacate in part and affirm in part.
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Originating Judge:Jean A. Stanley |
Unicoi County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| Estate of James Sanderson
W2001-01938-COA-R3-CV
This case concerns the administration of an estate. The decedent's widow appeals the trial court's judgment claiming that it was error to deny her claim for an elective share of the estate. Appellant also alleges error in the finding that the administrator had not caused the estate to suffer monetary loss as a result of actions taken by him in his role as administrator. We affirm.
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Originating Judge:Roy B. Morgan, Jr. |
Hardeman County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| Town of Collierville vs. Norfolk Railway
W2001-02391-COA-R3-CV
This is a condemnation case on appeal for the second time. At three places at which roads were to cross over an existing railroad track, the town filed a petition to condemn property in which the railroad owned a right-of-way, in order to build railroad crossings. The trial court initially found that the railroad could not challenge the town's right to take the property and granted the town's motion for the writs of possession. The railroad appealed for the first time. In the first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and found that the railroad was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the railroad crossings would materially impair or interfere with the railroad's prior use of the rights-of-way. On remand, the trial court found that they would not, thus concluding that the town had the right to condemn the property. The trial court then considered the damages for the condemnation. The railroad sought incidental damages related to its depreciation costs, as well as costs for its increased exposure to liability because of the additional crossings. The trial court determined that the railroad, as a matter of law, could not recover depreciation costs, and also held that the railroad failed to produce proof to support an award of damages for increased liability exposure. The railroad appeals. We affirm, finding that the railroad can recover neither depreciation costs nor damages for increased exposure to liability from the additional crossings.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:John R. Mccarroll, Jr. |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| CH-01-1148-3
CH-01-1148-3
Originating Judge:D. J. Alissandratos |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| Larry Bullock vs. Charles Spell
W2002-00053-COA-R3-CV
This appeal arises from a contract dispute. The trial court, finding that Mr. Bullock had substantially complied with the contract provisions and that he did not repudiate the contract, entered judgment in his favor. The court awarded damages based on breach of contract, including attorney fees and additional damages. The parties raise multiple issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Originating Judge:D'Army Bailey |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| CH-01-0462-2;
CH-01-0462-2;
Originating Judge:Kenny W. Armstrong |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/18/02 | |
| Tracy Renee Morris v. Robert Andrew Morris
M2001-02275-COA-R3-CV
This case involves a petition to change custody. The parents were divorced in July 1998. By agreement, custody of the parties' two minor children was awarded to the mother. In February 2001, while the children were staying with the father at the mother's request, he filed a petition to modify custody to make him the permanent custodial parent. In his petition, the father alleged a material change in circumstances, in that the mother had difficulty keeping a job, maintaining a home, and taking care of the children. The trial court granted the father's petition. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not err in finding a material change in circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in changing custody to the father.
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Originating Judge:Judge Muriel Robinson |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 09/17/02 | |
| Mitch Grissim & Associates v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tennessee
M2001-02170-COA-R3-CV
This appeal involves a suit by an attorney against a former client for attorney fees allegedly due when the client terminated contingency fee contracts. The trial court denied plaintiff-attorney's motion for partial summary judgment and granted defendant-client's motion for summary judgment, holding that the attorney was not entitled to recover fees for services provided to the client prior to discharge. Plaintiff has appealed. We reverse and remand.
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:Judge Carol L. Mccoy |
Davidson County | Court of Appeals | 09/17/02 | |
| Patsy Mitchell vs. Dr. James Ensor
W2001-01683-COA-R3-CV
Patient brought medical malpractice action against physician and medical group, including allegations that physician failed to obtain the informed consent of female patient prior to administration of a testosterone injection. The circuit court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of physician and medical group. Patient appealed. We affirm and remand.
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:D'Army Bailey |
Shelby County | Court of Appeals | 09/17/02 | |
| Roger Clayton Morris v. Lola Jane Morris
W2002-00001-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Originating Judge:George R. Ellis |
Gibson County | Court of Appeals | 09/17/02 |